D********n
发帖数: 1161 | 1 金三是个极其聪明，极富智慧的人物。
做事不但有胆略，而且有谋略。
每次挑衅，机会和时机都是恰当好处。
目前往后，金三稳坐高山之巅，笑看世界风云。
我国枭雄蒋公介石，早就给金三留下精囊妙计：
不投降，不谈判，不宣战。
只要自己家里喝着小酒，搂着老婆，做做美梦就行。
中、美、俄三国演义，紧锣密鼓，就要你死我活了。
所以，三胖的最后手段，就是不用任何手段。
不过，瞅住机会，时不时地放几个炮仗，以表示惬意，还是必要必须和必需的。 | D********n
发帖数: 1161 | 2 Why haven’t sanctions on North Korea worked? Two very different theories.
North Korea has been under United Nations sanctions since 2006. These
sanctions have grown significantly stronger over time. Other nations and
entities, including the United States and the European Union, also have
imposed unilateral measures on Pyongyang in that period.
And yet, North Korea's nuclear weapons program has not only persisted but
flourished. The country also remains a dictatorship, with one of the worst
human rights records in the world. It seems obvious that sanctions on North
Korea have failed — so far, at least.
It's worth asking why, especially with another round of punitive measures on
the table. The good news is that there are two clear and logical theories
for why existing sanctions on North Korea haven't worked. But there's bad
news, too: At their core, the two theories are pretty different — and if
both are to be believed, they may imply contradictory policies.
Theory one: Sanctions have not hit North Korea hard enough.
The idea behind this theory is easy to grasp: North Korea hasn't been hit
hard enough by sanctions to steer it away from belligerence. Observers note
that life in North Korea, in economic terms, appears to have improved
significantly since 2006. “The sanctions were perfunctory,” former North
Korean official Ri Jong Ho, who defected, told The Washington Post earlier
this year.
This doesn't necessarily mean that the sanctions are not strict — notably,
the measures imposed by the United Nations in August did away with
precautions against causing humanitarian suffering. And North Korea's
apparent economic resilience can't fully be attributed to the economic
measures undertaken by Kim Jong Un, either, though those are important, too.
Instead, the biggest problem with the sanctions may be implementation. China
and Russia, two of North Korea's most important trading partners, have
often balked at fully implementing the sanctions. Even when China finally
agreed to meet the U.N. cap on coal imports from North Korea last year, some
suspected that Beijing was still dragging its feet.
Other countries may turn a blind eye, too. A recent U.N. report on North
Korea's economy suggested that there was plenty of blame to go around. For
example, when direct coal imports to China began to drop, Pyongyang began
rerouting this coal to other countries, including Malaysia and Vietnam. The
North Korean regime is also suspected of working on Syria's missile systems
and sending military trainers to African nations, including Angola and
Uganda.
“[A]s the sanctions regime expands, so does the scope of evasion,” the
report's authors noted. But if this problem could be addressed, it might
offer hope that sanctions could compel North Korea to change its behavior.
Theory two: North Korea's leadership doesn't care about sanctions.
A less hopeful theory posits that North Korea is impervious to sanctions
because … well, basically, because it's North Korea. Consider it this way:
Sanctions are designed to change a nation state's behavior through the use
of economic pressure. The idea is generally that the country's leaders will
ultimately decide that the economic cost of their behavior is too great and
switch course.
But North Korea isn't like any other country. Its leadership may not operate
the way we would expect it to. North Korea is one of the most closed-off
dictatorships the world has seen. Even seasoned observers of autocratic
states have expressed shock at the fervent adulation for the Kim dynasty in
the country. Under such a system, public opinion seems to have little effect
on Kim Jong Un.
“They'd rather eat grass than give up their nuclear program,” one high-
profile proponent of this theory, Russian President Vladimir Putin, said
recently.
Kim seems to view nuclear weapons as his only option against the United
States. These weapons would not only help him avoid being overthrown like
Libya's Moammar Gaddafi — a frequent reference point for North Korea — but
could also get U.S. forces out of South Korea and perhaps even reunite the
peninsula under Pyongyang's terms (sure, the latter scenario is unlikely,
but who in North Korea would tell Kim that?).
In fact, after surviving the devastation of the Korean War and the famine
during the 1990s, there is a sense among some North Korean officials that
the sacrifices imposed by the sanctions — or, worse, war — might be worth
it. “A lot of people would die,” one official recently told the New Yorker
's Evan Osnos. “But not everyone would die.”
The problem.
Which of these theories is more accurate? It may not be possible to say
definitively. Measuring the effectiveness of sanctions in any circumstances
is almost always difficult, let alone with regard to a country as secretive
and frequently duplicitous as North Korea. Meanwhile, we have little real
understanding of how Kim makes his decisions and what his private feelings
about sanctions are.
In some ways, both theories may be partially right. China has been reluctant
to sign off on an oil embargo against North Korea, in part because it
believes Pyongyang may view such a move as an existential threat and react
in an unexpected way.
But the differing theories point toward a worrying ambiguity. If North Korea
really is impervious to sanctions, imposing more such measures on the
country could be a waste of time and perhaps even counterproductive. At the
same time, if sanctions could actually change North Korea's behavior, the
skepticism of powerful critics like Putin undermines that enterprise and
bodes ill for their effectiveness.
【在 D********n 的大作中提到】
: 金三是个极其聪明，极富智慧的人物。
: 做事不但有胆略，而且有谋略。
: 每次挑衅，机会和时机都是恰当好处。
: 目前往后，金三稳坐高山之巅，笑看世界风云。
: 我国枭雄蒋公介石，早就给金三留下精囊妙计：
: 不投降，不谈判，不宣战。
: 只要自己家里喝着小酒，搂着老婆，做做美梦就行。
: 中、美、俄三国演义，紧锣密鼓，就要你死我活了。
: 所以，三胖的最后手段，就是不用任何手段。
: 不过，瞅住机会，时不时地放几个炮仗，以表示惬意，还是必要必须和必需的。
| D********n
发帖数: 1161 | 3 Zt.
北京大学国际关系学院院长教授贾庆国？就这个智力水平， 混到北大国际关系学院院
长？
华盛顿 —
联合国安理会星期一（9月11日）通过制裁朝鲜的最新决议。朝鲜此前发表声明强烈暗
示，将发起新一轮高强度的挑衅，称“已做好了不惜使用任何最后手段的准备”。美朝
战争似乎一触即发。 中国著名国际问题学者表示，中国也许该为美朝开战做好最坏的
打算了。
草案要求对朝鲜实施全面石油禁运、禁止雇用朝鲜海外劳工、冻结金正恩资产等等。新
决议剔除了这方面的要求。最后的决议也剔除有关在公海上强行拦截、检查朝鲜船只的
规定。
最新决议要求其成员国禁止向朝鲜出口天然气、液体油料以及固体油料，并对向朝鲜出
口的原油及其石油加工产品提出上限。
目前还不清楚朝鲜对最新决议的反应。面对美国提议的制裁草案，朝鲜外交部（外务省
）星期一发出声明，认为美方的活动已达到“极其冒险的地步”。朝中社的报道说，如
果美国在联合国安理会最终炮制出更为毒辣、非法无理的涉朝“制裁决议”，朝鲜必将
让美国付出相应的代价
中国学者：中国应该做好最坏的打算
面对美朝紧张关系的升级，中国一名著名国际问题学者，北京大学国际关系学院院长教
授贾庆国星期一在澳大利亚《东亚论坛》撰文说，也许到了做好做坏打算的时候了。
面对美朝紧张关系的升级，中国一名著名国际问题学者，北京大学国际关系学院院长教
授贾庆国星期一在澳大利亚《东亚论坛》撰文说，也许到了做好做坏打算的时候了。
他在文章中说，最新的事态发展令中国处理朝鲜问题的紧迫性增加。 他说，且不说美
国对朝鲜发动先发制人打击的可能性增强，即便是美国选择不这么做，美国对朝鲜制裁
的加强、军事演习的规模的扩大，令美朝军事冲突的可能性也加大，同时朝鲜爆发危机
的可能性也会增强。
贾庆国说，如果战争变成真正的可能，中国应该与美国和韩国讨论应急计划。 很长时
间以来，美国和韩国一直试图说服中国就应急计划举行讨论，但是中国总是因为担心这
样做会让朝鲜不安或是孤立朝鲜，所以一直拒绝接受这样的想法，但是，贾庆国说，考
虑到目前的事态发展，除了和华盛顿和首尔开始会谈外，中国没有更好的选择。
谁来控制朝鲜的核武库？
贾庆国认为，在应急会议中， 北京首先希望讨论的问题是：由谁来掌控朝鲜的核武库
，因为这些武器如果留在陷入一片政治混乱的朝鲜军队手中太危险了。
他觉得，中国可能并不反对由美国军方来接管这个工作，因为这样做第一会防止核扩散
，第二，朝鲜的核武器对中国来说并没有技术上的价值，但是管理费用却很高。
但是，他还说，中国可能会担心美国军队跨越朝鲜和韩国之间的军事分界线--38线，因
为这会令中国人想起1950年代的韩战。 为了达到某种平衡，他说，中国也有可能希望
由自己来管控朝鲜的核武库。他还认为， 因为核不扩散和费用这两点问题，美国也有
可能接受这样的条件，毕竟美国并没有中国这样的历史包袱，不会反对中国军队在朝鲜
采取这样的行动。
怎么处理朝鲜难民的问题？
贾庆国认为，中国希望与美韩讨论的第二个问题是预料中的难民问题。中国可能会接受
这样的建议： 由中国人民解放军跨过中朝边境，在那里建立一个安全区，安置难民，
为难民提供临时庇护，以避免大规模的难民涌入中国东北地区。
由谁维护朝鲜国内秩序？
贾庆国认为应急计划会议中要谈的第三个问题是，一旦危机爆发，由谁来恢复朝鲜国内
的秩序？ 是韩国军队？联合国维和部队，还是其他力量？他认为，中国可能会反对由
美国军队接管朝鲜，因为这样一来，美国军队不得不跨越“三八”线。
朝鲜半岛的未来如何？
贾庆国认为，美朝开战后，第四需要面对的问题是危机后朝鲜半岛的政治安排。到底是
由国际社会帮助朝鲜成立一个新的政府，还是支持联合国在朝鲜半岛进行全民公投，为
统一的朝鲜半岛做好准备。
“萨德”如何解决？
最后，贾庆国认为，北京想谈的是朝鲜核项目终止后，美韩撤走部署在朝鲜半岛的萨德
反导系统。 北京认为，在朝鲜半岛部署萨德威胁中国的安全，一直在敦促美国和韩国
撤走萨德。贾庆国认为，华盛顿和首尔很有可能接受这样方案，毕竟两国多次宣称，部
署萨德的目的只是针对朝鲜的核武器与导弹。
贾庆国说，就像以前一样，中国都不愿意面对朝鲜的危机局面，因为这样的局面包括核
战争、政治动荡、难民以及其他无法预测的负面结果，但是朝鲜半岛的局面恶化，北京
除了做最坏的打算没有别的选择。
【在 D********n 的大作中提到】
: 金三是个极其聪明，极富智慧的人物。
: 做事不但有胆略，而且有谋略。
: 每次挑衅，机会和时机都是恰当好处。
: 目前往后，金三稳坐高山之巅，笑看世界风云。
: 我国枭雄蒋公介石，早就给金三留下精囊妙计：
: 不投降，不谈判，不宣战。
: 只要自己家里喝着小酒，搂着老婆，做做美梦就行。
: 中、美、俄三国演义，紧锣密鼓，就要你死我活了。
: 所以，三胖的最后手段，就是不用任何手段。
: 不过，瞅住机会，时不时地放几个炮仗，以表示惬意，还是必要必须和必需的。
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