l*****7
发帖数: 8463 | 1 造假: 美国第一!!! 哈哈
http://www.mandatory.com/2012/11/13/ok-cupid-an-exploration-int
OK Cupid: An Exploration Into Just How Low Some Guys Will Go
Related:Funny, OkCupid, online dating, Sex and Dating
By Rob FeeNov 13, 2012
A friend of mine recently signed up for OKCupid (for those who might be
unaware: an online dating site) and was constantly telling me about all the
bizarre and pathetic lines guys try to use on her via instant message. She
would very blatantly shoot them down and yet they would continue to message
her. Obviously, for most women this doesn't come as a surprise whatsoever. I
started thinking about it and had a thought: I wonder how far guys would go
to get a date or a hook-up. And so, my OKCupid adventure began...
I set up a profile using the picture of a cute girl I know. Not too sexy of
a picture; I didn't want her to look like a slut. Here's my basic profile:
Cute girl. Everything mostly looks fine. It's a little bizarre that an adult
would choose to include the fourth installment of a children's movie in
their profile name for a dating site, but I digress.
Now comes the fun part: the bio. I wanted to make this so idiotic and
unappealing that no one in their right mind would show interest in this girl
. If you are hitting on her after reading her profile, you have no interest
in anything intellectual whatsoever. Here's part one:
Let's break this down a bit. It's riddled with typos. This girl clearly
lacks the ability to read and write. In the opening paragraph, she kind of
quotes Katy Perry and says her passions are krumping and interpretive dance
... but as long as you love chili and art you're golden! She also makes an
off-handed racist comment. She then describes what she's doing with her life
in the most vague way possible, only sharing a horribly offensive 9/11 joke
and that she posted on a picture of Willy Wonka. Then you get to what she's
really good at and she says iPods. What does that mean?? How are you good
at iPods?
Here's part 2 of her bio:
In the first question she confesses to what seems to be a serious hit-and-
run. Why would you show any interest in her? Under favorites, she admits her
illiteracy, calls it "Two and One Half Men," lists Geico commercials as one
of her favorite shows, and professes love for "Bon Jorvi." Next up, on "The
six things I could never do without," we get the mention of a dead father
with September in parentheses - whatever that means - some bizarre proverbs,
and then, #4 just says YOLO. Finally, she spends a lot of time thinking
about kids! That's creepy! She doesn't have kids and says she doesn't want
kids but ONLY thinks about kids. Fellas, run.
So, by reading that bio you would assume most guys steered clear right? No.
Not at all. Within 6 hours, my profile had been viewed over 400 times and 39
guys had messaged me.
Let's give them the benefit of the doubt and say they didn't really read the
bio. They just saw a cute girl and went for it. I'm not saying that's smart
but I'm just hoping for their sake they didn't read that trainwreck of a
description and think "OK yeah! This is what I've been searching for!"
Once they went to messaging, that's when I got really stupid with it. A few
of the guys got one message, realized they were dealing with an idiot/
sociopath, and stopped communicating. Others, not so much. Here's what I got
within six hours of creating the profile:
Dude, the first thing she said to you was about her HORRIBLE DIARRHEA. That'
s her opener. At one point, I just typed the word "glue" and he didn't skip
a beat.
Here's the next guy:
The first thing she implies here is that she just had an abortion, and he
replies, "Yay :) lol." If that wasn't troubling enough, she then says she
went to get her arm refitted. What in the world could that mean? Not only
does he not question it at all but he gives her his cell number!
This guy just rolled with the punches, didn't he? She tells him that she
spent Halloween getting fingered by her cousin and he uses that as a segue
to talk about trick or treating with HIS cousins. Sorry, buddy, cousin-
fingering has to be a no-no.
Look, guy, there is no way you want to hang out with this girl. Her favorite
movies include two Step Up sequels that don't exist, not to mention she
spelled "Lincoln" the way Linkin Park spells it.
This guy started off with a terrible line so I knew I could push this one a
little further. He asked for a secret so he got the story of a c-section
birth followed by a questionable adoption. Now, having a c-section and
giving up the kid isn't a shameful thing, but this was the first thing she
comes out with after, of course, calling him a "retrad." His thumb-wrestling
comment was so obnoxious that I had to bail. He even grossed out a fake
girl. Wow, good job.
I gotta give it to this guy, at least he bailed whenever I told him I was
actually 16 (although saying I was born in 1996 wasn't an immediate giveaway
, apparently). He did ignore some serious spelling errors. He should have
gone after the mom, though - she seems cool!
He didn't respond. You'd think that line would work, for sure!
He didn't realize how much I loved Ice Age 4. It's a lifestyle.
And finally, the ultimate boyfriend material:
He thought he'd be cute and just go straight for the sex, so I decided to
flip it on him and get him involved in prostitution. I thought $45 would
turn him away, since it's extremely low and was offered to him almost
immediately, but instead he started bargaining for the deluxe package, I
guess? He sent about 30 more messages asking for my number and insisting
that he was serious.
Now, of course, I'm not saying that every guy on the Internet is desperate
and creepy, but ... fellas, browse through that profile a little and make
sure you aren't getting ready to message an illiterate part-time prostitute
with a rubber arm and a history of vehicular crimes. Have fun out there!
Also from Mandatory: The Most insane OK Cupid Profiles | l*****7
发帖数: 8463 | 2 http://finance.yahoo.com/news/starbucks-amazon-google-face-uk-1
UK lawmakers slam Starbucks, Amazon and Google on tax
Reuters – Mon, Nov 12, 2012 2:59 PM EST
By Tom Bergin
LONDON (Reuters) - UK lawmakers criticized executives of Starbucks, Google
and Amazon on Monday for not paying more tax in Britain and Amazon said it
had received a $252 million demand for back taxes from France.
Britain's Public Accounts Committee (PAC), which is charged with monitoring
government financial affairs, invited the companies to give evidence amid
mounting public and political concern about tax avoidance by big
international companies.
Britain and Germany last week announced plans to push the Group of 20
economic powers to make multinational companies pay their "fair share" of
taxes following reports of large firms exploiting loopholes to avoid taxes.
Amazon received a $252 million back tax claim from the French tax authority
in September, related to its practice of channeling European sales through
Luxembourg. The company said it was fighting the claim, referred to by an
Amazon official at the hearing.
Members of Parliament (MPs) on the committee quizzed Starbucks Chief
Financial Officer Troy Alstead about how the group's UK unit managed to
report 13 years of losses.
"You're either running the business badly, or there's some fiddle going on,"
Austin Mitchell MP said.
A Reuters report last month showed that Starbucks had paid no corporation,
or income, tax in the UK in the past three years and had paid only 8.6
million pounds since 1998.
Over this period it sold 3.1 billion pounds worth of coffee, prompting
criticism from politicians and media commentators.
Alstead denied Starbucks was shifting profits out of the UK and blamed high
rents for contributing to the company's troubled record in the UK.
He said the UK business only made a profit in the UK once, in 2006, despite
him telling analysts on a conference call in 2009 that the UK unit was
profitable and his predecessor listing the British operation in 2008, when
asked about the foreign markets with the best margins.
Alstead also told the committee the company had an agreement with the Dutch
authorities that allowed it pay a "very low tax rate" on its operation there.
Starbucks UK has an agreement to remit 6 percent of its turnover to the
Dutch unit - its regional headquarters - in respect to the use of the
Starbucks brand.
Alstead also told the committee that Starbucks's Swiss coffee trading unit
charged group companies a 20 percent mark-up on coffee beans.
The company does not usually publish how much it spends on raw or green
coffee beans but said in 2009 that it bought 367 million pounds for an
average $1.47 per pound, suggesting a total coffee bill of $539 million and
that the Swiss unit, which employs 30 people, enjoyed income of almost $110
million that year.
The company declined to comment on the Reuters calculation. Alstead denied
the world's largest coffee chain channeled profits through tax havens and
said it followed the law in every country where it operated.
NO ANSWERS
Members of the committee repeatedly criticized Andrew Cecil, Brussels-based
Director of Public Policy for internet retailer Amazon, for failing to
answer questions about the group's operations.
Cecil declined several times to tell the committee the level of Amazon's
sales in the UK.
"We have not disclosed those figures ever publicly," he said.
Google's annual reports do disclose this figure. The most recent regulatory
filing gave UK revenues as 11-15 percent of total sales in 2011, an amount
equal to $5.3 to $7.2 billion.
Amazon did not respond to emails or calls asking for explanations about the
discrepancy.
"It's just not acceptable .. It's outrageous," the committee's chairman,
Margaret Hodge MP, said of Cecil's inability to answer questions about
Amazon's UK sales and corporate structure.
Amazon's main UK unit paid less than 1 million pounds in income tax last
year.
Amazon avoids UK taxes by reporting European sales through a Luxembourg-
based unit. This structure allowed it to pay a tax rate of 11 percent on
foreign profits last year - less than half the average corporate income tax
rate in its major markets.
Matt Brittin, Google Vice President for Sales and Operations, Northern and
Central Europe, acknowledged the company did cut its tax bill by channeling
profits from European sales through Bermuda but said this was perfectly
legal.
Google's filings show it had $4 billion of sales in the UK last year, but
despite having a group-wide profit margin of 33 percent, its main UK unit
reported a loss in 2011 and 2010.
It had a tax charge of just 3.4 million pounds in 2011.
The search engine provider books European sales via an Irish unit, an
arrangement that allowed it to pay taxes at a rate of 3.2 percent on non-U.S
. profits last year.
Google is under audit by the French tax authority regarding its structure,
but the company denied a newspaper report last month that it had received a
back tax claim for 1 billion euros.
(Reporting by Tom Bergin; Editing by Giles Elgood and Philippa Fletcher)
the
message
I
【在 l*****7 的大作中提到】
: 造假: 美国第一!!! 哈哈
: http://www.mandatory.com/2012/11/13/ok-cupid-an-exploration-int
: OK Cupid: An Exploration Into Just How Low Some Guys Will Go
: Related:Funny, OkCupid, online dating, Sex and Dating
: By Rob FeeNov 13, 2012
: A friend of mine recently signed up for OKCupid (for those who might be
: unaware: an online dating site) and was constantly telling me about all the
: bizarre and pathetic lines guys try to use on her via instant message. She
: would very blatantly shoot them down and yet they would continue to message
: her. Obviously, for most women this doesn't come as a surprise whatsoever. I
| l*****7
发帖数: 8463 | 3 http://www.organicmilkmarketingsettlement.com/
AURORA ORGANIC DAIRY LITIGATION SETTLEMENT
Home Case Documents Frequently Asked Questions Contact Us
Welcome to the In Re: Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Marketing and Sales
Practices Litigation Settlement Website
If you purchased Milk Products (organic milk and/or butter) produced by
Aurora Organic Dairy and sold in the U.S. under certain brands, including
but not limited to, Aurora Organic Dairy’s “High Meadow” brand, Costco’s
“Kirkland” brand, Safeway’s “Safeway Select” and “O Organics” brands
, Target’s “Archer Farms” brand, Wal-Mart’s “Great Value” brand, and/
or Wild Oats’ “Wild Oats” brand, on or before September 14, 2012, you may
be entitled to compensation.
The Settlement includes, but is not limited to, the Milk Products (i.e.,
organic milk and dairy products including organic butter, organic cream, and
organic non-fat dry milk) identified below:
Producer/Retailer Product/Brand
Aurora High Meadow organic half gallons in fat free, 2% and whole milk
High Meadow organic salted butter (1 lb. package)
Costco Kirkland Signature organic 2% 3-pack half gallons
Kirkland Signature organic 1% 3-pack half gallons
Kirkland Signature organic salted butter (2 pk 1 lb. packages)
High Meadow organic salted butter (2 pk 1 lb. packages, 3pk 1 lb. packages)
Safeway Safeway Select organic half gallons in fat free, 1%, 2% and whole
milk
O Organics half gallons in fat free, 1%, 2% and whole milk
O Organics gallons in fat free, 1%, 2% and whole milk
O Organics salted and unsalted butter (1 lb. packages)
Target Archer Farms organic half gallons in fat free, 1%, 2% and whole milk
Archer Farms organic salted and unsalted butter (1 lb. packages)
Wal-Mart Great Value organic half gallons in fat free, 1%, 2% and whole
milk
Great Value organic gallons in fat free, 1%, 2% and whole milk
Wild Oats Wild Oats Organic half gallons in fat free, 1%, 2% and whole milk
Wild Oats Organic salted and unsalted butter (1 lb. packages)
Click to submit a claim electronically
Case Relevant Event Date
A Claim Form must be postmarked or Filed online by March 13, 2013
An Exclusion must be postmarked on or before January 28, 2013
An Objection must be postmarked or delivered to the court no later than
January 28, 2013
The Final Fairness Hearing is February 26, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.
Although the information in this website is intended to assist you, it does
not replace the information contained in the Class Notice or the Settlement
Agreement, both of which can be downloaded from this website. | l*****7
发帖数: 8463 | 4 http://www.wnd.com/2012/09/israeli-science-website-obama-birth-
WND EXCLUSIVE
Israeli science website: Obama birth certificate forged
Award-winning, former Netanyahu adviser behind assessment
Published: 09/10/2012 at 8:02 PM
by Jerome R. CorsiEmail | Archive
Jerome R. Corsi, a Harvard Ph.D., is a WND senior staff reporter. He has
authored many books, including No. 1 N.Y. Times best-sellers "The Obama
Nation" and "Unfit for Command." Corsi's latest book is "Where's the REAL
Birth Certificate?"More ↓Less ↑
Subscribe to author feed
inShare103
Text smaller
Text bigger
Ads by Google
Retire To Another CountryLearn How to Get a Dual Citizenship And Retire
Abroad! Free Report Here www.Sovereign-Investor.com
Israel Hanukoglu
Israel Science and Technology, the national database and directory of
science and technology-related websites in Israel, has published an article
asserting the long-form birth certificate released by the White House is a
forged document.
Ads by Google
Windows 7 Driver DownloadWindows 7 Drivers Latest Download. Microsoft
Certified. (Recommended) www.Windows-7.DriverUpdate.net
Reduce Smog/Air PollutionSan Onofre plant helped avoid 100,000 metric tons
of pollutants songscommunity.com/clean
The website was created by a former science adviser to Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel Hanukoglu, Ph.D.
Hanukoglu, an award-winning researcher, is a professor of biochemistry and
molecular biology in Israel.
The professor established the first version of his website during his tenure
as Netanyahu’s science adviser. The site has evolved into “the premier
science and technology portal for Israel.”
The website says that the White House’s release of the Obama document in
April 2011, after years of controversy, “raised in our minds the
possibility that there could be something suspicious about the information
available on this document.”
The website conducted an independent analysis and cites others who came to
the same conclusion.
The website says the publication “of such a blatantly fake document about
something so basic as the birthplace of Mr. Obama, should raise great
concern about the suitability of the person who is holding the reigns on the
most powerful country of the World.”
Israel Science and Technology explains why, as a site of science and
technology, it dedicated “a page to expose forgery about a document related
to Mr. Barack Hussein Obama.”
“Mr. Obama is the president of the USA that is currently the leader of the
Free World, and the most powerful country in the Western hemisphere,” the
site says. “In his position as the President, the policies pursued by Mr.
Obama affects the whole world and not just the USA.”
Moreover, inaction by members of the U.S. House of Representatives and
Senate, as well as U.S. courts, despite many appeals, also was seen to “
raise a concern about how the governmental institutions of the reputedly
best, and certainly the most important democracy in the Free World have
avoided the issue.”
The missing ’1′
Utilizing the software program Foxit Reader version 4.3.1, the Israel
Science and Technology website examined the PDF file posted by the White
House April 27, 2011, and found that the last digit of the birth certificate
’s number, 61 10841, disappears under 800-percent magnification.
Also, the font of the last digit is different from the other digits.
“This is only one example,” the Israelis concluded after examining the
birth certificate number. “Many more examples can be discovered by
examining magnified document with full page view of the document.”
Conclusion: “In brief, this simple analysis using just a viewing software
reveals that the PDF document has been altered by a graphics software.”
The ‘ungrouped’ image
Next, the Israeli Science and Technology site examined the PDF birth
certificate file in the freely available Inkscape graphics software, version
0.48.1.
“In vector graphics software, an image is composed of elements,” the
website notes. “If the ‘Long-Form Birth Certificate’ of Obama was a
photocopied document then it should not be composed of separate parts.”
The website says the status line “at the bottom of the software reports
that the image is composed of ’2 objects’ that have been grouped.”
The Israelis found the Obama birth certificate PDF could be ungrouped,
revealing individual layers. The most important of nine different ungrouped
layers also shows the final digit, 1, is missing in the birth certificate
number 61 10641.
Israeli Science and Technology “ungrouped” image of Obama long-form birth
certificate
Israeli Science and Technology cited as additional evidence of forgery the
following analyses, many of which were first published by WND:
An expert analysis of the typography and layout of elements in the long-form
birth certificate by Mara Zebest, here and here
The conclusion of Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s “Cold Case Posse” that the birth
certificate is fake.
“From A to Z: What’s Wrong with Obama’s Birth Certificate,” published by
WND May 13, 2011.
“Irrefutable’ Proof of Obama Forgery,” published by WND July 17, 2011.
“A Tale of Two Birth Certificates,” published by WND April 28, 2011.
“Layered Colors ‘Simple Proof of Obama Document | l*****7
发帖数: 8463 | 5 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/
home | about | documents | news | publications | FOIA | research |
internships | search | donate | mailing list
Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80
Updated - February 11, 2004
Edited by Jeffrey Richelson
Originally posted December 20, 2002
Previously updated February 26, 2003
Documents - Press release - Further reading
Between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the commencement of
military action in January 1991, then President George H.W. Bush raised the
specter of the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons as one justification for
taking decisive action against Iraq. In the then-classified National
Security Directive 54, signed on January 15, 1991, authorizing the use of
force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, he identified Iraqi use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) against allied forces as an action that would lead the U.S
. to seek the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. (Note 1)
In the aftermath of Iraq's defeat, the U.S.-led U.N. coalition was able to
compel Iraq to agree to an inspection and monitoring regime, intended to
insure that Iraq dismantled its WMD programs and did not take actions to
reconstitute them. The means of implementing the relevant U.N. resolutions
was the Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). That inspection regime
continued until December 16, 1998 - although it involved interruptions,
confrontations, and Iraqi attempts at denial and deception - when UNSCOM
withdrew from Iraq in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, and harassment.
Subsequent to George W. Bush's assumption of the presidency in January 2001,
the U.S. made it clear that it would not accept what had become the status
quo with respect to Iraq - a country ruled by Saddam Hussein and free to
attempt to reconstitute its assorted weapons of mass destruction programs.
As part of their campaign against the status quo, which included the clear
threat of the eventual use of military force against the Iraqi regime, the U
.S. and Britain published documents and provided briefings detailing their
conclusions concerning Iraq's WMD programs and its attempts to deceive other
nations about those programs.
As a result of the U.S. and British campaign, and after prolonged
negotiations between the United States, Britain, France, Russia and other U.
N. Security Council members, the United Nations declared that Iraq would
have to accept even more intrusive inspections than under the previous
inspection regime - to be carried out by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) - or face "serious consequences." Iraq agreed to accept the U.
N. decision and inspections resumed in late November 2002. On December 7,
2002, Iraq submitted its 12,000 page declaration, which claimed that it had
no current WMD programs. Intelligence analysts from the United States and
other nations immediately began to scrutinize the document, and senior U.S.
officials quickly rejected the claims. (Note 2)
Over the next several months, inspections continued in Iraq, and the chief
inspectors, Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) and Mohammed El Baradei (IAEA) provided
periodic updates to the U.N. Security Council concerning the extent of Iraqi
cooperation, what they had or had not discovered, and what they believed
remained to be done. During that period the Bush administration, as well as
the Tony Blair administration in the United Kingdom, charged that Iraq was
not living up to the requirement that it fully disclose its WMD activities,
and declared that if it continued along that path, "serious consequences" -
that is, invasion - should follow.
The trigger for military action preferred by the British government, other
allies, and at least some segments of the Bush administration, was a second
U.N. resolution that would authorize an armed response. Other key U.N.
Security Council members - including France, Germany, and Russia - argued
that the inspections were working and that the inspectors should be allowed
to continue. When it became apparent that the Council would not approve a
second resolution, the United States and Britain terminated their attempts
to obtain it. Instead, they, along with other allies, launched Operation
Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003 - a military campaign that quickly brought
about the end of Saddam Hussein's regime and ultimately resulted in his
capture. (Note 3)
As U.S. forces moved through Iraq, there were initial reports that chemical
or biological weapons might have been uncovered, but closer examinations
produced negative results. In May 2003, the Bush administration decided to
establish a specialized group of about 1,500 individuals, the Iraq Survey
Group (ISG), to search the country for WMD - replacing the 75th Exploitation
Task Force, which had originally been assigned the mission. Appointed to
lead the Group, whose motto is "find, exploit, eliminate," was Maj. Gen.
Keith Dayton, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of
Operations. In June, David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapons inspector after
Operation Desert Storm, was appointed special advisor and traveled to Iraq
to lead the search. (Note 4)
By the time of the creation of the ISG, and continuing to the date of this
publication, a controversy has existed over the performance of U.S. (and
British) intelligence in collecting and evaluating information about Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction programs. The reliability of sources has been
questioned. It has been suggested that some human intelligence may have been
purposeful deception by the Iraqi intelligence and security services, while
exiles and defectors may have provided other intelligence seeking to
influence U.S. policy.
The quality of the intelligence analysis has also come under scrutiny. The
failure to find weapons stocks or active production lines, undermining
claims by the October 2002 NIE and both President Bush and Secretary of
State Colin Powell (Document 16, Document 27), has been one particular cause
for criticism. Controversy has also centered around specific judgments - in
the United States with regard to assessments of Iraq's motives for seeking
high-strength aluminum tubes, and in the United Kingdom with respect to the
government's claim that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Africa. Post-war
evaluation of captured material, particularly two mobile facilities that
the CIA and DIA judged to be biological weapons laboratories, has also been
the subject of dispute. (Note 5)
In addition, members of Congress and Parliament, as well as potential
political opponents and outside observers have criticized the use of
intelligence by the Bush and Blair administrations. Charges have included
outright distortion, selective use of intelligence, and exertion of
political pressure to influence the content of intelligence estimates in
order to provide support to the decision to go to war with Iraq. (Note 6)
The material presented in this electronic briefing book includes both
essential pre-war documentation and documents produced or released
subsequent to the start of military action in March 2003. Pre-war
documentation includes the major unclassified U.S. and British assessments
of Iraq's WMD programs; the IAEA and UNSCOM reports covering the final
period prior to their 1998 departure, and between November 27, 2002, and
February 2003; the transcript of a key speech by President Bush; a statement
of U.S. policy toward combating WMD; the transcript of and slides for
Secretary Powell's presentation to the U.N. on February 5, 2003; and
documents from the 1980s and 1990's concerning various aspects of Iraqi WMD
activities.
Key documentation related to the controversy that has become available in
recent months makes up almost of all of the 14 additional documents
contained in this updated briefing book. These records include:
The full Top Secret key judgments section of the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Document 15)
The CIA-DIA evaluation of two specialized tractor-trailers (Document 32)
Reviews by the British parliamentary committees concerning the quality and
use of intelligence on Iraq by the British government (Document 34, Document
36)
David Kay's unclassified statement on the ISG's interim findings (Document
39)
Congressional critiques of U.S. intelligence performance (Document 37,
Document 41)
Administration rebuttals of those and other critiques. (Document 35,
Document 38, Document 40, Document 43).
Much that is of interest concerning intelligence and Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction has appeared in articles, monographs, and studies published by
magazines or research groups. A list of key publications is provided
immediately after the notes section. Other important materials have been
posted temporarily on government web sites. The documentation provided in
this briefing book collects many of the most significant of these records in
one place, allowing readers to substantially augment their understanding of
the issues by directly comparing the different sources and conclusions, and
ensuring that these materials will be accessible for the long term.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Read the Documents
Document 1: Interagency Intelligence Assessment, Implications of Israeli
Attack on Iraq, July 1, 1981. Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of
Information Act
On June 7, 1981, in an attempt to prevent Iraqi acquisition of a nuclear
weapons capability, Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor,
before it became operational. This assessment, produced by the CIA and other
U.S. intelligence agencies, examines Arab reactions to the attack as well
as both the immediate and short-term repercussions of the pre-emptive strike
.
Document 2: CIA, Iraq's National Security Goals, December 1988. Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released by Mandatory Declassification
Review
Written after the conclusion of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, this CIA survey
examined Saddam Hussein's likely regional and international objectives and
strategies - including his relations with other Arab states and the PLO, his
desire to reduce Iraqi dependence on the USSR, and his goal of preventing
closer ties between the US and USSR and Iran. With respect to weapons of
mass destruction, the analysis briefly discusses Iraqi attitudes toward
chemical and nuclear weapons. The first are considered a "short-term fix,"
while the latter represent "the long-term deterrent."
Document 3: CIA, Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments, July 1990. Top Secret
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of
Information Act
During the Persian Gulf War, Iraq made extensive use of its Scud missile
force to attack both Israel and Saudi Arabia - a Scud that hit a U.S.
barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 28 U.S. servicemen. This paper
completed a month prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait noted that "Iraq has
the most aggressive and advanced ballistic missile development program in
the Arab world" and that it already had two modified versions of the Scud B
- the Al Husayn and Al Abbas.
The paper examines the origins, development, and results of the Iraqi
missile program - in the form of the Scud B and its variants. It also
examines warhead options - including chemical, biological, and nuclear. In
addition, it discusses Iraq's missile production infrastructure as well as
foreign assistance to the missile program.
Document 4: Central Intelligence Agency, Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of
Mass Destruction, March 1991, Top Secret.
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This study, completed by the CIA's Office of Scientific and Weapons Research
after the conclusion of the first Persian Gulf War, examined the status of
the four components of Iraq's WMD programs -- chemical weapons, biological
weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles -- as of January 15, 1991,
the day President George H.W. Bush signed National Security Directive 54,
authorizing the use of force to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
The report asserted that Iraq apparently believed that it needed chemical
weapons both as a deterrent and to fulfill its role as "protector" of the
Arab world. There were strong indications, according to the report, that
Iraq was prepared to use chemical weapons in any conflict with the United
States. The author(s) characterized Iraq's biological weapons program as "
the most extensive in the Arab world." With respect to nuclear weapons, the
report concluded that Iraq probably had the capability, if combined with
clandestinely acquired foreign technology, to develop nuclear weapons in the
late 1990s. Iraq's ballistic missile program was "the most advanced in the
Arab world," the report also concluded.
Document 5: CIA, Project Babylon: The Iraqi Supergun, November 1991. Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released by Mandatory Declassification
Review
From 1988 to 1990, Iraq was involved in an unusual weapons program,
codenamed Project Babylon. The project's objective was the development and
production of several large caliber guns, including a 1,000-millimeter-
diameter supergun. In addition, the project included development of both
conventional and rocket projectiles for the gun. The gun was intended to
deliver the explosive devices to military and economic targets up to 620
miles away. The project was being managed for Iraq by a foreign company,
Space Research Corporation, headed by Gerald Bull.
By early 1990, a 350-mm-diameter version of the gun had been successfully
built and tested. In addition, many of the components for the 1,000-mm. gun
and two other 350-mm guns had been delivered to Iraq. In March 1990, Bull
was murdered. The following month, the United Kingdom customs service seized
the final eight sections that were to be used in the 1,000-mm. gun barrel.
Other nations followed by seizing other components of the supergun. The
seizures prevented Iraq from completing the project. In July 1991, after
initial denials, Iraq acknowledged the project. In October 1991, Project
Babylon components were destroyed under U.N. supervision.
This document discusses the rationale, origins, technical details, and
history of Project Babylon.
Document 6: CIA, Iraqi BW Mission Planning, 1992. Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of
Information Act
This information report states that in the fall of 1990, Saddam Hussein
ordered that plans be drawn up for the airborne delivery of an unspecified
biological agent. The probable target was Israel. The plan envisioned a
conventional air raid employing three MiG-21s, to be followed by another
raid involving three MiGs and a SU-22 aircraft that would disperse the
biological agent.The first mission was shot down over the Persian Gulf and "
no efforts were made to find another method to deliver the BW agent."
Document 7: United Nations, Note by the Secretary General, October 8, 1997 w
/att: Letter dated 6 October 1997 from the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary General.
Source: http://www.iaea.org
Part of one of the report describes the work done by the IAEA, during the
period April 1, 1997 to October 1, 1997 in montoring and verifying Iraqi
compliance with the nuclear disarmament provisions of U.N. resolution 687 (
1991). It includes an extensive summary of the technical discussions between
IAEA and Iraq. The second part of the report provides an overview of IAEA
activities since 1991 related to on-site inspection of Iraqi's nuclear
capabilities and the destruction, removal, or neutralization of Iraqi
nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons related material or facilities.
Document 8: United Nations, Note by the Secretary General, October 6, 1998 w
/att: Report of the Executive Chairman of the activities of the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9(b) (
i) of the resolution 687 (1991).
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres98-920.htm
This report from the executive chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM) covers developments in the relationship between Iraq and the
Commission, priority issues with respect to disarmament, and ongoing
monitoring and verification activities through October 11, 1998. Two months
later, on December 16, UNSCOM, in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate,
withdrew its staff from Iraq.
Document 9: United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 8 February 1999
from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, February 9, 1999 w/enc: Report of the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with the panel on
disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification
issues (S/1999/100).
Source: http://www.iaea.org
This report summarizes the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency'
s implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning the
dismantling of Iraq's nuclear program as of February 1999 - two months after
U.N. inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq. It includes an examination of the
remaining questions and concerns and their impact on the IAEA's ability to
develop a "technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear
weapons [program] and on the IAEA's technical ability to fully implement its
OMV [on-site monitoring and verification] program."
Specific questions and concerns noted in the report include: lack of certain
technical documentation, external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear
weapons program, and Iraq's inability to provide documentation showing the
timing and modalities of its alleged abandonment of its nuclear weapons
program.
Document 10a: Forged correspondence to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic
of Niger, concerning visit to Niger by Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican,
February 1, 1999.
Document 10b: Forged correspondence within Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Niger, concerning transfer of uranium to Iraq, July 30, 1999.
Document 10c: Forged letter to the President, Republic of Niger, concerning
agreement to supply 500 tons of uranium per year to Iraq, July 27, 2000.
Document 10d: Forged letter to the Niger Ambassador to Italy, concerning
protocol of agreement to supply uranium to Iraq, October 10, 2000.
Source: Documents provided by journalist
The only publicly acknowledged evidence for the claim that Iraq had tried to
acquire uranium from Africa, which President Bush made in his January 28,
2003 State of the Union address, based on British intelligence information,
are these documents that were claimed to have been official correspondence
involving officials of the Republic of Niger. The charge that Iraq had
sought to purchase uranium had been deleted from a previous speech due to
the CIA's objection that the information had not been confirmed.
Documents 10a-10d were all determined to be crude forgeries - which included
names and titles that did not match the individuals who held office at the
time the letters were purportedly written - although the British government
has insisted it has additional information that would support the claim that
Iraq was seeking to purchase uranium. The inclusion of the claim in the
State of the Union despite its removal from an earlier speech, combined with
the revelation of the forged documents, produced further criticism of the
Bush administration and CIA Director George Tenet. Tenet, and then the
president, took responsibility for the inclusion of the unvetted information
. An FBI investigation into the apparent forgery that commenced in the
spring of 2003 is now "at a critical stage" according the Washington Post (
Mike Allen and Susan Schmidt, "Bush Aides Testify in Leak Probe," Washington
Post, Tuesday, February 10, 2004; Page A01).
Document 11: UK Joint Intelligence Committee, Iraq's Weapons of Mass
Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, September 2002.
Unclassified.
Source: http://www.pm.gov.uk
This extensive analysis of Iraqi WMD programs was produced by the British
Government's Joint Intelligence Committee, which is responsible for
overseeing the production of national and strategic intelligence. One part
of the document focuses on Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear, and
ballistic missile programs for the years 1971-1998 and in the post-
inspection era (1998-2002). Other parts of the document concern the history
of UN weapons inspections and "Iraq under Saddam Hussein."
In the foreword, Prime Minister Tony Blair writes (p.3) that "In recent
months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq
that ... Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the
ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the
world."
Document 12: Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities - An
Operational Support Study, September 2002 (Extract) Unclassified.
Source: http://www.dia.mil
This extract is part of a larger DIA study, produced for the United States
Central Command to assist it in planning military operations. It notes the
absence of reliable information on whether Iraq was producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons. The authors do express their belief that "Iraq
retained production equipment, expertise and chemical precursors and can
reconstitute a chemical warfare program in the absence of an international
inspection regime." It also summarizes intelligence on possible chemical
weapons activities, such as renovation of two facilities formerly associated
with the Iraqi chemical weapons program.
Document 13: U.S. State Department, A Decade of Deception and Defiance,
September 12, 2002. Unclassified.
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov
Three pages of this document focus on U.S. charges concerning Iraqi failure
to comply with the restrictions pertaining to weapons of mass destruction
placed upon it as a result of the Persian Gulf War. It charges, inter alia,
that "Iraq is believed to be developing ballistic missiles with a range
greater than 150 kilometers - as prohibited by UN Security Council
Resolution 687" and "Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and
has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb." With
respect to chemical weapons, it charges that "Iraq has not accounted for
hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled
munitions, including Scud variant missile warheads."
Document 14: CIA, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, October 2002,
Unclassified.
Source: http://www.cia.gov
Issued a month after the British assessment (see Document 8), this CIA study
is the unclassified version of a Top Secret National Intelligence Estimate
completed shortly before its release. The study contains analysis, maps,
tables, and some satellite photographs of apparent Iraqi WMD sites.
Among the study's key judgments is the statement that "Iraq has continued
its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions
and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as
missiles with ranges in execess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it
probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade."
Document 15: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence
Estimate, Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,
October 2002. Top
Secret (Extract).
Source: The White House
In response to the post-war controversy over U.S. intelligence estimates of
Iraqi WMD programs, the White House released the entire key judgments
section of the Top Secret October 2002 national intelligence estimate on the
subject. (An unclassified version of the NIE had been released that same
month, see Document 14).
The estimate concluded that Iraq continued its weapons of mass destruction
programs despite U.N. resolutions and sanctions and that it was in
possession of chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with
ranges exceeding U.N. imposed limits. In addition, it was judged that Iraq
was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program and, if left unchecked, would
probably have a nuclear weapon before the end of the decade - assuming it
had to produce the fissile material indigenously. If Iraq could acquire
sufficient fissile material from abroad it could construct a nuclear weapon
within several months to a year, the estimate reported.
With regard to both chemical and biological weapons, the NIE reported not
only that Iraq had maintained stocks of the weapons but was actively engaged
in production. The released section contains the assessment, based at least
in part on human intelligence, that "Baghdad has begun renewed production
of" a variety of chemical weapons - mustard gas, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.
It also stated that all key aspects of Iraq's offensive biological weapons
program were active - including R&D, production, and weaponization - and
that most components were larger and more advanced than they were before the
Gulf War. It also reported that Iraq possessed mobile facilities for
producing bacterial and toxin biological warfare agents.
The estimate also examined Iraq's possible willingness to engage in
terrorist strikes against the U.S. homeland and whether Saddam would assist
al-Qaeda in conducting additional attacks on U.S. territory. Iraq would
probably attempt clandestine attacks in the United States if it feared an
attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or
unavoidable, probably with biological agents, according to the NIE. In
addition, in the event that Saddam concluded that al-Qaeda was the only
organization that could conduct the type of terrorist strike against the U.S
. that he wished to see take place, he might take "the extreme step of
assisting the Islamist terrorists."
The released key judgments section is also notable for its reporting of
dissents within the Intelligence Community on two related issues - when Iraq
could acquire a nuclear weapon, and its motive in seeking to obtain high-
strength aluminum tubes. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
Research (INR) argued that while Saddam wished to acquire a nuclear weapon,
it did not believe that Iraq's recent activities made a compelling case that
a comprehensive attempt to acquire nuclear weapons was being made. INR,
along with the Department of Energy, questioned whether the high-strength
aluminum tubes Iraq had been attempting to acquire were well-suited for use
in gas centrifuges used for uranium enrichment.
Document 16: The White House, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat,"
October 7, 2002. Unclassified.
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov
This speech, given by President Bush at the Cincinnati Museum Center,
presents his administration's view concerning the threat from Iraq. It
discusses Iraqi chemical, biological, ballistic missile, and nuclear
programs - as well as concerns about possible Iraqi connections to
international terrorist groups. With respect to how close Iraq is to
developing a nuclear weapon, Bush notes that "we don't know exactly, and
that's the problem." He went on to state that "If the Iraqi regime is able
to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little
larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a
year."
Document 17: Letter, George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to
Senator Bob Graham, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
October 7, 2002. Unclassified.
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org
This letter from the DCI provided an unclassified CIA assessment of Saddam
Hussein's willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. According to the
letter, Iraq "for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting
terrorist attacks with conventional or ... chemical and biological weapons
against the United States," but if "Saddam should conclude that a U.S.-led
attack could no longer be deterred, he probably would become much less
constrained in adopting terrorist actions." The letter also discusses the
question of Iraqi links to Al-Qaeda and the basis for U.S. assessments of
the links.
Document 18: DoD, Iraqi Denial and Deception for Weapons of Mass Destruction
& Ballistic Missile Programs, October 8, 2002. Unclassified.
Source: http://www.defenselink.mil
The day after President Bush's Cincinnati speech (Document 12), the Defense
Department provided a briefing on Iraqi denial and deception activities with
respect to their WMD programs. These slides were used in the presentation.
They include a variety of satellite photographs (from commercial as well as
a intelligence satellites), tables, and charts that concern Iraq's assorted
programs and select facilities (for example, the Abu Ghurayb BW Facility).
In addition, the presentation focused on Iraq's denial and deception
strategy and concealment apparatus.
Document 19: George W. Bush, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction, December 2002. Unclassified.
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov
This strategy document is an unclassified extract of Top Secret National
Security Presidential Directive 17.(2) The unclassified version asserts that
"We will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to
threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." It also notes that "
because deterrence may not succeed ... U.S. military forces and appropriate
civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed
adversaries, including in appropriate cases through pre-emptive measures."
Document 20: Table of Contents, Currently Accurate, Full and Complete
Declaration December 7, 2002, w/covering letter from Mohammed A. Aldouri,
Permanent Representative to the U.N.
Source: http://www.fas.org
This table of contents describes the content of the report submitted by Iraq
to the United Nations with regard to its nuclear, chemical, biological, and
missile programs, as required by U.N.Security Council Resolution 1441. It
shows the varied methods Iraq used in trying to produce nuclear material
suitable for a weapon as well as the large number of sites involved in the
nuclear program.
Document 21: Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service, Iraq: Weapons
Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy, December 10, 2002.
Unclassified.
Source: http://www.house.gov/shays/CRS/CRSProducts.htm
This paper, updated from an earlier version, discusses a number of issues
concerning Iraq. Outside of the WMD area, it examines human rights/war crime
issues, international terrorism, Iraq-Kuwait issues, reparation payments,
sanctions, and the oil-for- food program. With respect to weapons of mass
destruction, it focuses largely on the U.N. resolutions placing limits on
Iraqi WMD programs and the work of U.N. inspectors in attempting to monitor
Iraqi chemical, biological, missile, and nuclear programs.
Document 22 : Department of State, Fact Sheet: Illustrative Examples of
Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council,
December 19, 2002.
Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118pf.htm
At a December 19 press conference, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated
that U.S. experts found the Iraqi declaration "to be anything but currently
accurate, full, or complete." He also charged that the declaration "totally
fails to meet the resolution's requirements." The same day the State
Department issued a fact sheet providing several examples of omissions from
the declaration.
Document 23 : Hans Blix, An Update on Inspection, January 27, 2003.
Source: http://www.un.org
In Resolution 1441, adopted in November 2002, the U.N. Security Council
called for progress reports from UNMOVIC and the IAEA two months after
renewing inspections in Iraq. As head of UNMOVIC, Blix is responsible for
overseeing inspections whose objective is to verify Iraqi chemical and
biological warfare disarmament. Part of Blix's report reviews the sequence
and content of U.N. resolutions dealing with the disarmament of Iraq.
The key part of his paper, however, deals with the extent of Iraqi
cooperation - with regard to both substance and process. With regard to
process, while he states that "Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well
so far with UNMOVIC in this field," he does note a number of problems,
including Iraq's refusal to guarantee the safety of proposed U.N. U-2
overflights as well as it insistence on sending helicopters into the no-fly
zone to transport the Iraqis who serve as the inspectors minders. In
addition, Blix notes "some recent disturbing incidents and harassment."
With regard to cooperation on substance, Blix's report is more negative,
noting that Iraq has failed to engage in the "active" cooperation called for
in Resolution 1441. He questions Iraqi claims concerning the quality,
quantity, and disposition of VX nerve gas produced by Iraq as well as claims
that Iraq destroyed 8, 500 liters of anthrax. In addition, he reports that
Iraq has tested two missiles in excess of the permitted range of 150
kilometers.
The final portion of the report specifies how the inspection process can be
made more fruitful - including the turning over of more relevant documents,
lists of key personnel, and the facilitation of credible interviews.
Document 24: Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in
Iraq, January 27, 2003 w/att: IAEA Update Report for the Security Council
Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002), January 27, 2003.
Source: http://www.iaea.org
While UNMOVIC handled inspections relating to chemical and biological
weapons, the IAEA was charged with trying to verify Iraqi nuclear
disarmament. This report from the IAEA director ElBaradei's update report
provides background on previous resolutions, the IAEA's findings before the
end of inspections in 1998, and his agency's activities since the resumption
of the inspection regime on November 27.
The review of agency activities addresses the establishment of a Baghdad
field office, Iraq's declarations pertaining to the status of its nuclear
program, the request for and discovery of relevant documents, the inventory
of nuclear material, ongoing monitoring, interviews, and specific issues
raised by states - including the U.S. charge that aluminum tubes procured by
Iraq were intended for use in centrifuges.
While in his cover letter ElBaradei observes that "we have to date found no
evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the
elimination of the programme in the 1990s," in the update report it is also
noted that "little progress has been made in resolving the questions and
concerns that remained as of 1998" and that "further verification activities
will be necessary before the IAEA will be able to provide credible
assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme."
Document 25: Colin L. Powell, Briefing on the Iraq Weapons Inspectors' 60-
Day Report: Iraqi Non-Cooperation and Defiance of the UN, January 27, 2003.
Source: http://www.state.gov
The same day that Blix and ElBaradei addressed the UN, U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell gave a short briefing to reporters on the U.S. view of
those reports, followed by a question and answer session. Powell noted the
statement by Blix that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine
acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it." The
secretary went on to mention several specific issues, including Iraqi
failure to account for the anthrax and VX it had produced, as well as the
development of missiles exceeding the allowed range. Powell also noted
impediments to the work of the inspectors, including "a swarm of Iraqi
minders," an incomplete list of Iraqi personnel involved in WMD programs,
and the inability of the inspectors to interview Iraqi scientists in private.
Document 26: The White House, What Does Disarmament Look Like?, January 2003.
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov
As part of pressing its case that Iraq was not truly willing to disarm, the
Bush administration released this short paper contrasting the nuclear
disarmament process in three other countries - South Africa, the Ukraine,
and Kazakhstan - with Iraqi behavior. It identified several characteristics
of importance - high level political commitment, national initiatives to
dismantle weapons of mass destruction, and full cooperation and transparency
. It then asserts that "the behavior of the Iraqi regime contrasts sharply
with successful disarmament examples." It goes on to note the activities of
several Iraqi organizations, including the Special Security Organization,
and the National Monitoring Directorate, and the areas where Iraq's "
currently accurate, full, and complete" declaration" falls short - including
with respect to biological agents, ballistic missiles, and attempts to
procure uranium.
Document 27: Colin L. Powell, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council
, February 5, 2003.
Source: http://www.state.gov
In the face of requests and demands that the U.S. provide further evidence
in support of its position that Iraq was failing to comply with U.N.
resolution 1441, was impeding the work of UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors, and
that a resort to military force would be necessary unless Iraq's behavior
changed, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the U.N. Security Council
. The bulk of Powell's remarks, as contained in the transcript, involved his
provision of "additional information [about] what the United States knows
about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in
terrorism ..."
The intelligence provided came from a variety of sources - including
satellite imagery, communications intercepts, human assets in Iraq,
detainees, and defectors. It represents the largest single public disclosure
of such information made in support of U.S. diplomacy - surpassing the
scope and volume of disclosures made during the Cuban missile crisis or the
campaign in response to the Soviet Union's shootdown of KAL 007 in 1983.
The transcript contains Powell's reading of intercepts, and his description
of the content of satellite imagery being shown to the Security Council. It
also contains his description of organizations and activities, information
about which was obtained from human sources and/or unspecified
communications intelligence - such as the existence of a "Higher Committee
for Monitoring the Inspections Teams" as well as the presence of Al-Qaida
associates in Baghdad.
Document 28: Department of State, Iraq: Failing to Disarm - U.S. Secretary
of State Powell's Presentation to the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003.
Source: http://www.state.gov
This Powerpoint presentation provided an overview of part of Secretary
Powell's remarks. It contains a selected portion of intercepts concerning
and a satellite image pertaining to Iraq's hiding of evidence, charges that
Iraq is muzzling its scientists and specifications of how that is being done
, the assertion that Iraq is still seeking nuclear weapons (with reference
to intercepted aluminum tubes), and the charge that Iraq is harboring
terrorists, including Al-Qaida representatives.
Document 29: U.S. Department of State, Iraq: Failing to Disarm, February 5,
2003.
Source: http://www.state.gov
These images constitute the full set of slides used by Secretary Powell in
support of his presentation. They contain the full text presented of
intercepts, all nine satellite images, and other slides.
Denial and Deception Part 1
Denial and Deception Part 2
Biological Weapons
Chemical Weapons
Delivery Systems
Terrorism
Nuclear Systems
Human Rights Violations
End of Slide Presentation
Document 30 : Dr. Hans Blix, Briefing of the Security Council, February 14,
2003.
Source: http://www.un.org
In accordance with UN Resolution 1441, UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix delivered a
progress on his organizations activities in Iraq, its findings, and Iraqi
compliance with the resolution.
Blix noted that "so far UNMOVIC has not found any [weapons of mass
destruction], only a small number of chemical munitions which should have
been declared and destroyed." However, he also noted that many proscribed
programs had not been accounted for, a matter that he characterized as being
of "great significance." He specifically mentioned programs for the
production of anthrax, VX nerve gas, and long-range missiles. He also noted
the status of UNMOVIC investigations of the Al-Samoud and Al-Fatah missiles
as well as casting chambers. With regard to Iraqi actions, he reported that
Iraq had formed two commissions to search for relevant documents and that
the National Monitoring Directorate had provided a list of 83 individuals
who could allegedly verify destruction of chemical weapons and expresses his
hope that Iraq will draw up a similar of individuals who participated in
the destruction of biological warfare items.
Document 31 : Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in
Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update, February 14, 2003.
Source: http://www.iaea.org
In his update report, the director of the IAEA noted that his agency's
inspections had moved from the "reconnaissance phase" (aimed at re-
establishing knowledge of Iraqi nuclear capabilities) into the "
investigative phase" (achieving an understanding of Iraqi capabilities over
the previous four years).
He also reported on the status of the inspection process - noting that in
the preceding two weeks the IAEA had conducted 38 inspections at 19 sites,
and that its methods included sampling air, water, and sediment, as well as
the use of hand-held and car-borne gamma-ray detectors. With respect to
specific issues he addressed, among others, uranium acquisition, uranium
enrichment, and the high explosive, HMX.
Similarly to Blix, he reported that "we have to date found no evidence of
nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq," but that "a number of issues
are still under investigation." ElBaradei also noted that a new document
provided by Iraq contained "no new information," and expressed the hope that
the newly established Iraqi commissions "will be able to uncover documents
and other evidence that could assist in clarifying … remaining questions."
Document 32: Central Intelligence Agency/Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraqi
Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants, May 28, 2003.
Unclassified.
Source: http://www.cia.gov
In his February 5, 2003, presentation to the U.N. Security Council,
Secretary of State Colin Powell charged that Iraq had begun constructing
mobile facilities to produce biological weapons in the mid-1990s. This
program involved, he charged, the manufacture of mobile trailers and
railcars to produce biological agents, designed to evade U.N. inspectors.
Agent production reportedly took place from Thursday night through Friday, a
period during which the United Nations did not conduct inspections due to
the Muslim holiday.
This paper presents a joint CIA-DIA evaluation of two specialized tractor-
trailers and a mobile laboratory truck discovered in Iraq after the U.S.
invasion. Kurdish forces took one tractor-trailer into custody near Mosul in
late April. U.S. troops discovered the other in early May, at the al-Kindi
Research, Testing, Development, and Engineering Facility in Mosul. U.S.
troops also found the mobile laboratory, in late April. The CIA and DIA
analysts concluded that the discoveries constituted "the strongest evidence
to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program."
The text of this paper reviews the Intelligence Community's pre-war sources
on the Iraqi mobile program (including a chemical engineer, a civil engineer
, and a defector from the Iraqi Intelligence Service), and the Community's
pre-war assessment of the program. The paper also asserts that the
discovered plants are consistent with intelligence reports, and that
legitimate uses, including hydrogen production, are unlikely.
According to a subsequent New York Times report, engineers from the Defense
Intelligence Agency who examined the trailers concluded in June that the
vehicles were probably used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather
balloons, as the Iraqi had claimed.
Document 33 : CIA Statement on Recently Acquired Iraqi Centrifuge Equipment,
June 26, 2003.
Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/wmd/iraqi_centrifuge_equipment.htm
After Saddam Hussein's regime was deposed in March 2003, Dr. Mahdi Shukur
Ubaydi, who headed Iraq's uranium enrichment program before 1991, turned
over to U.S. officials in Baghdad a volume of centrifuge documents and
components he had hidden in his garden.
This brief CIA statement reports on some of what Dr. Ubaydi told U.S.
officials. The images, which were removed from the CIA's web page shortly
after their initial appearance, include both photographs of centrifuge parts
and blueprints.
Document 34: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision to go
to War in Iraq: Ninth Report of Session 2002-03, Volume I (London: The
Stationary Office
Limited, July 2003). Unclassified.
Source: http://www.uk.gov
The primary purpose of this document is to report the committee's assessment
of whether the British Parliament received "accurate and complete"
information from the government in the period leading up to military action
in Iraq - particularly with respect to weapons of mass destruction.
The two key sections of the report examine the claims made in the government
's
September and February "dossiers," including assertions concerning Iraq's
chemical and biological weapons capability, its long-range missile effort,
its nuclear weapons program, Iraq's alleged attempt to acquire uranium from
Africa, and the assertion that Iraqi forces could deploy chemical or
biological weapons within 45 minutes of being given an order to do so.
The report also contains 33 conclusions and recommendations. The committee
concluded that the government genuinely perceived "a real and present danger
" from Iraq, that in the absence of significant human intelligence Britain
was heavily dependent on US technical intelligence, defectors, and exiles "
with an agenda of their own," and that the accuracy of British assessments
could not yet be determined.
Document 35: Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet
on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of
Mass Destruction, August 11, 2003.
Source: http://cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr08112003.htm
In the face of criticism in the press and Congress over the apparent
disparities between the claims of the October 2002 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraqi WMD and the failure to find weapons stocks or open
production lines in the aftermath of the war, DCI Tenet issued this
statement in defense of the estimate.
He characterizes much of the commentary as "misinformed, misleading, and
just plain wrong," and goes on to state that "we stand by the judgments in
the NIE," and promises that after the Iraq Survey Group completes its work,
"but not before," the Intelligence Community, "will stand back to
professionally review where were are."
Tenet's statement goes on to defend the consistency of the community's
analysis concerning Iraqi programs as well as its collection efforts after
the departure of U.N. inspectors in 1998. He then proceeds to examine
intelligence performance with each component of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction programs - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and
delivery systems.
The most extensive part of his statement is a defense of the estimate's
judgment that Iraq was seeking to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.
He states that this conclusion was based on six factors, which did not
include its reported attempt to acquire uranium from Africa. In addition, he
describes the alternative views within the Intelligence Community as to
whether Iraq was attempting to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for use
in uranium enrichment or for conventional military uses.
Document 36: House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction - Intelligence and Assessments (London: The
Stationery Office Limited, September 2003). Unclassified.
Source: http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/isc/
The House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee defined the
objective of their report as determining "whether the available intelligence
, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly
assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in [British] Government
publications."
The initial portions of the report provide overviews of the committee's
investigation, of the intelligence assessment organizations (the Joint
Intelligence Committee and Assessments Staff), and of JIC assessments from
August 1990 to September 2002. The subsequent parts of the study focus on
the September 2002 dossier (including the claims that Iraqi forces could
deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes and had sought to
purchase uranium from Africa), assessments from October 2002 to March 2003,
the February 2003 document on Iraqi denial and deception (which included
substantial portions, without attribution, from a previously published, non-
governmental analysis), and several other issues, including intelligence
support to U.N. inspectors.
The report includes twenty-six conclusions and recommendations concerning a
variety of topics - including the adequacy of the Secret Intelligence
Service's human intelligence effort in Iraq, whether it was reasonable that
British intelligence analysts drew the conclusions they did given the
available intelligence on Iraqi WMD programs, how quickly it appeared Iraqi
forces could employ chemical or biological weapons, and decisions to include
or exclude certain information or conclusions about Iraqi capabilities and
the extent of the threat posed to Britain.
Document 37: Letter, Porter J. Goss and Jane Harman, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, to George J. Tenet, Director of Central
Intelligence, September 25,
2003. Unclassified.
Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36817-2003Oct2?language=printer
This letter criticizes the Intelligence Community's performance in providing
intelligence related to Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
programs, as well as with respect to Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda. Goss and Harman
, the committee's chairman and vice chairman, respectively, write that a "
dearth of post-1998 underlying intelligence reflects a weakness in
intelligence collection" - pointing to past committee concerns about
inadequacies in human intelligence (HUMINT) and measurement and signature
intelligence (MASINT) crucial to producing accurate assessments on weapons
of mass destruction and terrorism. The "lack of specific intelligence on
regime plans and intentions, WMD, and Iraq's support to terrorist groups
appears to have hampered the IC's ability to provide a better assessment to
policymakers from 1998 through 2003."
Document 38: Letter, George J. Tenet to Honorable Porter J. Goss, October 1,
2003. Unclassified.
Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36712-2003Oct2?language=printer
In this letter to Porter Goss, the chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Director of Central Intelligence George
Tenet disputes the contents of the September 25 letter Tenet received from
Goss and Committee Vice Chairman Jane Harman. He also criticizes the
Committee's distribution of the letter to the press "before providing the
Intelligence Community any reasonable opportunity to respond."
Tenet argues that the HPSCI was not in a position to fully assess the
Intelligence Community's performance on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
programs or its ties to al-Qaeda. The Committee, Tenet charged, had reached
its conclusions without having heard from David Kay, special advisor to the
Iraq Survey Group - which had been charged with searching Iraq for weapons
of mass destruction.
Further, Tenet charged that the Committee's assertion that the Intelligence
Community did not challenge longstanding judgments and assessments was "
simply wrong." He also accused the Committee of having failed to try to
understand the scope of U.S. collection activities targeted against Iraqi
WMD programs.
Document 39: Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report of the
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense
, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, October 2, 2003.
Unclassified.
Source: http://cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html
In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces failed to
uncover production facilities for, or stocks of, weapons of mass destruction
. To improve the chances of success, an Iraq Survey Group was established
under the direction of Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the chief of the Defense
Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations. Dr. David Kay, who served
as a U.N. weapon inspector for several years after the 1991 Persian Gulf War
, was appointed as a special advisor to the group, and would direct the
group's operations in Iraq.
Kay's October 2 presentation to the Congressional committees provides an
unclassified summary of the group's interim report. Kay told the attending
members that the ISG had not yet found stocks of weapons, but was not at a
point where it could be determined definitively that such weapons stocks did
not exist or that they existed before the war but had been relocated.
Kay also noted a number of factors that had hindered the ISG's search -
including the compartmentalization of Iraqi WMD programs, deliberate
dispersion and destruction of material and documentation related to those
programs, post-war looting, and a "far from permissive environment" for
search activities.
In addition, Kay summarized some of the Survey Group's discoveries, which
included: a clandestine network of laboratories and safe-houses controlled
by the Iraqi Intelligence Services containing equipment suitable for CBW
research; reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a
scientists home; documents and equipment hidden in scientists' homes that
could be used for resuming uranium enrichment activities; and a continuing
covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited
SCUD missiles.
Document 40 : Stuart Cohen, Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from
Soft Myths, November 26, 2003. Unclassified.
Source: http://www.cia.gov/nic/speeches_iraq_wmd.htm
The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National
Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no
reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information
available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were
profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other
intelligence agencies.
Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths
concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going
to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of
the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties
concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts
overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."
Document 41: Congresswoman Jane Harman, "The Intelligence on Iraq's WMD:
Looking Back to Look Forward," January 16, 2004.
Source: http://www.house.gov/harman/press/releases/2004/011604_WAC.html
This speech given by the Jane Harman (D-CA), the vice chairman of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, characterized the October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs
as "significantly flawed." She singled out two specific conclusions - that
Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, and that it was
reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, noting that "these were the
centerpieces of the NIE and of the case for war and it appears likely that
both were wrong."
Harman went on to call for creation of a Director of National Intelligence
who would serve as a member of the president's cabinet, increased
collaboration within the intelligence community, and "virtual reorganization
" - creating "task forces" through altered personnel policies and providing
virtual workplaces.
Document 42: Transcript of David Kay testimony before Senate Armed Services
Committee, January 28, 2004
Source: http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/ pdf/Iraq/kaytestimony.pdf
David Kay appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee shortly after
he resigned as special advisor to the Iraq Survey Group. Kay states,
referring to the expectation that there would be substantial stocks of, and
production lines for, chemical and biological weapons in Iraq, that "we were
almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here." He also notes that
other foreign intelligence agencies, including the French and the German,
also had believed that Iraq possessed such stocks and production lines. In
addition, he discusses the issue of whether political pressure had any
impact on the content of the October 2002 national intelligence estimate (
Document 15). Kay also notes that "based on the work of the Iraq Survey
Group … Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441.
He goes on to note the discovery of hundreds of instances of activities
prohibited by U.N. Resolution 687.
Document 43: George J. Tenet, Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction, remarks
prepared for delivery at Georgetown University February 5, 2004.
Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html
In the midst of the continuing post-war controversy over intelligence
estimates of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program, Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet gave this speech in which he addressed "how the
United States intelligence community evaluated Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programs over the past decade, leading to a National
Intelligence Estimate in October of 2002."
In his talk, Tenet reviewed the "three streams of information" available
concerning Iraqi WMD programs - Iraq's history, the inability of Iraq to
account for weapons that it possessed at the time of the 1991 Gulf War, and
information obtained after U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998. He also
compared the estimate's descriptions of Iraqi WMD activities with what has
been discovered by the Iraq Survey Group. He argued that "it would have been
difficult for analysts to come to any different conclusions than the ones
reached in October of 2002," but went on to say that "in our business that
is not good enough."
Tenet also spoke about the role of U.S. and British intelligence in
monitoring Libyan WMD, the activities of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q.
Khan, and related topics.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Notes
1. George W. Bush, National Security Directive 54, Responding to Iraqi
Aggression in the Gulf, January 15, 1991. Top Secret. See National Security
Archive Electronic Briefing Book Number 39, Operation Desert Storm: Ten
Years After, January 17, 2001, Document 4.
2. See Sharon A. Squassoni, Congressional Research Service, Iraq: U.N.
Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 7, 2003, pp. 13-14.
3. Accounts of the war and the diplomatic battles prior to it, include Todd
S. Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq (New York: Times
Books, 2003); William Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain, Europe, and the
War in Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
4. James Risen, "U.S. Asks Ex-U.N. Inspector To Advise on Arms Search," New
York Times, June 12, 2003, p. A14; Central Intelligence Agency, "DCI Tenet
Announces Appointment of David Kay as Special Advisor," June 11, 2003, (
available at www.cia.gov); Kenneth Gerhart, "The Changing Face of ISG's Home
Base," Communique, July-August 2003, pp.5-7.
5. On the various element of the controversy, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies
, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," The Atlantic, January 2004, pp. 78-92
; Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews, and George Perkovich, WMD in Iraq:
evidence and implications (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2004); Thomas Powers, "The Vanishing Case for War," New
York Review of Books, December 4, 2003, pp. 12-17. With regard to the
possibility that human sources knowingly provided false information on
weapons of mass destruction as well as Saddam's whereabouts on the opening
night of the war, see Bob Drogin, "U.S. Suspects It Received False Iraq Arms
Tips," Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2003; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough
, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, January 2, 2004, p. A7.
6. See note 5, the citations for Pollack; Cirincione, Matthews and Perkovich
; and Powers.
7. Joby Warrick, "Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake," Washington Post, March
8, 2003, pp. A1, A18.
8. Mike Allen and Barton Gellman, "Preemptive Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic
Doctrine," Washington Post, December 11, 2002, pp. A1, A26.
9. Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen Not Biological Arms,"
New York Times, August 9, 2003, pp. A1,
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
For Further Reading
David Albright, Iraq's Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction,
December 5, 2003, (available at http://www.isis-online.org)
Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews, and George Perkovich, WMD in Iraq:
evidence and implications (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2004) (available at http://www.ceip.org)
Anthony Cordesman, Intelligence and Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: The
Lessons from the Iraq War, July 1, 2003 (available at http://www.csis.org)
Barton Gellman, "Iraq's Arsenal Was Only on Paper," Washington Post, January
7, 2004, pp. A1, A14-A15.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iraq's Weapons of Mass
Destruction: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, September 2003).
Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," The
Atlantic, January 2004, pp. 78-92 (also available at http://www.theatlantic.com)
Thomas Powers, "The Vanishing Case for War," New York Review of Books,
December 4, 2003, pp. 12-17.
home | about | documents | news | publications | FOIA | research |
internships | search | donate | mailing list
Contents of this website Copyright 1995-2004 National Security Archive. All
rights reserved. Terms and conditions for use of materials found on this
website.
Forgery,” published by WND July 26, 2011. | s*****r
发帖数: 11545 | 6 She is an idiot for pursuing unconditional love in a whorehouse. What does
she expect from a hooker if she makes herself look like a whore? | l*****7
发帖数: 8463 | 7 Clinton, "I did not have sexual relations with that woman...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KiIP_KDQmXs
Monica Lewinsky Interview [Part 1 of 6]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpCv-UT2yCU&feature=related
http://spectator.org/archives/2012/08/23/bill-clinton-and-legit
Bill Clinton and Legitimate Rape
By Jeffrey Lord on 8.23.12 @ 6:09AM
Clinton rape scandal resurfaces in Akin controversy: The McCaskill-Clinton
videos.
"…the threat, use and cultural acceptance of sexual force is a pervasive
process of intimidation that affects all women." -- Feminist Susan
Brownmiller in her 1975 bestseller Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape
"Rape is rape. And the idea that we should be parsing and qualifying and
slicing what types of rape we are talking about doesn't make sense to the
American people and certainly doesn't make sense to me." -- President Obama
on Congressman Todd Akin's use of the term "legitimate rape"
"Bill Clinton to Have Leading Role at Party's Convention" -- July 30, 2012
New York Times story announcing that the Obama campaign has selected the
former President to nominate Obama
So.
The Obama White House has decided to legitimize rape.
Talk about a mistake.
President Obama, after a considerable absence, abruptly appeared in the
White House pressroom the other day to address Congressman Todd Akin's
wildly offensive comment about "legitimate rape." In the President's own
words: "Rape is rape. And the idea that we should be parsing and qualifying
and slicing what types of rape we are talking about doesn't make sense to
the American people and certainly doesn't make sense to me."
In a stroke the President -- not to mention his allies on Capitol Hill, in
the media and left-leaning interest groups -- resurrected one of the most
divisive moments of the 1990's.
That moment?
What NBC reporter Lisa Myers was said in the day to have called the "very
credible" allegation that Bill Clinton raped a Clinton campaign worker named
Juanita Broaddrick.
In a ricochet doubtless unintended, the decision by the White House to
personally insert the President into the Akin "legitimate rape" controversy
now focuses attention on two stark realities:
· The selection of Clinton to give the nominating speech for President
Obama in a primetime TV slot at the Democrats' convention.
· Re-surfacing videos of Missouri Senator Claire McCaskill campaigning with
Clinton while saying she "wouldn't want him near my daughter." Videos like
this one and this one of McCaskill on Meet the Press.
In other words, both Obama -- not to mention McCaskill -- are now
essentially and literally "legitimizing rape" by the selection of Clinton as
Obama's nominator -- and as the man who raised funds for McCaskill in the
first place.
Will McCaskill return the funds Clinton raised for her in 2006? What do you
think?
Just call it the legitimizing of rape.
Page: 1 2 3 > Last ›
http://www.dcdave.com/article5/070729.htm
Is Hillary Clinton a Lesbian?
The essential information contained in this article was known to the author
for many years. As explained in the text, only when Ms. Clinton became an
announced candidate for the U.S. presidency did he see fit to publish it.
According to Carl Bernstein, in his recent book, A Woman in Charge: The Life
of Hillary Rodham Clinton, the answer to the title question is, as former
CIA Director George Tenet might say, a slam dunk, and it is negative.
Throughout her years as a public person there has been sexual innuendo about
Hillary implying that somewhere along her way--in the rumor it is usually
at Wellesley--she experimented with lesbianism. (One wonders if a malleable
male politician, say Bill Clinton, a former overweight band boy, would be
accused of having "experimented" with being gay at Georgetown University, in
the same manner as "tough, inflexible" Hillary at Wellesley.) When not
whispered sotto voce, such innuendo about her reached its most incendiary
and unsupportable in 2005 with Edward Klein's supposed biography, The Truth
about Hillary, an ideological screed, which contains barely smidgens--with
no context--about what its title promises. Little could be more
contradictory to what is known about Hillary's actual character and history-
-and her manner, with, respectively, men and women who are her friends--than
the notion of her as a lesbian. p. 47
However, DC Dave followers familiar with the Seventeen Techniques for Truth
Suppression will notice that Bernstein, in this short passage, has managed
to work in numbers 3, 4, and 6. He has characterized what are really quite
serious specific allegations as "rumors;" he has set up a straw man in the
form of someone who would jump to the conclusion that a "tough, inflexible"
female must have lesbian inclinations, and he has zeroed in on the charges
of the created straw man, Edward Klein; and he has impugned Klein's motives
as ideological.
In a previous article I have called Klein a "crude propagandist," not just
for his Hillary biography, which is subtitled, "What She Knew, When She Knew
It, and How Far She'll Go to Become President," but especially for his work
as the ghost writer of the Parade magazine Walter Scott column. If one does
an Internet search, using any search engine, for the terms "Hillary lesbian
," what one finds right away is that Klein's extremely weak case for Hillary
's possible lesbianism currently dominates the Worldwide Web. Finding the
Outside magazine article that leads with Jack Wheeler's charges emanating
from White House Secret Service contacts or Gennifer Flowers's quote from
Bill about Hillary's Sapphic practices is next to impossible (“Lord of the
Big Guys” by Alex Heard, Feb. 1994).
Edward Klein has become virtually everyone's straw man of choice when it
comes to Hillary and lesbianism, and it should be abundantly clear to anyone
not blinded by his own political partisanship that that is what was
intended. And the attacks on Klein are not confined to the usual mainstream
"liberal" venues. This is how Bill Press leads off his article in Joseph
Farah's generally conservative World Net Daily:
Just when you think the right-wing hate machine could sink no lower, along
comes the pack of lies just packaged by Penguin Books under the title "The
Truth About Hillary," by Edward Klein. The truth about Hillary? No way. It's
nothing but a hatchet job, aimed at destroying Sen. Clinton's reputation
and political future. The jacket flap alone exposes Klein as nothing but a
right-wing political assassin.
Press goes on to inform us that, "In his personal attacks against Hillary
Clinton, Klein stoops so low that he's been abandoned by some of his fellow
conservatives. Bill O'Reilly won't book him on his Fox News show. Chief
Clinton hater Dick Morris condemned the book. And New York Post columnist
John Podhoretz called it a 'smear for profit.'"
One search engine hit looks a bit more promising. A posting on the
conservative, Clinton-hating, Free Republic forum is entitled Exposed!
Hillary Lived with Lesbian - The Truth about Their 4-YEAR Relationship (with
pics), Globe Magazine, May 4, 2004 weekly issue, Bob Altman.
What follows is a lot of the usual anti-Clinton banter in posting after
posting in the thread, until someone pleads, "Can anyone post the article
itself or summarize the information in it?" Unfortunately, no one does, or
if they tried to it didn't make it up on the forum. That someone might have
tried and failed looks like a real possibility when one considers what
happened to the original poster, whose screen name is "threat matrix." When
one clicks on his name, what comes up is, "This account has been banned or
suspended." That is precisely what happened to me on Free Republic when I
persisted in exposing the work of false critics of the Clintons some years
ago.
Perhaps the Globe article had no substance to it. After all, it is a
supermarket tabloid of the sort that specializes in celebrity gossip, but,
at times, such rags can be more reliable, and certainly more hard-hitting,
than the mainstream press. A couple of examples that I ran across were the
July 27, 1999, Star article about the branding of pledges by the Yale
fraternity of which young George Bush was president and the February 19,
2002, article in the National Enquirer about the questionable "suicide" of
Enron executive Cliff Baxter. If anyone might have saved a copy of that
Globe article, I would appreciate it if they would copy it and send it to me.
The Evidence
With so much sand being thrown into our eyes by the likes of Carl Bernstein
and Bill Press, readers need to be reminded that there is a rather large
body of evidence that Hillary Clinton is, indeed, a lesbian, and not just
someone who might have merely dabbled in the practice at one time or another
. It goes beyond her hard manner and her most un-wife-like indifference to
her husband's carousing. Here is a review of what was first presented in "
Hillary Biographer Crude Propagandist":
· Gennifer Flowers quoted her lover, Bill Clinton, colorfully, and to this
writer's Southern ears, quite authentically, with respect to Hillary's
experience in performing oral sex on women on page 42 of her book, Passion
and Betrayal.
· Dr. Jack Wheeler, citing unnamed Secret Service agents, reported in a
published interview that the agents had caught Hillary in the sex act with
another woman in the White House and named a prominent Hollywood actress who
hails from Arkansas as one of her preferred partners. Secret Service agents
were also the source of the story told to the policeman son-in-law of a
colleague of this writer that Hillary had a regular woman whom she brought
into the White House for sexual purposes.
· Jerry Oppenheimer repeated and dismissed the Washington "rumor" in his
book, State of the Union: Inside the Complex Marriage of Bill and Hillary
Clinton, that a Washington veterinarian, on house call to the White House to
treat a sick Socks, the Clinton cat, had "opened the wrong door" and caught
Hillary in bed with another woman. This is virtually the same story that
was told to me in early 1993, the first I had heard that Hillary might be a
lesbian. In the previous article I characterized the account as fourth-hand
to me, which might have left readers with the impression that, as evidence,
it was less solid than it actually is. Any weakness in the chain of
communication of the story could easily bring it down. One of the people
might have been simply repeating a rumor or a pure fabrication, one might
suspect. So let's have a closer look at that chain: The person who told me
was a business contact of some years' standing. I don't know anything about
his political leanings; we never discussed politics. His overall credibility
was important, because he was engaged in selling my organization on a
product that his organization has developed, with millions of dollars in the
balance. He was leaving my office at the end of the day and introduced the
subject in an offhand sort of way. His sister, he said, was a Washington-
area veterinarian who has a friend who is another Washington-area
veterinarian. That friend had told her that she had received a call from the
White House requesting someone to come treat the Clinton's sick cat. She
sent a female assistant, who had difficulty locating the cat. In her search,
she happened to open what must have been Hillary's bedroom door, and there
in the bed were two women, one of whom she took to be Hillary. She told her
boss about the incident, the boss told her friend, the friend told her
brother, and the brother told me.
There it is in one place, the best evidence of the alleged lesbianism, as it
is known to this writer, of the person who, we are told by the national
media, is currently the nationally-preferred candidate for president of the
United States. One may contrast it with the various red herrings that can be
found in the various books and articles about Hillary that deign to broach
the subject. I would urge everyone with an interest in who might be the next
occupant of the position of leader of the world's most powerful country to
have a look at the evidence and make up his or her own mind about it.
One could hardly fail to see that I would answer the title question in the
affirmative. That conclusion is heavily influenced by my belief in the
credibility of two acquaintances. The reader's conclusion, in turn, would
depend to a degree on how reliable I am perceived to be. On that point, one
might notice that I am in a very similar position to the man who told me the
veterinarian story. A visit to my home page will show you that I am also
trying to sell my audience on some other very important things--although in
this case there is no personal financial gain hanging in the balance. I
would not want to do anything to damage my credibility with respect to those
other matters. At the same time, one may read what I have written about
those other important things as a means of assessing my general credibility,
and, therefore, my credibility with respect to the question at issue.
Why It Matters
In the previous article, I argued that Hillary's presumed lesbianism is
important primarily because it is a secret and that, along with far more
important things that have also been covered up about her, would make her
subject to blackmail. If she were an open lesbian, it may or may not be
worth talking about, depending upon one's ideological orientation, but I don
't believe that it would be as dangerous for the country's future. The same
could be said if she were simply running again to be one of one hundred U.S.
senators.
If you are a partisan Democrat (for those few who might have read this far),
it ought to matter to you as well. If you are like most of the ones I know,
you have already told anyone who will listen that you don't care about
anyone's sexual orientation and that anyone who would even bring up such
things is nothing but a low-life and a bigot, and probably a hypocrite, to
boot. But doesn't it bother you that people who surely don't wish the
Democrats well, and who seem to hate Hillary Clinton with a passion, have
been holding their fire with respect to the published evidence of Hillary's
lesbianism? Isn't it far better to get this matter before the public before
she is the only choice that Americans have for president except a Republican
who would be likely to pursue some version of George Bush’s despised
policies? You may not care whether or not Hillary is a lesbian, but you can'
t be sure about the views of the general voting public.
Concerning the despised policies, I believe that the evidence is strong that
she is the most likely of the Democratic candidates to continue to pursue
the worst one of all, which is the war in Iraq (as well as the war in
Afghanistan). Increasingly, the war's supporters seem to think so as well.
She was all for Bill's foreign interventions when he was president, she
voted to support the attack upon Iraq, and she refuses to apologize for it.
Whatever she might say now, I believe that what she has said and done in the
past indicates that she is the most likely candidate--maybe in either party
--to continue the policies of the Bush-Clinton era. So it is more important
that it is Hillary Clinton who is probably being duplicitous about her
likely lesbianism than it would be if it were someone else, almost anyone
else.
It's not just the policies that she would pursue, but the fact that the
Clinton administration from beginning to end, from the Vincent Foster murder
to the Marc Rich pardon, was a veritable sinkhole of corruption. The
Clinton corruption, like the Clinton policies, also shows a great deal of
overlap with that of the Bushes, going back to the days when Bill was
governor of Arkansas and the first George Bush was the president, and
illegal drugs were being smuggled into the country through an airstrip in
Mean, Arkansas. Richard Ben-Veniste was a lawyer for the later murdered drug
pilot, Barry Seal, in the Mean operation. As lead Democratic counsel on the
Senate committee looking into the death of Hillary's friend and long-time
colleague, Foster, Ben-Veniste did yeoman work on the cover-up. George W.
Bush rewarded him by making him a member of the 9-11 Commission. Ben-Veniste
's Republican counterpart in the Senate Foster cover-up was Michael Chertoff
. Chertoff now occupies one of the most powerful positions in the country as
head of Homeland Security. Playing even more important roles in the Foster
death cover-up were the lawyers John Bates and Brett Kavanaugh, who were key
"investigators" in the Kenneth Starr sham inquiry into Foster's death.
George Bush has made them both federal judges. Bates recently threw out the
lawsuit of the outed CIA operative, Valerie Plame, against Vice President
Richard Cheney. Bringing things full circle, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, whose
prison sentence for perjury in the Plame case was recently voided by Bush,
was the lawyer for Marc Rich.
Perhaps the strongest argument for a full airing of the question of Hillary'
s lesbianism is that the American mainstream press is working so hard to
keep the lid on the question and is protecting and promoting Hillary for
president in many of the same ways that they have protected and promoted
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. They clearly want her to be president, and
that can't be good, considering whom they have clearly wanted to be
president in recent history and what the results have been. An example of
their devious Hillary promotion was on display in the coverage of the recent
Democratic candidates' debate from South Carolina. At its conclusion, CNN
turned to its expert commentator, Jeffrey Toobin, for an assessment. Toobin,
with a bon mot that he had doubtless prepared before the debate ever took
place, because no fair-minded observer could have perceived her as so
dominant, opined that the group came across as "Gladys Knight and the Pips,"
with Hillary in the starring role and the others as mere anonymous backups.
Hillary stood out, he said, as the one who seemed most "presidential." No
mention was made when Toobin was introduced that he is a longtime apologist
for the Clintons who has even written a book belittling the charges of
wrongdoing against them.
Whether it has to do with her sexual preferences or her other actions as a
public figure, you can be sure that these opinion molders, Toobin, Press,
Klein, Bernstein, and the rest of the mainstream media are engaging in the
first of the Seventeen Techniques for Truth Suppression, they are dummying
up. They are not telling us everything that we need to know about Hillary
Clinton. Sunlight is still the best political disinfectant, and we can
hardly get too much of it. In the case of Bernstein, we don't have to guess
that he knows more than he's telling us. It's a virtual certainty that he
has read the most revealing book about the corruption of the Clintons that
has been published. That is The Secret Life of Bill Clinton: The Unreported
Stories, by the British reporter, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard. We know that
because we know that the book is in Bernstein's personal library. You can
see the dust jacket with the picture of Hillary whispering into Bill's ear
in this photograph of Bernstein in his study. The book is directly above the
cuff of his right shirt sleeve.
Since we began this essay with a quote from Carl Bernstein, a thoroughly
dishonest quote, as the evidence we have presented shows, we shall leave the
reader with a quote about the young Bernstein from his high school years
when he was just beginning to show his talent:
It was Carl's best American history paper, Alma Davidson, his teacher,
thought. The essay, a total of fourteen pages, complete with footnotes, was
neatly typed and well written. The subject was the famous South American
political hero Salvador Lopez. That puzzled her. She had never heard of
Salvador Lopez.
A few days later Carl got the paper back. He received an F. Everything in
the paper had been made up. Indeed, there was no Salvador Lopez. -- Adrian
Havill, Deep Truth: The Lives of Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, p. 22.
Thus did Bernstein reveal, well before he began to get paid for it, that he
had just the right stuff to be one of our leading Hillary Clinton-promoting
journalists.
David Martin
July 29, 2007
Addendum 1
Concerning the danger of having a closeted homosexual in a high position in
government, see also “Were Russians about to Catch Hillary in Lesbian Honey
Trap?”
David Martin
April 6, 2012
Addendum 2
After this article was posted on Rense.com on April 27, 2012, I received a
couple of emails in which I was asked why I had not mentioned the one
published first-hand account in which a woman talks of her own intimate
sexual encounter with Hillary Clinton. That is in the memoir of Cathy O’
Brien, with the assistance of Mark Phillips, Trance Formation of America,
with the very descriptive subtitle “The True Life Story of a CIA Mind
Control Slave.”
My excuse was that I bought and read the book shortly after it came out in
1995 and that with all the shocking allegations contained in it, I had
completely forgotten about the description of the Hillary tryst. Now that I
have been reminded, I must say that I don’t know quite what to make of it.
At this point my thoughts on the subject come close to those of Robert
Sterling, the editor of The Konformist, as he recounts them here., although
I would hardly characterize O’Brien’s talks as “public ravings.”
Furthermore, in most cases I would prefer to hold Sterling’s writings at a
safe arm’s length.
For those wishing to make up their own minds, the entire book is now online,
and the account of the Hillary liaison can be found near the end of Chapter
14. The book can be purchased at the web site http://www.trance-formation.com/.
CIA mind control is certainly a reality, as described in part by the
Wikipedia page on Project MKULTRA.
David Martin
May 1, 2012
Home Page Column Column 5 Archive Contact | l*****7
发帖数: 8463 | 8 http://www.boycottliberalism.com/Clinton-Quotes.htm
Bill Clinton Quotes
William Jefferson Clinton Quotes
Liberalism Defined
Exposing Liberalism to Light
"When I was in England I experimented with marijuana a time or two—and didn
't like it—and didn't inhale and never tried inhaling again"
"But I want to say one thing to the American people. I want you to listen to
me. I'm going to say this again. I did not have sexual relations with that
woman, Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie, not a single time; never.
These allegations are false."
"Indeed I did have a relationship with Ms Lewinsky that was not appropriate.
In fact, it was wrong."
Deposition by Bill Clinton in the Pula Jones Case
Q. Mr. President, before the break, we were talking about Monica Lewinsky.
At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky alone together in the Oval Office?
A. I don't recall, but as I said, when she worked at the legislative affairs
office, they always had somebody there on the weekends. I typically worked
some on the weekends. Sometimes they'd bring me things on the weekends. She
– it seems to me she brought things to me once or twice on the weekends. In
that case, whatever time she would be in there, drop it off, exchange a few
words and go, she was there. I don't have any specific recollections of
what the issues were, what was going on, but when the Congress is there, we'
re working all the time, and typically I would do some work on one of the
days of the weekends in the afternoon.
Q. So I understand, your testimony is that it was possible, then, that you
were alone with her, but you have no specific recollection of that ever
happening?
A. Yes, that's correct. It's possible that she, in, while she was working
there, brought something to me and that at the time she brought it to me,
she was the only person there. That's possible.
Q. At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky alone in the hallway between the
Oval Office and this kitchen area?
A. I don't believe so, unless we were walking back to the back dining room
with the pizzas. I just, I don't remember. I don't believe we were alone in
the hallway, no.
Q. At any time have you and Monica Lewinsky ever been alone together in any
room in the White House?
A. I think I testified to that earlier. I think that there is a, it is – I
have no specific recollection, but it seems to me that she was on duty on a
couple of occasions working for the legislative affairs office and brought
me some things to sign, something on the weekend. That's – I have a general
memory of that.
Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that Monica Lewinsky
had been served with a subpoena in this case?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Excluding conversations that you may have had with Mr. Bennett or any of
your attorneys in this case, within the past two weeks has anyone reported
to you that they had had a conversation with Monica Lewinsky concerning this
lawsuit?
A. I don't believe so. I'm sorry, I just don't believe so.
Q. Did you have an extramarital sexual affair with Monica Lewinsky?
A. No.
Q. If she told someone that she had a sexual affair with you beginning in
November of 1995, would that be a lie?
A. It's certainly not the truth. It would not be the truth.
Q. I think I used the term "sexual affair." And so the record is completely
clear, have you ever had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, as that term
is defined in Deposition Exhibit 1, as modified by the Court.
A. I have never had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky. I've never had an
affair with her.
Bill Clinton's testimony before Office of the Independent Counsel
prosecutors investigating the president's relationship with former White
House intern Monica Lewinsky
"When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996, and
once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters
did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not constitute sexual
relations, as I understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998
deposition."
"But they did involve inappropriate, intimate contact. These inappropriate
encounters ended at my insistence in early 1997. I also had occasional
telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual
banter."
"I will try to answer to the best of my ability other questions, including
questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, questions about my
understanding of the term of sexual relations, as I understood it to be
defined at my January 17th, 1998, deposition, and questions concerning
alleged subordination of perjury, obstruction of justice and intimidation of
witnesses."
"When she used two different terms, sexual relationship, if she meant by
that what most people mean by it, then that is not an untruthful statement."
"believe -- I believe that the common understanding of the term, if you say
two people are having a sexual relationship, most people believe that
includes intercourse. So if that's what Ms. Lewinsky thought, then this is a
truthful affidavit. I don't know what was in her mind, but if that's what
she thought, the affidavit is true."
"Well, if you go back to my statement, I remember there were a few times in
'96. I can't say with any certainty. There was once in early '97. After she
left the White House, I do not believe I ever had any inappropriate contact
with her in the rest of '96. There was one occasion in '97 when, regrettably
, that we were together for a few minutes. I think about 20 minutes. And
there was inappropriate contact."
"I do not think there is anything improper about a man giving a woman a gift
or a woman giving a man a gift, that necessarily connotes an improper
relationship. So it didn't bother me. I wasn't -- you know, this was
December 28th. I was -- I gave her some gifts. I wasn't worried about it. I
thought it was an all right thing to do."
"Sir, the truth is that most of the time, even when she was expressing her
feelings for me in affectionate terms, I believe that she had accepted,
understood my decision to stop this inappropriate contact. She knew from the
very beginning of our relationship that I was apprehensive about it. And I
think that in a way she felt a little freer to be affectionate, because she
knew that nothing else was going to happen."
"Most of them were signed "Love," you know, "Love, Monica." I don't know
that I would consider -- I don't believe that in most of these cards and
letters she professed her love, but she might well have."
"It depends upon what the meaning of the word is means. If is means is, and
never has been, that's one thing. If it means, there is none, that was a
completely true statement."
"I said I was very well prepared to talk about Paula Jones and to talk about
Kathleen Willey, because she had made a related charge. She was the only
person that I think I was asked about who had anything to do with the --
anything that would remotely approximate sexual harassment."
"Now, someone had asked me on that day, are you having any kind of sexual
relations with Ms. Lewinsky -- that is ask me a question in the present
tense -- I would have said no. And it would have been completely true."
"I mean that at the time of the deposition, we had been -- that was well-
beyond any point of improper contact between me and Ms. Lewinsky. So that
anyone generally speaking in the present tense saying that was not an
improper relationship would be telling the truth if that person said there
was not, in the present tense --the present tense encompassing many months."
"And it's an embarrassing and personally painful thing, the truth about my
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky."
"What I meant was, and what they can infer that I meant was, that I did
things that were -- when I was alone with her that were inappropriate and
wrong, but that they did not include any activity that I -- that was within
the definition of sexual relations that I was given by Judge Wright in the
deposition. I said that I did not do those things that were in that --
within that definition and I testified truthfully to that. And that's all I
can say about it. Now, you know, if there's any doubt on the part of the
grand jurors about whether I believe some kind of activity falls within that
definition or outside that definition, I'd be happy to try to answer that."
"Now respectfully, I believe the grand jurors can ask me if I believe --
just like that grand juror did -- could ask me, do you believe that this
conduct falls within that definition. If it does, then you're free to
conclude that my testimony is that I didn't do that. And I believe that you
can achieve that without requiring me to say and do things that I don't
think are necessary, and that I think, frankly, go too far in trying to
criminalize my private life."
"You are free to infer that my testimony is that I did not have sexual
relations as I understood this term to be defined."
"I had to acknowledge, because of this definition, that under this
definition I had actually had sexual relations once with Gennifer Flowers, a
person who had spread all kinds ridiculous, dishonest, exaggerated stories
about me for money. And I knew when I did that it would be leaked. It was.
And I was embarrassed. But I did it."
"I told you, in response to a grand jury's question -- you asked me did I
believe that oral sex performed on the person who was being deposed was
covered by that definition. And I said: No. I don't believe it's covered by
the definition. I said you were free to conclude that I did not do things
that I believe were covered by the definition."
"I'm not going to answer that question because I believe it's a question
about conduct that, whatever the answer to it is, would -- does not bear on
the perjury because oral sex performed on the deponent under this definition
is not sexual relations. It is not covered by this definition."
"I recall telling a number of those people that I didn't have -- either I
didn't have an affair with Monica Lewinsky or I didn't have sex with her.
And I believe, sir, that you will have to ask them what they thought. But I
was using those terms in the normal way people use them."
"I said there is nothing going on between us. That was true. I said I have
not had sex with her, as I define it. That was true."
"So I said things that were true. They may have been misleading, and if they
were, I will have take responsibility for it, and I'm sorry."
JIM LEHRER Interview I
JIM LEHRER: The news of this day is that Kenneth Starr, independent counsel,
is investigating allegations that you suborn perjury by encouraging a 24-
year-old woman, former White House intern, to lie under oath in a civil
deposition about her having had an affair with you. Mr. President, is that
true?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: That is not true. That is not true. I did not ask anyone
to tell anything other than the truth. There is no improper relationship and
I intend to cooperate with this inquiry, but that is not true.
JIM LEHRER: No improper relationship, define what you mean by that.
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well I think you know what it means. It means that there
is not a sexual relationship, an improper sexual relationship or any other
kind of improper relationship.
JIM LEHRER: You had no sexual relationship with this young woman?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: There is not a sexual relationship. That is accurate. We
are doing our best to cooperate here, but we don't know much yet, and that's
all I can say now. What I'm trying to do is to contain my natural impulses
and get back to work. It's important that we cooperate. I will cooperate,
but I want to focus on the work at hand.
JIM LEHRER: Just for the record, make sure I understand what your answer
means and there is no ambiguity about it --
PRESIDENT CLINTON: There is no ambiguity.
JIM LEHRER Interview II
JIM LEHRER: You wrote about it in the book, that because we had a pre--
already prearranged interview, you went ahead with the interview, and I did
the first interview with you, and I asked you if you had had a sexual--
improper relationship. I kept using the past tense, and you kept saying is,
"There is no relationship." My question to you is, was that--that was an
intentional dodge, was it not?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: It was an intentional dodge because I didn't want--I
respect you. I didn't want to lie to you, and I thought that I had to, as I
said in the book, buy two weeks time for things to calm down in order to
avoid having Ken Starr and his boys win this long fight that they were
fighting against me, and--but I also said in the book that I hated it and I
tried to--after I did that interview with you--I tried to confine my
comments thereafter just simply saying that I didn't violate any laws and I
didn't ask anybody else to, and that's pretty much what I said from there on
out.
Other Quotes
"I tried to walk a fine line between acting lawfully and testifying falsely,
but I now recognize that I did not fully accomplish this goal and am
certain my responses to questions about Ms. Lewinsky were false,"
"It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is. If the--if he--if 'is'
means is and never has been, that is not--that is one thing. If it means
there is none, that was a completely true statement....Now, if someone had
asked me on that day, are you having any kind of sexual relations with Ms.
Lewinsky, that is, asked me a question in the present tense, I would have
said no. And it would have been completely true."
"African-Americans watch the same news at night that ordinary Americans do."
"When I met her more than 35 years ago, I thought Hillary had the best
combination of mind and heart I’d ever seen – and I still do. But it’s
going to take every dollar to make sure that Americans get to know the real
Hillary, like I do.”
"We think it's important to help poor people in the world but we're going to
suck up 80 percent of the savings in the world, which could be going to
invest somewhere else because we think tax cuts for people who make a
million dollars a year are more important,"
"Climate change is more remote than terror but a more profound threat to the
future of the children and the grandchildren and the great-grandchildren I
hope all of you have."
"I think we should be in the Kyoto climate change system,"
"When we got real tough on visas - because one out of a zillion of them
might have a bomb - we lost a lot of brains. We might have dodged a bomb but
we lost a lot of brains."
"I authorized the CIA to get groups together to try to kill bin Laden."
"I worked hard to try to kill him."
"I got closer to killing him than anybody has gotten since. And if I were
still president, we'd have more than 20,000 troops there trying to kill him,
"
"I tried and I failed to get bin Laden. I regret it, but I did try and I did
everything I thought I responsibly could."
"I desperately wish that I had been president when the FBI and CIA finally
confirmed, officially, that bin Laden was responsible for the attack on the
U.S.S. Cole, .... "Then we could have launched an attack on Afghanistan
early."
"I always thought that bin Laden was a bigger threat than the Bush
administration did,"
"At the time, 1996, he (bin Laden) had committed no crime against America,
so I did not bring him here because we had no basis on which to hold him,
though we knew he wanted to commit crimes against America.
"And they will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. .
.. There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region
and the security of all the rest of us."
"The administration ... decided to launch this invasion virtually alone and
before the U.N. inspections were completed - with no real urgency, no
evidence that there were any weapons of mass destruction there,"
"For every one person who said they voted for Hamas because they wanted to
see Israel destroyed, there were one hundred who said they just wanted a
change and better life,"
"When [the U.S.] kicked out Saddam, they decided to dismantle the whole
authority structure,.... "Most of the people who were part of that structure
were good, decent people who were making the best out of a very bad
situation,"
"I agree that we should reach out to the Iranians and the Syrians and try to
get a regional solution.
Compiled by Thomas George
e****[email protected] | l*****7
发帖数: 8463 | 9 http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/08/ob
Obama has millions of fake Twitter followers
Comments 43
By David Jackson, USA TODAY
Updated 2012-08-24 11:42 AM
President Obama and Mitt Romney
CAPTIONAP photosPresident Obama's Twitter account has 18.8 million followers
-- but more than half of them really don't exist, according to reports.
A new Web tool has determined that 70% of Obama's crowd includes "fake
followers," The New York Times reports in a story about how Twitter
followers can be purchased.
"The practice has become so widespread that StatusPeople, a social media
management company in London, released a Web tool last month called the Fake
Follower Check that it says can ascertain how many fake followers you and
your friends have," the Times reports.
"Fake accounts tend to follow a lot of people but have few followers," said
Rob Waller, a founder of StatusPeople. "We then combine that with a few
other metrics to confirm the account is fake."
Notes the Times:
If accurate, the number of fake followers out there is surprising. According
to the StatusPeople tool, 71 percent of Lady Gaga's nearly 29 million
followers are "fake" or "inactive." So are 70 percent of President Obama's
nearly 19 million followers.
Republican opponent Mitt Romney has far fewer Twitter followers -- not quite
900,000 -- but it's a good bet that some of them are fake as well.
Both campaigns have denied buying Twitter followers.
See photos of: Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, Lady Gaga
TAGS:
Barack Obama Mitt Romney Lady Gaga
More from USATODAY
Four elected despite losing popular vote (USATODAY.COM in News)
Victoria's Secret brings sexy back to Manhattan (USATODAY.COM in Life)
Faker$: Put yourself on the cover of a magazine (USATODAY.COM in Technology
Live)
'He-Man': A simple but fun digital diversion (USATODAY.COM in Technology
Live) More from the web
Who is subsidizing whom? (ExxonMobil's Perspectives Blog)
Mitt Romney Hates the Crazy Christians Too (Vice)
When Should You Claim Your Social Security? (AARP.org)
Michelle Obama's Election Night Dress Was Exactly What America Needed (PHOTO
) (CafeMom)
Paul Ryan Ex-Girlfriend: Deneeta Pope (Picture and Video) (Zimbio) [?]
Antibacterial DNA: Haier's Solution to Cleaner Washing and Drying (Washer
Dryer Info)
[?]
PREVIOUS
White House didn't know about bin Laden book
NEXT
Obama team offers beer recipe -- for 25K signatures
To report corrections and clarifications, contact Standards Editor Brent
Jones. For publication consideration in the newspaper, send comments to
l*****[email protected]. Include name, phone number, city and state for
verification. To view our corrections, go to corrections.usatoday.com.
USA TODAY is now using Facebook Comments on our stories and blog posts to
provide an enhanced user experience. To post a comment, log into Facebook
and then "Add" your comment. To report spam or abuse, click the "X" in the
upper right corner of the comment box. To find out more, read the FAQ and
Conversation Guidelines.
Approval ratings, 1945-present
About David Jackson
David's journalism career spans three decades, including coverage of five
presidential elections, the Oklahoma City bombing, the 2000 Florida
presidential recount and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He has covered the
White House for USA TODAY since 2005. His interests include history,
politics, books, movies and college football -- not necessarily in that
order. More about David
Follow the Oval on Twitter: @The Oval, @djusatoday.
Also contributing to the Oval: Richard Wolf @richardjwolf; Aamer Madhani @
AamerISmad
Watch and rate ads from the 2012 campaign
Subscribe to The Oval
Subscribe to The Oval via RSS
Sign up for The Oval e-mail alerts
Delivered by FeedBurner
USA TODAY on 2012 races
Blogroll
ABC News
CBS News
CNN
Daily Kos
Drudge
FactCheck
FiveThirtyEight
Fox News
Hot Air
Memeorandum
MSNBC
MyDD
Newsweek
On Deadline
Politico 44
PolitiFact
Pollster.com
Power Line
Real Clear Politics
Roll Call
Swampland
Swing State Project
Talking Points Memo
The Caucus
The Corner
The Fix
The Hill
The Huffington Post
The Page
The Swamp
Top of the Ticket
Townhall.com
USA TODAY On Politics
U.S. News
Wizbang | l*****7
发帖数: 8463 | 10 http://www.freshusanews.com/
Create an article which reports a fake story about your friend and send it
to everyone you know for a laugh!
Almost in five seconds !
Already have an idea who is your victim? Put in the info:
First name:
(example: Michael)
Last name:
(example: Scofield)
Profession:
(example: student, professor, doctor)
Location:
(example: New York, Chicago)
Select story:
For male
Partying with the Hilton Sisters
Best Male Stripper
Arrested for Public Intoxication!
Wins the Mega Million
For female
New 'Seventeen' Face
Smashes her Boyfriend's car Because of Facebook
Fakes Documents for a Boob Job
Addicted to Porn
Want to know when new stories are added? Enter your email: | l*****7
发帖数: 8463 | | g********6
发帖数: 951 | 12 球中文摘要，泻泻
the
message
I
【在 l*****7 的大作中提到】
: 造假: 美国第一!!! 哈哈
: http://www.mandatory.com/2012/11/13/ok-cupid-an-exploration-int
: OK Cupid: An Exploration Into Just How Low Some Guys Will Go
: Related:Funny, OkCupid, online dating, Sex and Dating
: By Rob FeeNov 13, 2012
: A friend of mine recently signed up for OKCupid (for those who might be
: unaware: an online dating site) and was constantly telling me about all the
: bizarre and pathetic lines guys try to use on her via instant message. She
: would very blatantly shoot them down and yet they would continue to message
: her. Obviously, for most women this doesn't come as a surprise whatsoever. I
|
|
