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从解放军的外语看中国的战略
万维读者网 2011-11-23 22:05:45
万维读者网记者江夏编译报道：美国军方《武装部队杂志》(Armed Forces Journal)
2011年11月号刊登韓德森（Scott J. Henderson）的文章说，美国和西方对中国的观察
，通常基于政府政策的演变、外交关系、实力重组等因素，但还有另一个有用的参照物
，那就是军队的外语培训。
早在1949年，中国人民解放军就在洛阳建立了外语学院，作为培养国防语言人才的摇篮
。现在洛阳“解放军外语大学”已经培养了5万多名毕业生，担负起军事翻译、军事外
交、国际反恐、联合国维和行动等各项工作。从该校的课程设置可知，这是一所培训(
能破解密碼的)多种语言人才的军事情报学府。
解放军外语大学出版自己的《外语杂志》。1978年至1987年，以英文、俄文、日文、韩
文为主要出版语种。相对少的外国语种，显示当时中国主要关注的是周边问题，尚不具
备处理地区问题的能力。1988年到1997年，《外语杂志》显示中国更加关注东部战略方
向。在北方，俄语仍然是事关战略利益的语种，但蒙古语在1990年代中期开始受到注意
。在西部战略方向，印地语成为北京重视的主要语言。此外，哈萨克语、土耳其语、阿
拉伯语也受到青睐。在南部战略方向，中国特别看重越南语、缅甸语、泰语。
到了现在，2011年的《外语杂志》显示，解放军外语大学的语种已经达到26个，包括
英语、法语、德语、西班牙语、俄语、乌克兰语、
日语、韩语、
越南语、老挝语、柬埔寨语、泰语、缅甸语、马来语、印尼语、
蒙古语、哈萨克语、吉尔吉斯语、乌兹别克语、
印地语、乌尔都语（巴基斯坦）、尼泊尔语、普什图语（阿富汗）、
阿拉伯语、波斯语（伊朗）、土耳其语等。
大量新增的语种，反映出中国最新的三个潜在国防战略方向——两条指向里海以北的通
道，一条从印尼指向土耳其的欧亚大陆南方海上通道。这三条战略通道，显然是古代陆
上、海上丝绸之路的现代版。
北方战略通道，自中国、蒙古、哈萨克，沿里海北岸经俄国抵达乌克兰。
中部战略通道，自中国、吉尔吉斯，乌兹别克、也沿里海北岸经俄国抵达乌克兰。
南部战略通道，从印尼到越南，直至尼泊尔；然后从巴基斯坦、阿富汗，穿越里海南部
，经伊朗抵达土耳其。
其沿途经过地区使用印尼语、缅甸语、越南语、柬埔寨语、老挝语、泰语、马来语、尼
泊尔语、印地语、乌尔都语、阿拉伯语、普什图语、波斯语等多种语言。
这几条通道与中国策划的横穿亚洲大陆的高铁计划吻合。计划中的高铁2025年通到欧洲
，第一条线路从新加坡通向云南省；第二条线路走中部战略通道，从新疆经哈萨克、乌
兹别克、土库曼、土耳其通到德国。预料北线最终会把黑龙江和北欧联系起来。
在中国锐意拓展的能源及矿产资源供应地——非洲，解放军借助担负联合国维和任务的
机会大举部署。在非洲的维和地区，中国军队只需要五种主要语言：阿拉伯语、英语、
法语、西班牙语、葡萄牙语。而解放军外语大学培训的军人，学习除葡萄牙语外的其他
四种语言。有趣的是，尽管北京在葡语国家安哥拉投资达85亿美元，两国关系却从去年
开始冷淡下来。
从解放军外语大学的语种选择，可以佐证中国的主要战略利益，是在面向中东、非洲的
向西战略方向。为了避开不安全的南线海上战略通道，通过建设陆上高铁，确保中国经
济发展所需的能源和矿产资源，经里海南北两路的欧亚大陆高铁线路，源源不断地运送
到中国大陆。
(www.creaders.net 记者稿件 转载请注明出处)
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/11/6187393/
ARMED FORCES JOURNAL November 2011
Polyglot Dragon
What the PLA’s language school says about China’s strategic direction
BY SCOTT J. HENDERSON
China watchers searching for clues to Beijing’s strategic direction
generally look for changes in government policy, diplomatic liaisons, or
force realignment. Here is another useful indicator: language training.
When global ambitions push a nation beyond the boundaries of its homeland
and away from its native language, a state designs and invests in foreign
language training. If China peers out across the operational environment and
determines, for example, that Central Asia or African energy reserves are
top priorities, we would expect to see resources allocated for training
personnel in the applicable languages and dialects.
As an external instrument of the state, the military is often at the
forefront in dealing with foreign entities, and language capability is
crucial. Since 1949, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has run a joint-
service university on the bank of the Yellow River in Luoyang City, Henan
province. Created to serve as the “cradle of defense language talent,” the
PLA University of Foreign Languages (PLAUFL) has graduated more than 50,000
students who have taken jobs in military translation, military diplomacy,
anti-terrorism and peacekeeping operations. A look at the course curriculum
suggests further that the university is a military intelligence facility for
training cryptologic linguists.
A study of the PLAUFL course curriculum and its major publication suggests a
close correlation between the languages taught and China’s directional
assessment. Expanding national strategic reach is a logical reason for
developing a polyglot force capability to protect economic and security
interests abroad. The language capability prerequisite can be plotted and
used to expose the potential direction of China’s strategic interest.
26 LANGUAGES
The PLAUFL publishes its own periodical, the Journal of Foreign Languages.
The earliest editions, published from 1978 to 1987, establish English,
Japanese, Korean and Russian as core languages. The relatively low number of
languages indicates a country concerned with peripheral security, not
regional capacity.
Issues from 1988 to 1997 show a nation broadening its strategic direction
beyond eastern security concerns. In the north, Russian remains the mainstay
of strategic interest, but the Mongolian language sees increased focus in
the mid-1990s. In the west, India (Hindi) is a major subject of interest for
Beijing, which is also looking through Central Asia (Kazakh) to Turkey (
Turkish) and the Middle East (Arabic). In the southern region, China pays
particular attention to Burmese, Thai and Vietnamese.
More recently, the institute’s 2011 curriculum reveals an interest in
Iranian and Middle East politics amid programs of study in 26 languages.
These may be organized by geographic proximity to China: border countries (
Bahasa (Indonesian), Burmese, Cambodian, Hindi, Japanese, Kazakh, Kyrgyz,
Korean, Laotian, Malay, Mongolian, Nepali, Pashto (Afghanistan), Russian,
Thai, Urdu (Pakistan), Uzbek and Vietnamese), Eastern European (Ukrainian),
Western European (English, French, German and Spanish), and Middle Eastern (
Arabic, Persian and Turkish).
The change in languages taught at the PLAUFL reveals a nation following Mao
’s tenets on guerrilla warfare: First, secure your bases, then expand
operations. The core languages (English, Japanese, Korean and Russian) show
a nation fully engaged in defensive orientation, biding its time during the
establishment and consolidation phases. The introduction of languages
outside of China’s core defensive interests mark a shift to an expansive
phase.
STRATEGIC ROUTES
More specifically, these new languages may outline at least three potential
offensive strategic directions — two that pass north of the Caspian Sea and
a southern route that extends from Indonesia all the way into Turkey.
Viewed as a comprehensive strategy, these three routes appear to be a
modified version of the ancient Silk Road.
The northern strategic route runs from China through Mongolia, Kazakhstan,
Russia and Ukraine, passing north of the Caspian Sea.
The middle strategic route runs from China through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
Russia and Ukraine, also passing north of the Caspian Sea.
The southern strategic route runs from Indonesia into Vietnam, and up
through Nepal. It then crosses from Pakistan and Afghanistan under the
Caspian Sea from Iran into Turkey. Its language chain includes Arabic,
Bahasa (Indonesian), Burmese, Cambodian, Hindi, Laotian, Malay, Nepali,
Pashto, Persian, Thai, Turkish, Urdu and Vietnamese.
These routes correspond with China’s reported plans for high-speed rail
lines that cross the Asian continent and ultimately link up with the
European rail system by 2025, as described by Jiaotong University’s Wang
Mengshu in the Global Times.
The first line would run from Yunnan province to Singapore (a start along
the southern strategic route).
The second line, corresponding with the middle strategic route, would begin
in Xinjiang and travel through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan into
Germany.
The final, northern line would connect Heilongjiang and southern Europe.
Besides the obvious economic advantages in opening these corridors, high-
speed rail may have security implications as well. In the event of conflict
and blocked sea lanes, the overland route could provide a valve for the
continued inbound energy resources and outbound exports. While it would not
be impossible to interrupt the overland supply lines, the multinational
nature of the railroad could present political dilemmas. The rail lines
would also be a valuable supplement for China’s insufficient military
airlift capability in moving troops and equipment to various parts of the
country. High-speed rail could move troops rapidly across the country,
followed by conventional trains carrying heavier equipment; however, they
would still be vulnerable to precision weapons.
Languages unassociated with these strategic routes — Arabic, English,
French, Japanese, Korean, Russia and Spanish — still serve multiple
purposes, including resource-gathering tools languages essential to
operations in Africa and South America.
Chinese military and police units have in recent years begun to make
substantial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions. With
Beijing in a worldwide search to secure resources, it is difficult to ignore
the disproportionately large contingent of troops located in the resource-
rich region of Sub-Saharan Africa.
According to U.N. statistics, China on Dec. 31 had 2,039 troops deployed on
10 U.N. missions worldwide. More than 80 percent, however, were dispatched
to oil and mineral-producing regions of Africa. Moreover, U.N. missions
placed Chinese forces in close proximity to other potentially lucrative
nations not involved in peacekeeping operations, such as Angola, Cameroon,
Ghana and Nigeria. Whether intentional or not, China is using U.N. missions
as a deployment vehicle to move military troops into strategically valuable
areas. Moreover, the deployments correspond with soaring Chinese direct
investment in Africa, with a welter of new deals for cobalt, copper, iron
ore, manganese and other mineral resources.
Has China adopted a strategy of pushing military personnel into areas
adjacent to its burgeoning national interests? What can the PLA’s language-
training curriculum tell us about this?
Chinese peacekeepers need only five primary languages to communicate with a
majority of the resource-producing African states: Arabic, English, French,
Spanish and Portuguese. The PLAUFL trains service members in all but
Portuguese. It is interesting to note that last year, Chinese relations with
Portuguese-speaking Angola cooled considerably despite Chinese investment
of $8.5 billion.
SUMMARY
China’s thinking on national security has evolved in three-stages:
defensive military strength, consolidation through comprehensive national
power, and expansion by means of national strategic capability.
During the Cold War, while militarily weak, the Chinese developed a
defensive strategy to prevent external invasion through a combination of
military and cultural forces.
In stage two, following Deng Xiaoping’s reform, increased confidence led to
the concept of comprehensive national power and consolidation of gains.
Military requirements were lowered and national development moved into the
spotlight.
The current stage, national strategic capability, is founded on safeguarding
sovereignty and national interests while expanding international influence.
In short, China is now strong enough to begin expanding outward in a
meaningful way, and language has become a key ingredient behind the move.
To determine the most beneficial strategic avenue for that movement, China
weighed its domestic and international environments and chose the path best
suited for its future prosperity and security: westward. Beijing has
supplemented strategic western movement with resource outreach, moving into
Africa and South America to secure mineral and energy rights. The military
element of these moves is being partially assisted through U.N. peacekeeping
mission deployments. The close integration of Beijing’s economic interests
and national security may force us to re-evaluate the People’s Liberation
Army as a resource military deployed forward to protect Chinese financial
interests abroad.
From the linguistic evidence, China is interested in pushing westward and
challenging the commonly held belief that sea lanes and air transport are
the only viable model for modern distribution of goods and economic activity
. This potential swing in its strategic orientation, through the re-
establishment of an overland rail above and below the Caspian Sea, could
substantially change the face of the players and infrastructure in the
Eurasian economy and perhaps alter the balance of power.
AFJ (Armed Forces Journal) |
