u***r
发帖数: 4825 | 1 https://www.rt.com/op-ed/488480-china-nuclear-arsenal-disarmament/
Scott Ritter
is a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer. He served in the Soviet
Union as an inspector implementing the INF Treaty, in General Schwarzkopf’s
staff during the Gulf War, and from 1991-1998 as a UN weapons inspector.
Follow him on Twitter @RealScottRitter
As the US threatens to withdraw from the New START treaty over Chinese non-
participation, domestic pressure from inside China builds for a larger
strategic nuclear arsenal. Could this be a good thing?
In an op-ed published in Chinese newspaper Global Times, its editor-in-chief
Hu Xijin, argued that China should seek to upgrade its strategic nuclear
arsenal from its current level of about 200 antiquated weapons to a
modernized force comprising more than 1,000 nuclear weapons, including more
than 100 modern mobile DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
each armed with 10-12 nuclear warheads, capable of striking the US mainland.
The deployment of DF-41 missiles, when combined with China’s new JL-3
submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed H-20 strategic
bombers, would give China a capable nuclear TRIAD that rivaled those of the
US and Russia.
While Hu Xijin’s op-ed received considerable support on Chinese social
media, there was some pushback. Zhao Tong, a senior fellow in nuclear policy
at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, based in Beijing, has
argued that even in a climate of deteriorating Sino-American relations, any
effort on the part of China to build a viable strategic nuclear arsenal on
par with that of the US was counterproductive and dangerous.
This point of view has a logic of de-escalation that is inherently
attractive, but when viewed in the larger context of global nuclear posture
where the US and Russian nuclear disarmament is held hostage by the current
non-participation of China in meaningful disarmament talks, any call for
China to maintain the nuclear status quo is in itself destabilizing.
The only way to bring China to the table for any meaningful arms control
agreement is for it to build up its nuclear arsenal to a level where
reciprocal cuts make sense for all involved parties. In short, nuclear
symmetry perversely requires that China in effect adopts an “escalate to de
-escalate” approach to arms control if disarmament is to have any political
viability.
There is a historical precedent for this kind of madness. When the Soviet
Union deployed the SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missile in the late
1970s, it unhinged the strategic nuclear balance in Europe. Both NATO and
the US were alarmed and pushed for arms control agreements that eliminated
so-called Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) from the arsenals of both the US
and the Soviet Union. In 1979 the US threatened to deploy advanced Pershing
II missiles and Ground-launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) into Europe to
offset the threat posed by the SS-20 missiles. The problem, however, was
that while the SS-20 missile was a reality, the Pershing II/GLCM weapons
were still in development stage and had yet to be deployed. From a purely
political perspective, there was no incentive for the Soviets to get rid of
the SS-20.
Instead, in November 1983, the US and NATO were compelled to go through with
the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM missiles to Europe, triggering
social and political unrest in the form of massive protests, and placed the
US-NATO alliance under considerable stress. Besides, by deploying these new
weapons into Europe, the US changed the very calculus of war — the Pershing
II, once launched, was less than 10 minutes flight time from Moscow,
reducing the time the Soviet command would have to react in a time of crisis
regarding the initiation of a general nuclear war.
In the end, the US and the Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty, eliminating
the SS-20, Pershing II, GLCM and other nuclear delivery systems, and in
doing so heralded a new age of relations between the two sides that helped
bring about the end of the Cold War. But the world had to be led to the edge
of a nuclear abyss before reason could prevail.
Today the US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals are capped at 1,550
nuclear delivery systems each by the limits set forth in the New START
Treaty. While both sides recognize the desirability of additional reductions
, the insistence on the part of the Trump administration that any future
arms control agreement on strategic nuclear weapons must include China has
thrown a monkey wrench in an arms control process which for decades has been
governed on the basis of US-Soviet/Russian bilateral agreements. Even
something as simple as extending the existing New START treaty for five
years in order to buy time for the complexities of transitioning bilateral
arms control structures into a new trilateral reality is unacceptable to
Washington.
As insane as it might appear, the Trump approach might provide the only
viable path forward regarding the possibility of meaningful trilateral arms
control between the US, Russia, and China. As things currently stand, the
failure to extend New START will eliminate constraints on the part of both
the US and Russia when it comes to fielding new strategic nuclear weapons.
This alone is a destabilizing and dangerous reality which, left to its own
devices, could lead to a new nuclear arms race which would make those of the
Cold War pale in comparison in terms of capability and lethality. The wild
card in this equation is China. As things currently stand, the small size
and relative lack of sophistication of China’s existing strategic nuclear
arsenal make it a virtual non-player when it comes to discussions of
symmetrical disarmament based upon historical TRIAD constructs (where
strategic nuclear capability is spread among manned bombers, land-based
ICBMs, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.)
China’s current nuclear force structure is heavily weighted toward
intermediate-range missiles. However, any nuclear modernization program that
saw China develop a viable TRIAD-based nuclear deterrence capability would
not only compel both Russia and the US to take into account a Chinese
strategic nuclear threat when building their respective post-New START
nuclear force structure, but also create real political incentive on the
part of all three nations to take the off-ramp from a path of nuclear
posture escalation and instead embrace the de-escalation of trilateral arms
control.
This, of course, is not the ideal situation. Trillions of dollars will be
expended by all three parties pursuing weapons whose only utility is to
create the conditions for their eventual elimination. But nuclear policy
historically has not been the purview of sane and rational thinking — one
only needs to refer to the deterrence model of “mutually assured
destruction (MAD)” to make that point.
In the early 1980s both the US and the Soviet Union knew that to escalate
tensions by deploying new INF weapons into Europe was an inherently
dangerous gambit. Indeed, on at least one occasion it nearly triggered a
general nuclear war. But in the end, it was the only politically viable path
toward eventual disarmament and the normalization of relations between the
US and the Soviet Union.
In the dangerous waters of a post-New START world, perhaps the only way to
navigate clear of the rocks and shoals of nuclear conflict is for China to
escalate its development of a viable strategic nuclear force in order to
enable the kind of meaningful trilateral strategic nuclear arms control the
world needs to survive. | u***r
发帖数: 4825 | 2 耐心读完了，总结一下，这是对胡锡进的一个回应。角度新颖。
中国加大、更新核武会短期升级、恶化（escalate），但是长期看，有助于推动中、美
、俄三方会谈，一起进行核武控制，反而可能有助于打破之前美俄核控谈判的僵局。所
以是"Escalate to de-escalte" | V*******n
发帖数: 1 | | l******t
发帖数: 55733 | 4 平衡以后的再平衡
【在 V*******n 的大作中提到】
: 没法看，啥傻逼逻辑？
| S**C
发帖数: 2964 | 5 Accept to be capped at a nuclear warheads level that is significantly below
US and Russia wouldn’t be in the China's interest.
Allowing China to match the current American level wouldn’t be in the U.S.
interest, nor US has any interest in shrinking its force to China's level.
China has never been keen at keeping a large nuclear force. | b*****l
发帖数: 1 | 6 战是为了止战
★ 发自iPhone App: ChinaWeb 1.1.5
【在 l******t 的大作中提到】
: 平衡以后的再平衡
| V********u
发帖数: 80 | 7 知识渊博
【在 b*****l 的大作中提到】
: 战是为了止战
:
: ★ 发自iPhone App: ChinaWeb 1.1.5
| c********i
发帖数: 942 | 8 不错，为中国加大核武库找了一个很好的理由
但是中国可以采取这样策略：自主扩大核武库到美国或俄罗斯核武库（取其大者）的约
80%，但是不加入核控谈判
就好比人民币自主绑定美元一样，核武库大小也采取自主绑定策略，绑定在80%左右。
当然特殊时期可以秘密突击扩大核武库，比如到1.5~2倍
这样的好处是
1，合理合法建设和拥有可与美俄匹敌和足够自卫的核武库，有理有利有节
2，不激化国际核武竞赛
3，拥有一定自由度和灵活度，不受三方核武条约限制，特殊时期可以突击核扩军 |
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