h*h
发帖数: 27852 | 1 【 以下文字转载自 History 讨论区 】
发信人: hsh (三胡), 信区: History
标 题: 按照德国军方计划，先打莫斯科的话，德国可以击败苏联。
发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Tue Oct 4 10:49:07 2011, 美东)
事实上，10月2日开始莫斯科战役；10月18日下雨泥泞，德军无法前进；11月15日地面
足够冷冻，德军又发动进攻，这时苏军34个精锐的西伯利亚师已经到达莫斯科；12月5
日，由于天气太冷（1941年的冬天即使以苏联的标准也是个特别冷的冬天）和德军过冬
装备不足，希特勒宣布飓风行动结束。
战术检讨：
1。中央集群的一个装甲军（古德里安）8月25日被抽去参加基埔会战，战后回到中央集
群，是莫斯科战役的主力突击力量。基埔战役和往返奔驰给古德里安军带来了人员和设
备伤损。如果不打基埔会战的话，人员和设备状况会好得多。
2。北方集群可以抽调一个装甲军加入莫斯科战役。
3。南方集群压住基埔苏军，北方集群压住列宁格勒苏军，是没有问题的。41年11月34个西伯利亚师回防莫斯科以前苏军战力惨不忍睹。
4。1941年11月以前，没人知道美国会参战，苏军士气很低。
5。如果按军方计划，8月25日发起进攻，到10月17日，苏军远东精锐还没有回到莫斯科
，德军有足够时间和力量拿下莫斯科，然后在莫斯科过冬。42年可以横扫苏联的欧洲部
分，基埔不在话下，列宁格勒也有可能。德国会得到足够的资源，坚守欧洲甚至进军北
非胜算很大。苏联即使没有政局变化，也要变成一个亚洲国家了。 | s*****r
发帖数: 43070 | 2 对乌克兰过于贪婪，应该集中精力干掉莫斯科，把苏联赶到中亚去，很难再和德军抗衡
。 | h*h
发帖数: 27852 | 3 希特勒从一开始就不想中心开花先拿下莫斯科。莫斯科是苏联欧洲部分的交通枢纽和第
二大工业区，政治（和士气）意义巨大，而且是德军理想的过冬地。
【在 s*****r 的大作中提到】
: 对乌克兰过于贪婪，应该集中精力干掉莫斯科，把苏联赶到中亚去，很难再和德军抗衡
: 。
| x****u
发帖数: 12955 | 4 If they attack Moscow directly, it's also possible that they couldn't finish
the job by November, then they would be facing counter attack directly by
the Siberian divisions, plus flanking attack from Kiev. | h*h
发帖数: 27852 | 5 有可能，不过德军机会很大，我觉着有至少80%把握。越早打莫斯科，苏军战斗力越差。时间在苏联一边。
Moscow or Kiev-- How Germany could have won WW2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Pt. #1
The Russian Front was the decisive theatre of WW2. If Germany won everywhere
else, but lost on the Russian Front, then they lost the war. But 80% of the
Wehrmacht was employed fighting the Soviets, so if they lost everywhere
else, but they won on the Russian Front, then depending on when these events
took place the Wehrmacht should have been able to shift forces to redeem
their failures elsewhere, & win the war. Even after the US came in, if
Germany had won on the Russian Front within 6 to 8 months afterward (roughly
the time between the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor & the Torch invasion), then
Germany should have been able to make Europe (& possibly N Africa)
impregnable to invasion.
So how could this have come about? I propose that with just 1 change in
strategy, Germany's victory on the Russian Front was virtually assured--
probably in '42.
On 18 Aug '41 the Army High Command (OKH) presented Hitler with its plan for
the autumn campaign, which designated Moscow as the key objective. On 22
Aug, however, Hitler rejected the OKH plan & decided instead to strip Army
Gp Center (AGC) of both of its 2 panzer armies, sending one to support AGN
vs Leningrad & the other to support AGS vs Kiev. These new dispositions were
in effect by 25 Aug. AGN arguably made no better progress with 2 panzer
armies than it could have with only 1, but AGS won one of the largest
encirclement battles of the war, took the city of Kiev, captured over 450,
000 Soviet troops, & positioned itself for a thrust all the way to the Don
River & the southern city of Rostov, which it captured before the end of the
year (& then had to abandon during the winter).
Taking Gen. Guderian's 2d Panzer Army (2PzA) as an example, between 25 Aug &
the beginning of Oct the 2PzA drove 300 miles to Kiev, 250 miles back to a
position S of Orel & Bryansk, & spent perhaps another 250 miles in tactical
manuvering-- 36 days of exhausting combat for the men, & at least 800 miles
of wear & tear on the vehicles, not counting losses, injuries, & battle
damage. The experience of Gen. Hoth's 3PzA with AGN was similar. These 2
Panzer Armies, worn down as they were, then spearheaded the attack on Moscow
(assisted by Gen. Hoeppner's 4PzA from AGN).
On 25 Aug Moscow was located 200 miles ENE of the German salient at Smolensk
. On 2 Oct Moscow was located 200 miles NNE of Orel & Bryansk, & the
Wehrmacht was in position to begin Operation Typhoon, the campaign against
Moscow. Within days the Wehrmacht captured the 3d, 13th, 19th, 20th, 24th, &
32d Soviet Armies, capturing over 670,000 prisoners & leaving only 90,000
men & 150 tanks available for the defense of Moscow. On 13 Oct, 12 days into
the campaign, 3PzA penetrated within 90 miles of Moscow, having traversed
110 miles from its start-point. The doom of the Soviet Union appeared to
have been sealed.
But on 18 Oct rain began turning the roads into a thick gumbo of mud in
which trucks couldn't move unless they were towed by tanks. Aircraft couldn'
t take off except from paved runways-- but there were almost no paved
runways. A plane could land in the mud only on its belly, or its landing
gear would snag & cause it to crash. On 30 Oct, when the mud grew so thick
even the tanks could hardly move, the offensive was halted on orders from
Hitler. This respite in front of Moscow enabled Stalin to build
fortifications & reinforce the units defending his capital with his Siberian
reserves.
On 15 Nov the ground froze sufficiently to allow the Wehrmacht to resume its
offensive. Three days later Stalin began his first tentative probing
attacks, for the first time using his new T-34 tanks in large formations, &
by the end of the month it was becoming obvious that Russia was in the
beginnings of one of its worst winters on record. Despite all these
disadvantages Wehrmacht troops still fought their way to within artillery
range of the Kremlin by 2 Dec. In blizzard conditions the Battle of Moscow
raged for 3 days before the incredibly severe weather & the withering away
of his troops & equipment caused Hitler to order disengagement.
On 6 Dec Stalin launched his first winter offensive. The Wehrmacht hadn't
prepared any fortifications for the winter, so the Germans suffered heavy
losses while being driven halfway back to their starting positions. Raging
with fury, Hitler purged his army that winter of over 100 senior generals.
Pt #2
During Operation Typhoon the German Wehrmacht enjoyed 16 days of good
weather (2-18 Oct), 12 days of worsening weather (18-30 Oct), followed by 15
more days of impossible weather (31 Oct-14 Nov). This was followed by about
12-14 days of marginal weather (14 thru 26 or 28 Nov, when the ground froze
), followed by 7 to 9 days of worsening weather which by 5 Dec became
impossible. Thus the campaign included a total of 16 days of good weather,
33 days of marginal weather, & 15 days of impossible weather, during which
the Wehrmacht, with exhausted panzer crews fresh from the Kiev & Leningrad
campaigns, fought its way to within artillery range of the Kremlin.
What would have been the situation had Hitler not interfered, & allowed the
OKH plan for the autumn campaign to stand?
Between 25 Aug & 17 Oct there were 53 days of good weather. This favored the
Germans, who needed good weather to make full use of their aircraft,
panzers, & artillery. This is greater than the 49 total days of combined
good & marginal weather encountered in the actual campaign, which argues
strongly, absent other factors, that under the OKH plan the Wehrmacht would
have reached Moscow as early as 16 September-- a mere 24 days into the
campaign.
For the first 12 days progress might have been similar in both scenarios,
since good weather was enjoyed in both. For the next 12 days, however,
Operation Typhoon encountered 4 days of good weather & 8 days of worsening
weather, while in our hypothetical scenario the weather would remain good.
Let us assume that in our hypothetical scenario the pace during this period
would be similar to that achieved in the first 12 days. Since 3PzA
penetrated within 90 miles of Moscow in the first 12 days, having covered
over half the distance from its start-point, it's reasonable to assume,
absent other factors, that the Wehrmacht could have reached Moscow within 24
days. This would leave 29 days of good weather to consolidate these gains &
continue the offensive.
However, these assumptions are "absent other factors." There are 2 other
factors that shorten the time-frame even further.
First is the effect of the Leningrad & Kiev campaigns on the panzers & their
crews. Fresher panzer formations, absent the losses in the Leningrad & Kiev
campaigns, might have arguably made faster progress.
And second, on 14 Sep 1941 Stalin's agent in Japan, Richard Sorge, reported
that the Japanese intended to attack the United States instead of Siberia.
Acting on this information Stalin brought 34 elité divisions of the
Siberian Army, over 1000 tanks, & over 1000 aircraft to defend Moscow. These
forces were in place by mid-November, & represented the main defense that
slowed & ultimately defeated the historical offensive. Had the attack been
launched on 25 Aug instead of 2 Oct, then the Germans would have entered
Moscow on or before 16 Sep-- only 2 days after Sorge's report & long before
the transfer of any Siberian divisions could take place.
There is also 1 other factor that would have increased the impact of the
capture of Moscow. During Operation Typhoon Stalin remained in Moscow
himself, he issued orders that no one was to evacuate, & he threatened to
shoot anyone who tried to leave. Had these orders been in effect during our
hypothetical scenario then the Germans might have captured not only many
senior Soviet government officials & their staffs & files, but also STAVKA,
the Soviet High Command, & its files, & even Stalin himself.
Even absent this particular consideration, the consequences of a German
conquest of Moscow would have been enormous. Moscow was much more than just
the administrative nerve-center of a totalitarian state. It was also the
road & rail hub of European Russia, & one of its largest commercial &
manufacturing complexes. Moscow had long been the seat of Great Russian
chauvinism. If Soviet resistance had continued at all past the fall of
Moscow, then it would have been a resistance infected with gnawing self-
doubts. The Wehrmacht might have been able to continue their campaign--
successfully-- while greatly reducing their forces.
During the autumn campaign AGN should have been stripped of its 4PzA,
because the focus of the campaign was Leningrad, which had been besieged.
AGN was therefore fighting an infantry campaign. 4PzA, as in the historical
Operation Typhoon, should have participated in the advance on Moscow. AGS
should have retained its 1PzA in order to maintain pressure on Soviet forces
defending Kiev.
After the fall of Moscow the Wehrmacht should have dug in to defend the
place, with 4PzA operating N of the city with an infantry Army, 3PzA
operating to the S with an infantry Army, & the city itself heavily defended
by infantry & artillery in fortifications. 2PzA should have been shifted S
of 3PzA to take up positions in preparation for a spring offensive vs Kiev.
The spring '42 campaign should have used 3 PzAs to encircle & reduce Kiev,
driving to the Don & Rostov. By autumn '42 the Wehrmacht should have held
everything from the Volga to the Don.
finish
【在 x****u 的大作中提到】
: If they attack Moscow directly, it's also possible that they couldn't finish
: the job by November, then they would be facing counter attack directly by
: the Siberian divisions, plus flanking attack from Kiev.
| x****u
发帖数: 12955 | 6
差。时间在苏联一边。
It's a gamble. Odds to win were in favor of attacking Moscow directly.
However, the consequence of going for the win and failing it would have been
disastrous. So the risk/reward calculation was still roughly 50/50 for
either option.
A safe bet with hindsight would have been to attack Kiev as historically
happened, forgo Operation Typhoon, solidify the central front, and exploit
the advantage in Ukraine. Then make a push for Moscow in spring of 1942.
【在 h*h 的大作中提到】
: 有可能，不过德军机会很大，我觉着有至少80%把握。越早打莫斯科，苏军战斗力越差。时间在苏联一边。
: Moscow or Kiev-- How Germany could have won WW2
: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
: ----
: Pt. #1
: The Russian Front was the decisive theatre of WW2. If Germany won everywhere
: else, but lost on the Russian Front, then they lost the war. But 80% of the
: Wehrmacht was employed fighting the Soviets, so if they lost everywhere
: else, but they won on the Russian Front, then depending on when these events
: took place the Wehrmacht should have been able to shift forces to redeem
| h*h
发帖数: 27852 | 7 其实当时斯大林已经开始迁都了，德国直插莫斯科基本可以肯定拿下，然后苏联欧洲部
分就完了。
不用马后炮，10月2日开始莫斯科战役也是明显的脑残，气候不饶人啊。
德军没有利用苏联百姓对政府的不满大打政治仗，是另外一个很大的败笔。
been
【在 x****u 的大作中提到】
:
: 差。时间在苏联一边。
: It's a gamble. Odds to win were in favor of attacking Moscow directly.
: However, the consequence of going for the win and failing it would have been
: disastrous. So the risk/reward calculation was still roughly 50/50 for
: either option.
: A safe bet with hindsight would have been to attack Kiev as historically
: happened, forgo Operation Typhoon, solidify the central front, and exploit
: the advantage in Ukraine. Then make a push for Moscow in spring of 1942.
| r**********g
发帖数: 22734 | 8 莫斯科被打下不知多少次了
连大波波都打下过莫斯科
毛子根本不care | h*h
发帖数: 27852 | 9 181X年和1941年的莫斯科，战略地位完全不同。拿下苏联的交通枢纽兼第二大工业区，
苏联欧洲部分就完了
拿破枪在莫斯科无法过冬，德军在莫斯科过冬太理想了
【在 r**********g 的大作中提到】
: 莫斯科被打下不知多少次了
: 连大波波都打下过莫斯科
: 毛子根本不care
| i*****g
发帖数: 11893 | 10 不用那么麻烦，民轮和邓轮 用嘴就可以吹翻了德国5千万大军和苏联5亿大军 | x****u
发帖数: 12955 | 11
The easy victory in Ukraine probably clouded their thinking.
Playing politics would have required Hitler to allow Slavic people to be
treated as normal humans, which he was incapable of doing.
【在 h*h 的大作中提到】
: 其实当时斯大林已经开始迁都了，德国直插莫斯科基本可以肯定拿下，然后苏联欧洲部
: 分就完了。
: 不用马后炮，10月2日开始莫斯科战役也是明显的脑残，气候不饶人啊。
: 德军没有利用苏联百姓对政府的不满大打政治仗，是另外一个很大的败笔。
:
: been
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