c********y
发帖数: 98 | 1 wwwwww......right now I'm having some doubts about the validity of the
question. I mean, China's case should really be categorized as
decentralization rather than federalism. Does decentralization require
institutionalization? I'm just too ignorant about the literature or other
countries' cases to answer this question at this moment. Anyone with any
illumination?
【 以下文字转载自 PoliticalScience 讨论区,原文如下 】
发信人: complexity (and rationality), 信区: PoliticalScience
标 题: market-preserving federalism in Ch | f*******n
发帖数: 588 | 2 It depends on how u define "institutionalization". In my opinion, the govern
mental bureacracy in China is based on the organization of party system. So,
u'd better focus on how the party system shapes the form and practice of Ch
inese government, i.e. both local and central, instead of accentrating the i
nstitutionalization of governmental bureaucracy per se.
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: wwwwww......right now I'm having some doubts about the validity of the
: question. I mean, China's case should really be categorized as
: decentralization rather than federalism. Does decentralization require
: institutionalization? I'm just too ignorant about the literature or other
: countries' cases to answer this question at this moment. Anyone with any
: illumination?
: 【 以下文字转载自 PoliticalScience 讨论区,原文如下 】
: 发信人: complexity (and rationality), 信区: PoliticalScience
: 标 题: market-preserving federalism in Ch
| a******o
发帖数: 1197 | 3 I think both of you make good points about allocation of authorities between
central and regional governments. Because I've gotta run in several minutes, I
just want to propose some discussion questions here:
1 Who or which province can defy the central government? Obviously, not all
regional governments can do that.
2 Is it possible to link the regional-central antagonism to the struggle
between cliques in the central government? A notorious example is the
"shanghai clique"
3 In Republican Chin
【在 f*******n 的大作中提到】
: It depends on how u define "institutionalization". In my opinion, the govern
: mental bureacracy in China is based on the organization of party system. So,
: u'd better focus on how the party system shapes the form and practice of Ch
: inese government, i.e. both local and central, instead of accentrating the i
: nstitutionalization of governmental bureaucracy per se.
| c********y
发帖数: 98 | 4 thanks for your good point. actually I was refering both to the party
bureaucracy and the government bureaucracy. I guess a provincial governer
alone is not able to defy the center, he/she has to do it together with the
party secretary. local policies are not decided by the governer alone. usually
the party secretary is more pivotal.
national
in
non-institutionalized
of
appointment
to
【在 f*******n 的大作中提到】
: It depends on how u define "institutionalization". In my opinion, the govern
: mental bureacracy in China is based on the organization of party system. So,
: u'd better focus on how the party system shapes the form and practice of Ch
: inese government, i.e. both local and central, instead of accentrating the i
: nstitutionalization of governmental bureaucracy per se.
| c********y
发帖数: 98 | 5 I think you've raised some important points. thanks.
1. it's actually very good that we have regional differences here, since they
can be used to test any potential theory. Say x, y, z are causes of the
durability of China's decentralization, then we can expect to see that if
province A has x, y, and z, then it wll defy the center more often that
province B, which does not have x, y, or z.
2. I've been thinking along the same line as well. I think it's an important
factor. seems an institutional
【在 a******o 的大作中提到】
: I think both of you make good points about allocation of authorities between
: central and regional governments. Because I've gotta run in several minutes, I
: just want to propose some discussion questions here:
: 1 Who or which province can defy the central government? Obviously, not all
: regional governments can do that.
: 2 Is it possible to link the regional-central antagonism to the struggle
: between cliques in the central government? A notorious example is the
: "shanghai clique"
: 3 In Republican Chin
| f*******n
发帖数: 588 | 6 Actually, in Han and Tang Dynasty, the local government has far more autonom
y than Song, Ming, Qing's local governments have. However, after the rise of
modern parties (e.g KMT, CCP) in the 20th Century, the historical trend to
build a modern political bureaucracy has severely strengthend the power of c
entral government. Modern political parties play a role of articulation in
the process at least. | f*******n
发帖数: 588 | 7 Right! Following this logic, now the issue seems to be "how the party member
identity conflicts and mutually relates with the governer identity in Chine
se politics". Empirically, how the decision-making process made by local gov
ernment becomes the key issue of this topic. The tuff thing is that we guys
may know little about it since we don't have enough data and documents :(
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: thanks for your good point. actually I was refering both to the party
: bureaucracy and the government bureaucracy. I guess a provincial governer
: alone is not able to defy the center, he/she has to do it together with the
: party secretary. local policies are not decided by the governer alone. usually
: the party secretary is more pivotal.
:
: national
: in
: non-institutionalized
: of
|
|
