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History版 - 基辅?莫斯科?当然先莫斯科!
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话题: moscow话题: wehrmacht话题: days话题: weather话题: oct
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1 (共1页)
h*h
发帖数: 27852
1
Moscow or Kiev-- How Germany could have won WW2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Pt. #1
The Russian Front was the decisive theatre of WW2. If Germany won everywhere
else, but lost on the Russian Front, then they lost the war. But 80% of the
Wehrmacht was employed fighting the Soviets, so if they lost everywhere
else, but they won on the Russian Front, then depending on when these events
took place the Wehrmacht should have been able to shift forces to redeem
their failures elsewhere, & win the war. Even after the US came in, if
Germany had won on the Russian Front within 6 to 8 months afterward (roughly
the time between the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor & the Torch invasion), then
Germany should have been able to make Europe (& possibly N Africa)
impregnable to invasion.
So how could this have come about? I propose that with just 1 change in
strategy, Germany's victory on the Russian Front was virtually assured--
probably in '42.
On 18 Aug '41 the Army High Command (OKH) presented Hitler with its plan for
the autumn campaign, which designated Moscow as the key objective. On 22
Aug, however, Hitler rejected the OKH plan & decided instead to strip Army
Gp Center (AGC) of both of its 2 panzer armies, sending one to support AGN
vs Leningrad & the other to support AGS vs Kiev. These new dispositions were
in effect by 25 Aug. AGN arguably made no better progress with 2 panzer
armies than it could have with only 1, but AGS won one of the largest
encirclement battles of the war, took the city of Kiev, captured over 450,
000 Soviet troops, & positioned itself for a thrust all the way to the Don
River & the southern city of Rostov, which it captured before the end of the
year (& then had to abandon during the winter).
Taking Gen. Guderian's 2d Panzer Army (2PzA) as an example, between 25 Aug &
the beginning of Oct the 2PzA drove 300 miles to Kiev, 250 miles back to a
position S of Orel & Bryansk, & spent perhaps another 250 miles in tactical
manuvering-- 36 days of exhausting combat for the men, & at least 800 miles
of wear & tear on the vehicles, not counting losses, injuries, & battle
damage. The experience of Gen. Hoth's 3PzA with AGN was similar. These 2
Panzer Armies, worn down as they were, then spearheaded the attack on Moscow
(assisted by Gen. Hoeppner's 4PzA from AGN).
On 25 Aug Moscow was located 200 miles ENE of the German salient at Smolensk
. On 2 Oct Moscow was located 200 miles NNE of Orel & Bryansk, & the
Wehrmacht was in position to begin Operation Typhoon, the campaign against
Moscow. Within days the Wehrmacht captured the 3d, 13th, 19th, 20th, 24th, &
32d Soviet Armies, capturing over 670,000 prisoners & leaving only 90,000
men & 150 tanks available for the defense of Moscow. On 13 Oct, 12 days into
the campaign, 3PzA penetrated within 90 miles of Moscow, having traversed
110 miles from its start-point. The doom of the Soviet Union appeared to
have been sealed.
But on 18 Oct rain began turning the roads into a thick gumbo of mud in
which trucks couldn't move unless they were towed by tanks. Aircraft couldn'
t take off except from paved runways-- but there were almost no paved
runways. A plane could land in the mud only on its belly, or its landing
gear would snag & cause it to crash. On 30 Oct, when the mud grew so thick
even the tanks could hardly move, the offensive was halted on orders from
Hitler. This respite in front of Moscow enabled Stalin to build
fortifications & reinforce the units defending his capital with his Siberian
reserves.
On 15 Nov the ground froze sufficiently to allow the Wehrmacht to resume its
offensive. Three days later Stalin began his first tentative probing
attacks, for the first time using his new T-34 tanks in large formations, &
by the end of the month it was becoming obvious that Russia was in the
beginnings of one of its worst winters on record. Despite all these
disadvantages Wehrmacht troops still fought their way to within artillery
range of the Kremlin by 2 Dec. In blizzard conditions the Battle of Moscow
raged for 3 days before the incredibly severe weather & the withering away
of his troops & equipment caused Hitler to order disengagement.
On 6 Dec Stalin launched his first winter offensive. The Wehrmacht hadn't
prepared any fortifications for the winter, so the Germans suffered heavy
losses while being driven halfway back to their starting positions. Raging
with fury, Hitler purged his army that winter of over 100 senior generals.
Pt #2
During Operation Typhoon the German Wehrmacht enjoyed 16 days of good
weather (2-18 Oct), 12 days of worsening weather (18-30 Oct), followed by 15
more days of impossible weather (31 Oct-14 Nov). This was followed by about
12-14 days of marginal weather (14 thru 26 or 28 Nov, when the ground froze
), followed by 7 to 9 days of worsening weather which by 5 Dec became
impossible. Thus the campaign included a total of 16 days of good weather,
33 days of marginal weather, & 15 days of impossible weather, during which
the Wehrmacht, with exhausted panzer crews fresh from the Kiev & Leningrad
campaigns, fought its way to within artillery range of the Kremlin.
What would have been the situation had Hitler not interfered, & allowed the
OKH plan for the autumn campaign to stand?
Between 25 Aug & 17 Oct there were 53 days of good weather. This favored the
Germans, who needed good weather to make full use of their aircraft,
panzers, & artillery. This is greater than the 49 total days of combined
good & marginal weather encountered in the actual campaign, which argues
strongly, absent other factors, that under the OKH plan the Wehrmacht would
have reached Moscow as early as 16 September-- a mere 24 days into the
campaign.
For the first 12 days progress might have been similar in both scenarios,
since good weather was enjoyed in both. For the next 12 days, however,
Operation Typhoon encountered 4 days of good weather & 8 days of worsening
weather, while in our hypothetical scenario the weather would remain good.
Let us assume that in our hypothetical scenario the pace during this period
would be similar to that achieved in the first 12 days. Since 3PzA
penetrated within 90 miles of Moscow in the first 12 days, having covered
over half the distance from its start-point, it's reasonable to assume,
absent other factors, that the Wehrmacht could have reached Moscow within 24
days. This would leave 29 days of good weather to consolidate these gains &
continue the offensive.
However, these assumptions are "absent other factors." There are 2 other
factors that shorten the time-frame even further.
First is the effect of the Leningrad & Kiev campaigns on the panzers & their
crews. Fresher panzer formations, absent the losses in the Leningrad & Kiev
campaigns, might have arguably made faster progress.
And second, on 14 Sep 1941 Stalin's agent in Japan, Richard Sorge, reported
that the Japanese intended to attack the United States instead of Siberia.
Acting on this information Stalin brought 34 elité divisions of the
Siberian Army, over 1000 tanks, & over 1000 aircraft to defend Moscow. These
forces were in place by mid-November, & represented the main defense that
slowed & ultimately defeated the historical offensive. Had the attack been
launched on 25 Aug instead of 2 Oct, then the Germans would have entered
Moscow on or before 16 Sep-- only 2 days after Sorge's report & long before
the transfer of any Siberian divisions could take place.
There is also 1 other factor that would have increased the impact of the
capture of Moscow. During Operation Typhoon Stalin remained in Moscow
himself, he issued orders that no one was to evacuate, & he threatened to
shoot anyone who tried to leave. Had these orders been in effect during our
hypothetical scenario then the Germans might have captured not only many
senior Soviet government officials & their staffs & files, but also STAVKA,
the Soviet High Command, & its files, & even Stalin himself.
Even absent this particular consideration, the consequences of a German
conquest of Moscow would have been enormous. Moscow was much more than just
the administrative nerve-center of a totalitarian state. It was also the
road & rail hub of European Russia, & one of its largest commercial &
manufacturing complexes. Moscow had long been the seat of Great Russian
chauvinism. If Soviet resistance had continued at all past the fall of
Moscow, then it would have been a resistance infected with gnawing self-
doubts. The Wehrmacht might have been able to continue their campaign--
successfully-- while greatly reducing their forces.
During the autumn campaign AGN should have been stripped of its 4PzA,
because the focus of the campaign was Leningrad, which had been besieged.
AGN was therefore fighting an infantry campaign. 4PzA, as in the historical
Operation Typhoon, should have participated in the advance on Moscow. AGS
should have retained its 1PzA in order to maintain pressure on Soviet forces
defending Kiev.
After the fall of Moscow the Wehrmacht should have dug in to defend the
place, with 4PzA operating N of the city with an infantry Army, 3PzA
operating to the S with an infantry Army, & the city itself heavily defended
by infantry & artillery in fortifications. 2PzA should have been shifted S
of 3PzA to take up positions in preparation for a spring offensive vs Kiev.
The spring '42 campaign should have used 3 PzAs to encircle & reduce Kiev,
driving to the Don & Rostov. By autumn '42 the Wehrmacht should have held
everything from the Volga to the Don.
h*h
发帖数: 27852
2
莫斯科和基辅 - 德国如何能赢得二战
-------------------------------------------------- --------------------------
----
PT。 #1
俄罗斯前是决定性的二战战场。如果德国队无处不在
一样,但失去了对俄罗斯阵线,那么他们输掉了这场战争。但80%的
德军采用苏联作战,因此,如果他们失去了无处不在
其他人,但他们赢得了俄罗斯的接待,然后根据这些事件时
发生德军应该已经能够转向强制赎回
他们的失败在其他地方,赢得战争的胜利。即使在美国,如果
德国之后赢得了俄罗斯前6至8个月内(大约
之间的日语攻击珍珠港及火炬入侵的时间),然后
德国应该已经能够使欧洲(北非)
固若金汤来入侵。
这怎么可能从何而来?我建议,仅1变化
战略,德国对俄罗斯阵线的胜利几乎是保证 -
大概在'42。
在8月18日'41陆军最高统帅部(OKH)提交与希特勒的计划
秋天的运动,它被指定为莫斯科的主要目标。 22日
八月,然而,希特勒拒绝OKH计划和决定,而不是地带军
GP中心(AGC),其2装甲军队,发送一条支持AGN
VS列宁格勒和其他支持AGS VS基辅。这些新的处置
在由25 8月AGN起可以说是没有更大的进展与2装甲
可能只有1比它的军队,但AGS赢得了最多的国家之一
战争的合围战役,基辅市,抓获超过450名,
000苏联军队,与定位推力一路唐
河和南部城市罗斯托夫,它的年底前抓获
年(然后不得不放弃在冬季)。
为例古德里安将军的2D装甲军(2PzA),8月25日&
华侨城2PzA开始驱车300英里,250英里回基辅,
奥廖尔和布良斯克的位置S的花费在战术上,可能还有250英里
manuvering - 男子用尽作战36天,及至少800英里
磨损和撕裂的车辆,不计损失,伤害,和战斗
损坏。霍斯将军的活动星系核3PzA的经验是相似的。这2个
装甲军,拖垮他们,然后率先对莫斯科的攻击
(将军Hoeppner的活动星系核4PzA协助)。
8月25日,莫斯科位于200英里的德国突出烯在斯摩棱斯克
。 10月2日是位于莫斯科200公里的奥廖尔和布良斯克州北北东,&
德军在开始运作台风,对运动
莫斯科。几天之内,德军攻占3D,13,19,20,24日及
32D苏联军队,夺取超过67万囚犯和留只有90000
男子和150辆坦克可用于保卫莫斯科。在13年10月,12天进
运动,3PzA侵入莫斯科90英里的范围内,有走过
从它的启动点110公里。苏联的厄运似乎
已被查封。
但10月18日雨开始变成厚厚的泥浆秋葵的道路
其中卡车动弹不得,除非他们在坦克拖走。飞机couldn“
吨除了铺的跑道起飞 - 但几乎没有人铺平了道路
跑道。一架飞机在泥泞的土地,只有在它的肚子,或降落
齿轮嵌入及导致其崩溃。在10月30日,当泥浆增长这么厚
甚至坦克难以移动,进攻停止对从订单
希特勒。这在莫斯科面前喘息的机会,使斯大林建设
防御工事和加强单位保卫他的西伯利亚资金
储备。
15 11月在地面冻结足以让德军恢复其
进攻。三天后,斯大林开始了他的第一次试探性探测
攻击,为他的新的T - 34坦克大编队首次使用,&
月底这是越来越明显,俄罗斯在
开始的最差纪录的冬天之一。尽管所有这些
缺点德军部队仍在争取他们的方式在炮兵
2 12月的克里姆林宫的范围在暴风雪条件的莫斯科战役
令人难以置信的恶劣天气持续了3天前的消亡
他的部队和装备造成希特勒为了脱离接触。
12月6日,斯大林开始了他的第一个冬季攻势。德军没有
为冬季准备任何防御工事,使德国遭受了惨重
损失,同时带动中途回它们的起始位置。熊熊
希特勒与愤怒,清除他的军队,超过100位高级将领的冬天。
PT#2
德国国防军操作台风期间享有16天的好
天气(2-18月),恶化的天气(18-30日)12天,其次是15
更不可能天气天(10月31日11月14日)。其次约
12-14天(14至26或11月28日,地面冻结时边际天气
),其次是7至9天的恶化天气由12月5日成​​为
不可能的。因此,活动包括总共16天的好天气,
边际天气,33天及15天不可能的天气,在此期间,
与疲惫的坦克乘员从基辅和列宁格勒新鲜的德军,
战役,战斗的方式,克里姆林宫炮兵范围内。
本来什么情况希特勒不干预,与允许
OKH秋季战役的计划将焉附?
8月25日及17年10月之间有53天的好天气。这有利于
德国,需要良好的天气,充分利用他们的飞机,
装甲部队,炮兵。这是更大的总和超过了49天
在实际的运动,它认为遇到天气良好及边际
强烈,如果没有其他因素,根据OKH计划,德军
早在9月16日已达到莫斯科 - 只有24天到
运动。
对于第12天的进展,可能已在这两种情况下类似,
因为天气良好,均享有。然而,在接下来的12天,
台风行动遇到了4天的好天气8天的恶化
天气,而在我们假设的情况的天气将保持良好。
让我们假设在我们的假想情景的步伐,在此期间
将在第12天。由于3PzA
在第12天莫斯科90英里范围内的渗透,拥有覆盖
一半以上的距离从它的启动点,这是合理的假设,
如果没有其他因素,德军可以达到24莫斯科
天。这将使29天的好天气,以巩固这些成果
继续进攻。
然而,这些假设是“如果没有其他因素。”还有其他2
因素,进一步缩短时限。
首先是列宁格勒和基辅竞选活动的装甲部队和他们的影响
船员。清新装甲编队,缺席的损失在列宁格勒和基辅
运动,有可能可以说是取得更快的进步。
第二,在1941年9月14日斯大林在日本的代理人,理查德佐尔格的报告
,日本攻击美国,而不是西伯利亚。
在此信息后,斯大林带来了34精英部门
西伯利亚军,1000多辆坦克,与1000多架飞机保卫莫斯科。这些
部队在11月中旬,与代表主要的防御
放缓及最终战胜了历史的进攻。如果真的被攻击
月25日推出的八月,而不是10月2日,那么德国将进入
莫斯科9月16日或之前 - 佐尔格的报告后,仅2天,长前
任何西伯利亚部门的转移可能发生。
还有1个其他因素有可能增加的影响
攻占莫斯科。操作过程中,台风斯大林留在莫斯科
自己,他发出的命令,没有人被疏散,与他威胁
拍摄任何人试图离开。如果这些订单已经生效,在我们的
假设的情况,那么德国有可能捕获不仅许多
苏联政府高级官员和他们的工作人员和文件,而且还STAVKA
苏联最高统帅部,和它的文件,及斯大林本人。
即使没有这个特殊的考虑,一个德国的后果
征服莫斯科将是巨大的。莫斯科是远不止
一个极权国家的行政神经中心。这也是
俄罗斯欧洲部分的道路和铁路枢纽,其最大的商业及
制造复合物。莫斯科已久的大俄罗斯的座位
沙文主义。如果苏联阻力继续在所有过去的秋季
莫斯科,那么它会一直啃与感染性自我
的疑问。德军可能已能够继续他们的活动 -
成功 - 而大大降低了他们的力量。
在秋季竞选活动星系核中,应该有其4PzA被剥夺,
因为运动的重点是,已被围困的列宁格勒。
活动星系核,因此战斗的步兵运动。 4PzA,因为在历史
操作台风,应该有参加在莫斯科的推进。 AGS
应保留其1PzA,以保持对苏联军队的压力
保卫基辅。
后,莫斯科的秋天,德军应该有挖保卫
的地方,与4PzA经营的N与一个步兵军,3PzA市
经营的S与一个步兵军,城市本身的严重辩护
由步兵和炮兵工事。 2PzA应该已经转向小号
的3PzA采取阵地,准备春季攻势VS基辅。
春天'42运动应该使用3 PzAs包围和减少基辅,
顿河罗斯托夫行驶到。 '42秋季的德军应举行
一切从伏尔加河,顿河。
1 (共1页)
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话题: moscow话题: wehrmacht话题: days话题: weather话题: oct