Stock版 - 与其灌水，不如读巴菲特致股东信之2007年（中） |
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t******o
发帖数: 61 | 1 咱们书接上回。2007年致股东信，中篇（后面有可能有中下、中下下、下、末篇等，取
决于我的阅读进度）。
A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects
excellent returns on invested
capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will
repeatedly assault any business
“castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such
as a company’s being the lowcost
producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-
Cola, Gillette, American
Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with
“Roman Candles,” companies
whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.
Our criterion of “enduring” causes us to rule out companies in industries
prone to rapid and
continuous change. Though capitalism’s “creative destruction” is highly
beneficial for society, it precludes
investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will
eventually be no moat at all.
老巴这里阐述了护城河效应，这个词在投资界应该也很有名。他认为靠谱的生意都应该
有护城河以保护投资收益。每家公司的护城河不尽相同：Geico和Costco的护城河是低
价、可口可乐和Amex护城河是世界品牌效应。我们坚持的‘持久性’信条让我们排除了
那些经常变来变去的公司。因为这些公司一旦发生大的战略变化后，就需要重新建立护
城河，否则早晚挂掉。整天重建护城河，怎能是靠谱的业务呢。
这个应该成为我们选股的重要指导思想。版上很多人选股并非了解这家公司，比如一些
小药股，或者一些被热炒的股票，他们股价高不是因为自己有独特的竞争优势，也就是
护城河，早晚要跌下去。只有那些个有别人无法匹敌的优势的公司，才能基业长青。我
以前买过不少乱七八糟的中小公司，无一例外赔了，有些是短期有盈利，但后来的持仓
过程中，价格最终归于内在价值，又跌了下去。这两年我更加注重绩优股龙头股，比如
互联网的FANG和BAT，比如银行的JPM和AMEX，比如军工的LMT和BA等，虽然随着大盘涨
涨跌跌，但是时间拉长后，这些完爆大盘和其他股票，为啥，就因为巨大的竞争优势，
对手根本无法超越。
那么中小公司是不是没有优势了呢，也不一定。最近我在看的一支股票：DATA，其实就
是Tableau，世界领先的数据可视化公司。在这个领域保持市场份额第一，而且产品确
实好用，我也用过，周围不少朋友和同事公司都用。其他竞争者比如QlikView等，差得
很远，不论是市场上还是技术产品上。另外还有微软，但是作为一个大公司，真的在这
种快速变化的产品领域竞争力略显不足。数据可视化是个大蛋糕，而且增长迅速，随着
大数据和AI在传统行业的普及，可视化这种需求慢慢变成刚需。Tableau的品牌、产品
易用性、用户口碑、平台粘性，构成了他们的独特护城河。非常看好。
Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends
on having a great
manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and
at Berkshire we have an
abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of
dollars of value that would never
have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.
But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the
business itself cannot be deemed
great. A medical partnership led by your area’s premier brain surgeon may
enjoy outsized and growing
earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership’s moat
will go when the surgeon goes. You
can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you
can’t name its CEO.
需要补充的是，护城河不能依赖于某个CEO。如果这个CEO不干了，那么护城河就没了。
运营企业不能靠一个明星一样的CEO，这样没有持续性。靠谱的公司是，即便CEO换了，
他的护城河依然存在，竞争对手依然无法抢占他们的市场。一个例子就是Mayo Clinic
，世界知名的医疗机构，那么NB，可是你并不知道他的CEO是谁。这就是一个很好的例
子，蓬勃发展是公司，而不是CEO。
联想到当今的市场，这个理论其实需要辩证的来看。现在花街宠儿反而就是一些明星
CEO，其公司市值很多成分就是个人光环效应，最著名的比如Elon Musk，要不是他这种
主角光环，Tesla和太阳能早完了。即便是现在人人喊打的贾跃亭，当年不也是自带光
环的中国互联网创业明星吗？反观苹果，倒是一个很好的反例。当年靠乔布斯的光环效
应大卖特卖产品，有了独特的护城河，后来即便换了CEO，其产品和品牌优势依然存在
，这些年都成了宇宙第一市值了。当然了，也是因为android阵营手机一直不给力，各
种问题。苹果这种品牌+技术+用户体验的护城河，不管谁当CEO，短期内都是难以打破
的。但是时间长了，就不好说了。
再有一个例子就是2017年巴菲特购入的一堆航空股票，其实你也不知道他们的CEO都是
谁，但是他们有护城河，比如UA的廉价、Delta的低成本相对高质量的服务、AA的规模
等。但是当你把四大航空公司都买入时，相当于构建了另一个护城河——垄断。这四家
公司垄断了美国市场，别人都进不来，而且这四家背后的大股东都是同一帮人，避免了
他们内部恶性竞争压价。所以长期看来，航空业利润是有保证的，这种长期护城河很难
很难打破，除非美国像中国那样建高铁，但你我都知道，那是不可能的。
Now let’s move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that
grows rapidly, requires
significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no
money. Think airlines. Here a
durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the
Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a
farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his
successors a huge favor by
shooting Orville down.
The airline industry’s demand for capital ever since that first flight has
been insatiable. Investors
have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they
should have been repelled by it.
And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire
buy U.S. Air preferred stock in
1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin,
and before long our preferred
dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the
recurrent, but always
misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell
our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain.
In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.
To sum up, think of three types of “savings accounts.” The great one pays
an extraordinarily high
interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an
attractive rate of interest that will be
earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both
pays an inadequate interest rate
and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.
根据业务增长对资本的需求，有三种公司：依靠有限的资本就可以无限增长的，比如微
软和Google（是的，老巴提到了Google，但是他没买）；依靠持续的一定量的资本投入
，能实现利润成比例增长的，比如他旗下的电厂和能源输送业务等；最差的就是投入大
量资本，还没啥利润的。
第三种公司，他举了航空公司为例。1989年，Berkeshire买过US Air的股票，然后赔了
很多。航空业从飞机发明那天起，就需要大量的资本。想想也是，一架飞机要多少钱，
即便是采用租赁方式，租金也是天文数字；飞行员空姐地勤，这又是一大堆人力成本，
还不用提强大的公会；航空燃油消耗巨大，而且石油价格不断动荡，很难用期货的方法
来hedge。总之，航空业是个投资无底洞，高投入，低产出。
可是为啥2017年巴老师自己打脸，大量购入航空股呢？我猜最重要的一点就是，几十年
的不断兼并，已经是一个很稳定的四大公司深度控盘的垄断市场，竞争成本大大下降。
当然也有人分析是信用卡公司开卡优惠送出去的一大堆航空点数，但是那个只是暂时的
，长期来看，还是垄断优势已经确立，很长时间都不会改变了。 | a******n
发帖数: 206 | | T********e
发帖数: 1193 | 3 慢慢读。
such
【在 t******o 的大作中提到】
: 咱们书接上回。2007年致股东信，中篇（后面有可能有中下、中下下、下、末篇等，取
: 决于我的阅读进度）。
: A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects
: excellent returns on invested
: capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will
: repeatedly assault any business
: “castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such
: as a company’s being the lowcost
: producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-
: Cola, Gillette, American
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