a*****y
发帖数: 33185 | 1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
Formulation of the problem
Various formulations of the "hard problem":
"Why should physical processing give rise to any inner life at all?"
"How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience?"
"Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all?"
"Why do qualia exist?"
"Why is there a subjective component to experience?"
"Why aren't we philosophical zombies?"
Chalmers stated the problem as "why does the feeling which accompanies
awareness of sensory information exist at all?" in both The Conscious Mind (
1996) and in the paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" (The
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1995).
James Trefil notes that "it is the only major question in the sciences that
we don't even know how to ask."[6] | a*****y
发帖数: 33185 | 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception
is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being
except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When
a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any
pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch"
and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain).
【在 a*****y 的大作中提到】
: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
: Formulation of the problem
: Various formulations of the "hard problem":
: "Why should physical processing give rise to any inner life at all?"
: "How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience?"
: "Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all?"
: "Why do qualia exist?"
: "Why is there a subjective component to experience?"
: "Why aren't we philosophical zombies?"
: Chalmers stated the problem as "why does the feeling which accompanies
| l****u
发帖数: 2166 | 3 这些问题，听上去很深刻， 但是仍然建立在两元的基础上，不然的话， why not?
如果两元本来就illusion, 这个问题跟着就失去了意义， 对部队？
如果两元有如此多无法解决的问题， 是不是也是说明其不可信任的illusion.
【在 a*****y 的大作中提到】
: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
: A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception
: is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being
: except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When
: a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any
: pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch"
: and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain).
| a*****y
发帖数: 33185 | 4 这也是西方哲学在心物问题上的困境
【在 l****u 的大作中提到】
: 这些问题，听上去很深刻， 但是仍然建立在两元的基础上，不然的话， why not?
: 如果两元本来就illusion, 这个问题跟着就失去了意义， 对部队？
: 如果两元有如此多无法解决的问题， 是不是也是说明其不可信任的illusion.
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