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_pennystock版 - 大牛们帮我看看 CBEH ?
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1 (共1页)
l*******g
发帖数: 137
1
用reuter.com 上的screener 选了这个股 CBEH :China Integrated Energy, Inc
想长期持有, 不知道这个选择对不对?
我看了yahoo finance上的估计, 说未来5年回报率都是30% 左右。 不知道这个靠不靠
谱。
如果想长期持有, 大家一般是怎么选股的呢?
菜鸟一只, 大牛请指教。多谢多谢。
y*****l
发帖数: 5997
2
你说大牛,没人敢回答了.我们都是青蛙,玩短线的,长期拿不住.
你要想拿长期,也要挑一个美国的蓝筹,不要选中概.

【在 l*******g 的大作中提到】
: 用reuter.com 上的screener 选了这个股 CBEH :China Integrated Energy, Inc
: 想长期持有, 不知道这个选择对不对?
: 我看了yahoo finance上的估计, 说未来5年回报率都是30% 左右。 不知道这个靠不靠
: 谱。
: 如果想长期持有, 大家一般是怎么选股的呢?
: 菜鸟一只, 大牛请指教。多谢多谢。

b*p
发帖数: 242
3
不错,难得中概好股票,值得关注。等回调,八块左右可以慢慢入。

【在 l*******g 的大作中提到】
: 用reuter.com 上的screener 选了这个股 CBEH :China Integrated Energy, Inc
: 想长期持有, 不知道这个选择对不对?
: 我看了yahoo finance上的估计, 说未来5年回报率都是30% 左右。 不知道这个靠不靠
: 谱。
: 如果想长期持有, 大家一般是怎么选股的呢?
: 菜鸟一只, 大牛请指教。多谢多谢。

b*p
发帖数: 242
4
不知道preferred stock dilution是不是已经priced in了?

【在 b*p 的大作中提到】
: 不错,难得中概好股票,值得关注。等回调,八块左右可以慢慢入。
y*****l
发帖数: 5997
5
中概看起来都是"好"股票,很多作假账的.

【在 b*p 的大作中提到】
: 不错,难得中概好股票,值得关注。等回调,八块左右可以慢慢入。
K**********r
发帖数: 2640
6
5年30%要求并不苛刻啊。 涨到12就差不多了。怕就怕前5天30%,后5天-30%。
现在进csco等它涨回26也差不多30%了,而且还用不了那么久。
b*p
发帖数: 242
7
大概看了下sec filings中概中少有的正规。

【在 y*****l 的大作中提到】
: 中概看起来都是"好"股票,很多作假账的.
m*z
发帖数: 2356
8
绝对不靠谱.打死我也不信未来5年回报率都是30%.
如果看好ENERGY想长期持有,最稳健的应该是买ENERGY的ETF, 或基金. 而不是一只成交
量不到250K的中概.
m*z
发帖数: 2356
9
他是说每年都是30%. 也就5年后会涨到$35

【在 K**********r 的大作中提到】
: 5年30%要求并不苛刻啊。 涨到12就差不多了。怕就怕前5天30%,后5天-30%。
: 现在进csco等它涨回26也差不多30%了,而且还用不了那么久。

b*p
发帖数: 242
10
csco 现在看来非常诡异,不值得碰。半年内两次跳水。莫非是被妹妹用来拉大盘的?

【在 K**********r 的大作中提到】
: 5年30%要求并不苛刻啊。 涨到12就差不多了。怕就怕前5天30%,后5天-30%。
: 现在进csco等它涨回26也差不多30%了,而且还用不了那么久。

相关主题
股市太无语;3个月涨45%的神奇Portfolio (转载)China Marine Food Group (CMFO)是骗子公司?【ZZ】
5日早晨关注的股票9月13日新闻汇总
说说昨天的中概 (转载)目前形势下,蝌蚪的想法,牛蛙,青蛙,蝌蚪们指教
b*p
发帖数: 242
11
sec filings 显示公司处于成长扩张期,diluted earning per share 估计一块钱不到
一点今年,8块左右就是12.5%?clean balance sheet no long term debt。技术面上
没有压力,最近超买,等回调。大环境也不错,税收优惠,地域优势,国家发展中西部
。说句笑话,烧地沟油这个想法不错。

【在 m*z 的大作中提到】
: 绝对不靠谱.打死我也不信未来5年回报率都是30%.
: 如果看好ENERGY想长期持有,最稳健的应该是买ENERGY的ETF, 或基金. 而不是一只成交
: 量不到250K的中概.

y*****l
发帖数: 5997
12
你学金融的?看看ZSTN正规不正规?

【在 b*p 的大作中提到】
: 大概看了下sec filings中概中少有的正规。
b*p
发帖数: 242
13
不是。自己关注或者投资的股票这些公开的信息总是要看的吧,看多了横向比较比较就
知道了。zstn 做的报告是不错,不过看了之后没有什么买的欲望,感觉发展快到瓶颈
了,而且preferred stock conversion rate 是现股价的一半不到。

【在 y*****l 的大作中提到】
: 你学金融的?看看ZSTN正规不正规?
b*p
发帖数: 242
14
我改变主意了。这个公司有前科、不干净,就算有发展前景我也不打算碰了。浪费了我
好多时间。

【在 b*p 的大作中提到】
: sec filings 显示公司处于成长扩张期,diluted earning per share 估计一块钱不到
: 一点今年,8块左右就是12.5%?clean balance sheet no long term debt。技术面上
: 没有压力,最近超买,等回调。大环境也不错,税收优惠,地域优势,国家发展中西部
: 。说句笑话,烧地沟油这个想法不错。

b*p
发帖数: 242
15
Google Baidu cache 原文连接已经失效了。
另外借壳上市后解雇独立会计师,07年贿赂国有控股公司员工虽然数目不大用途也和公司本身没关系。
西安宝润?
悬赏分:0 - 解决时间:2010-9-24 21:03
西安市宝润实业发展有限公司, 西安宝润 这家公司如何?
提问者: 匿名
最佳答案
西安市宝润实业发展有限公司(以下简称 西安宝润)在 2010年3月 公布了 2009年的业
绩。 这份业绩在当今中国生物柴油领域非常不景气的大背景下显得非常突出,醒目。
它的总收入是 289.57 百万美元,毛利是 41.47 百万美元, 纯利是 37.87 百万美元
。纯利达到了 2.6 个亿人民币。 对于一家以生物柴油生产为主,辅以国内的加油站
的民营企业来说, 确实非常漂亮,非常完美,非常突出。 但是对于我们投资者来说,
我们关心的不是报表是不是 漂亮,而是它 是不是真实的。下面我们对西安市宝润实业
的领域和经营情况进行详细分析。
关于生物柴油
2009 年的生物柴油的生产形势到底如何呢?
2008年国际金融危机以后,国内生物柴油企业正遭遇前所未有的困境:国际油价长时间
处于低位,不少民营中小企业停产,民营大型企业的利润也逐渐缩小。
困境一是原料问题。目前国内生物柴油企业采用的原料也是废油。 据估计,全国现有
200万吨左右的废油,有不少企业在做生物柴油,使废油成了俏货。更何况,废油不仅
被用来制作生物柴油,还被用于化工行业。 因为 原料缺乏, 而且 价格高昂,不少企
业 处于停产的阶段。
几年前投资上亿元的江西新时代油脂工业有限公司(以下简称江西新时代),现在也处
于停产状态。2009年-5月-20 日,据国际新能源网 报道,在江西省九江市都昌县的蔡
岭示范园,空旷的园区之内可以见到3栋厂房。经周围修路的施工人员介绍,记者才知
道,这里是此前投资2.9亿元的江西最大 生物柴油企业——江西新时代油脂工业有限公
司。
昔日繁忙的生产车间,如今异常安静,偶尔传出几声麻雀的叫声。偌大的办公区内,除
了几名值班人员,也是空空荡荡。
“公司从去年10月起就停工了,”公司总经理应为敏接受《每日经济新闻》记者采访时
说。
得知记者想了解企业生物柴油的生产情况,应为敏倒出了心中的苦水:“现在公司发展
面临着一些困境,首先就是原料问题。”
江西新时代采用的原料也是废油。应为敏估计,全国现有200万吨左右的废油,有不少
企业在做生物柴油,使废油成了俏货。更何况,废油不仅被用来制作生物柴油,还被用
于化工行业。
“我们也清楚,一家真正做生物柴油的企业,必须有一块自己的原料基地,这就要种麻
风树、光皮树,进行林业开发,但这样一来,生产周期就会很长。我们也曾经试种过麻
风树,但最后它们被冻死了。”应为敏说。
第二个困境是销售。这是一个普遍问题。据悉,加油站所售的油,基本来自中石油、中
石化。民营企业很难进行大宗交易,使公司的生产规模受到了限制。
“我们的油很难进入加油站,”应为敏无奈地看了一眼窗外,“就像游击队一样,始终
进入不了销售的主渠道。我们的预想是10万吨的生产水平,现在只有3万吨的量。想实
现原来预想的扩张速度很难。”
据中投顾问统计,2005年我国生物柴油产能为10万吨;2006年增至24万吨;截至2007年
底,我国生物柴油年生产能力约为300万吨,但实际产能 仅为30万吨。2008年的具体数
据尚未出炉,但受国际金融危机、油价下跌等不利因素影响,预计将比2007年有所下降
,约为25万~30万吨。
困境第三是油价变脸 生物柴油遭殃
2005年至2007年,国际油价连续飙升,2008年1月3日突破100美元大关,2008年7月11日
,更创出了147.27美元的新高。
在国际油价疯涨的同时,人们发现,生物柴油相对于普通柴油有更大的利润空间,于是
很多企业蜂拥而上,争夺生物柴油市场。然而,油价并没有持续上涨,而是在连创新高
之后急剧下跌。截至本月19日,国际原油价格仍只有57美元左右。目前稳定在 75 美元
左右。
这时,疯狂上马生物柴油的企业开始出现问题,规模小、技术差、质量没有鉴定等问题
显露无遗。
全国生物柴油行业协作组专家委员宁守俭在接受 《每日经济新闻》记者采访时表示:
“当时由于柴油价格很高,国际预期的原油价格也很高,因此许多新能源项目被搞得热
火朝天;生物柴油项目由于原料来源广, 许多投资者把目光投向了它。许多企业在高
油价时盲目上马,到了低油价时就出现了各种问题。
事实上,除了国际原油的价格回落,国内地沟油价格上升也是生物柴油企业受困的一个
重要原因。
困境第四,利润不高。
“现在这个行业的利润已经不高了,国际油价最起码要两到三年才能走出低价。”丁以
钿预测,“目前政策方面有一种趋势,就是生物化工和生物柴油相结合,简单地说,就
是用生物柴油企业来生产化工产品。”
从外部因素来看,现在的资本市场也逼着生物柴油企业转型。丁以钿介绍,以前,国外
资本对生物柴油题材非常感兴趣,古杉等企业都是在那时融资上市的。而现 在,生物
柴油题材在国外投资者眼中已经失去了光彩。 从实际情况来看,这个行业的纯利肯定
是低于 10%,如果一个生物柴油的纯利能够 超过 10%,那已经是不可思议了。 正因为
,这个行业的利润偏低,所以国内的石油巨头: 中国石油,中国石化才不感兴趣。和
民营企业不同,行业内的龙头企业拥有天时、地利、人和。但他们对于生物柴油的发展
却并不积极,这是为什么呢?丁以钿分析 认为:“现在生物柴油的利润已经非常低,
激不起他们的兴趣。” 这就是真相。
生物柴油企业的现状是如何呢?据中投顾问的数据,全国现有生物柴油产能万吨以上生
产企业26家,其中产能小于5万吨的有13家,5万~10万吨的有7家, 达到和超过10万吨
的有6家。 西安市宝润声称 它们的产量是 10 万吨,但是它们用什么来做原料? 我们
还是来看看他们的总经理自己是如何说的?
2007年的7月,中国生物柴油网报道:油价上涨让西安宝润实业(集团)发展有限公司
(下称“宝润实业”)总裁 高新成 先生既喜且忧。
全文如下:
“喜的是:可用于替代石油的液体燃料如生物柴油等,将大有用武之地,而他的公司在
生物柴油的开发上已占得先机;忧的是:自己开发的生物柴油面对无人检测、认定、收
购的情况,可谓“报国无门”。
“自产自销”的生物柴油企业
成立于1999年底的宝润实业,最初只是一个成品油批发企业,目前已在西安、宝鸡、宁
夏、铜川等地拥有成品油和重油存库,以及铁路装车专用线,此外还有5个加油站。
因为看好生物质能源的发展前景,宝润实业几年前开始在此方面进行探索。在建成陕西
省内最大的地沟油回收中心之后,高新成急于找到一种更清洁高效的技术来生产生物质
能源。这时,媒体报道的一个关于用花椒子油生产生物柴油的消息,引起了高新成的极
大关注。
这项技术是西北林业科技大学林学院苏印泉教授研究掌握的,并申请了国家专利。高新
成立即前去“拜师学艺”,两人一拍即合,决定合作搞一个大的生物柴油项目。
目前,陕西境内一吨花椒子油的市场价是5000元/吨左右,宝润实业买进后的加工成本
大约是近1000元/吨,算下来生产一吨生物柴油的成本在6000元左右,但市场上每吨生
物柴油的售价却只有5200元。“成本倒挂很严重。”高新成说当前企业的处境非常艰难。
但更让他不满的还不是暂时的价格。生物柴油生产出来之后,高新成花钱请陕西省内一
家具有资质的专业石油检测机构进行了全面检测,该机构认为已达到欧Ⅲ标准。然而,
高新成却不知道该通过何种渠道直接让自己的产品进入市场消费,靓媳妇也找不到婆家。
于是,高新成找到中石油、中石化在陕西省内的加油站,问他们能否买进他的生物柴油
。对方告诉他,因为相关标准没出台,上面也没给他们明确答复,他们不能接收他。“
全文结束。
高新成总裁所说的情况绝对是真实的。那么到了 2009年,情况是不是大大好转了呢?
根本没有的事。 从某种意义上说,情况是更糟糕了。
更令人不可思议的是。福建古杉生物柴油股份公司是国内公认的龙头老大,产量最高。
它也是在美国的纽约证交所上市,它也公布了2009年的业绩,2009年 的总收入是 92.
01 百万美元, 而在2008年这一数字是 219.2 百万美元,2009年的亏损额达到了惊人
的 41.53 百万美元。 说明 这类企业在 2009年遭遇了多大的困难。 西安宝润公布的
2009年总收入却是创纪录的 289.57 百万美元,利润是 37.87 百万美元,大大超过行
业的第一名。 完全不可思议,难道西安宝润有 通天的本领和三头六臂?
2
回答者:匿名 2010-9-24 21:03
l*******g
发帖数: 137
16

呵呵, 你们可不都是大牛?!
我刚入门, 对你们讨论的都没什么概念。 以后慢慢学习。

【在 y*****l 的大作中提到】
: 你说大牛,没人敢回答了.我们都是青蛙,玩短线的,长期拿不住.
: 你要想拿长期,也要挑一个美国的蓝筹,不要选中概.

l*******g
发帖数: 137
17
是, 他的意思是每年30%

【在 m*z 的大作中提到】
: 他是说每年都是30%. 也就5年后会涨到$35
l*******g
发帖数: 137
18

呵呵, 我还以为中国的股票只要是在美国上市 就有保证呢
多谢多谢

【在 b*p 的大作中提到】
: 我改变主意了。这个公司有前科、不干净,就算有发展前景我也不打算碰了。浪费了我
: 好多时间。

y*****l
发帖数: 5997
19
你说zstn做的报告不错?雅虎上说作假账。听谁的?
http://seekingalpha.com/article/234338-zst-digital-networks-deceptive-business-bad-investment?source=yahoo
ZST Digital Networks: Deceptive Business, Bad Investment
ZST Digital Networks (ZSTN) came public in October 2009 and raised $25
million by offering 3.1m shares at $8 per share. The offering was led by
Rodman & Renshaw and Westpark Capital, two ubiquitous underwriters in the
market for bringing Chinese companies public in the U.S. through reverse
takeovers (RTOs).
There are plenty of recent examples of why investors should be highly
skeptical of purchasing shares in these Chinese RTO companies. Many lack
transparency, internal controls, exaggerate their financial performance and
assets, have weak governance, and in some cases are outright frauds. Look no
further than China-Biotics (CHBT), Orient Paper (ONP), Douyuan Printing (
DYP), China New Borun (BORN), China Marine Food Group (CMFO), Fuqi Int’l (
FUQI), and China Northeast Petroleum (NEP) as cautionary examples.
Upon a close examination of ZSTN’s business, financial model, and
governance we are highly skeptical that their business exists in the manner
it is being portrayed to U.S. investors, and believe ZSTN is a business of
dubious practices and investment merits. Our main concern is their depiction
to U.S. investors of a business generating superior sales and earnings
growth without any cash flow generation. Furthermore, their financial model
appears to favor customers, suppliers, and business partners at the expense
of shareholders. We also provide hard evidence through a comparison of their
SAIC financials to their SEC filings that indicate gross misrepresentation
of their financial condition.
What Is ZST Digital’s Business?
The company claims to derive revenues principally from sale of products
related to cable TV program distribution systems which include digital cable
TV network equipments and IPTV set-top boxes. The company also recently
entered the GPS market and sells devices, and GPS installation and
subscription services. At present, ZSTN’s main clients are broadcasting TV
bureaus and cable network operators serving various cities and counties in
the Henan Province.
Red Flag #1: Unusual Financial Model Reporting Strong Sales and EPS Strength
Without any Real Cash Flow Growth
Focusing first on their income statement, ZSTN is reporting that its sales
have grown from $28m in 2007 to over $100m in 2009. The company does not
disclose units sold or average sales prices (ASPs) per unit. This lack of
transparency makes it difficult to reconcile total sales, but by cross
referencing various pieces of information from company filings, many
inconsistencies and question marks appear. To illustrate, ZSTN reports that
its main products are IPTV set top boxes (STB), which accounted for 56% of
its total revenues in 2008 amounting to $31m of IPTV product sales.
Furthermore, according to slide 8 on their recently filed September 2010
investor presentation (see here), ZSTN says the 2008 market for its IPTV
product is 2 million households, and that it has 62.5% of the market. This
implies company sales of approximately 1.25 million units. As previously
discussed, ZSTN does not disclose its ASP, however, by checking various
pricing sources in China we can estimate a range of $50 - $150 per STB. This
allows us to imply a range of how many units they are actually selling. The
discrepancy in unit sales is quite startling and illustrated below:
click to enlarge images
Sales, general and administrative (SG&A) and R&D expenses also seem highly
unusual for a technology company growing as fast as ZSTN claims. Selling
expense is among the lowest we’ve seen for any growth company in our
experience. ZSTN’s selling expense margin was a minuscule 0.01% (1 basis
point) in 2007 and has grown to 0.6% (60 basis points) in the LTM 6/30/10
period. In other words, ZSTN spent a mere $30,000 to generate $28m in
revenues in 2007 and is now only spending $670,000 in selling expense for $
105m of revenues. It begs the question; do ZSTN’s products just sell
themselves?
G&A expenses are also unusually low for a business of this size. We’ve
heard the argument that wages and operating costs are low in China; however,
how low is low? According to the proxy statement, the CEO of this $100m
operation only makes $15,000/year. Likewise, R&D spending is typically the
life blood for a technology-based company; yet, ZSTN reports that it spent
nothing on R&D expense in 2008.
To get a better sense of just how unusual ZSTN’s reported SG&A and R&D
figures are, we have benchmarked them against a range of other Chinese
publicly listed technology companies. To our amazement, ZSTN not only is
reporting superior revenue growth in our sample set, but also the highest
sales per employee at $500,000, all while having both the lowest SG&A and R&
D margins.
Not surprisingly, given the reported cost structure and sales growth, ZSTN
is also reporting strong EPS growth of $0.49 in 2007 to $1.30 for the LTM 6/
31/10 period. However, as we’ll explore next, the earnings quality, as
measure by actual cash flow, is very low. By looking at the all-important
cash flow statement, the true story of ZSTN is revealed. Over the LTM 6/31/
10 period, the company’s cash from operations was -$4.1 million. Factoring
in capital expenditures, free cash flow was -$5.4 million.
Turning our attention to the balance sheet reveals the mystery behind ZSTN’
s lack of cash flow. For a company that claims to be capital and operating
efficient, the balance sheet tells the opposite story. The current assets of
the company are comprised mainly of cash, accounts receivables, and
advances to suppliers.
The trend of increasing accounts receivables and advances to suppliers is
very worrisome, and can be seen in the charts below. ZSTN reports having
both few customers and even fewer suppliers. Their top 5 customers account
for 31% of sales and they report that almost half of their receivables are
late by 30 days or more.
A quick calculation of ZSTN’s days receivable outstanding ratio shows it
takes them over 200 days to collect payment. The ratio’s trend has been
increasing at an alarming rate.
Alarming Trend of DRO Rising and DPO Falling Signals a Potential Working
Capital Crunch Inventories Mysteriously Low and Inventory Turnover High…

On the supplier side, ZSTN reports 3 key suppliers accounting for over 30%
of their purchases. While it’s hard to gauge the solvency/credibility of
these suppliers, any mishap with one of these counterparties could cause
significant problems for ZSTN in collecting the cash. ZSTN appears to freely
advance them large amounts of cash, and pay their invoices quickly. ZSTN
reported almost no accounts payable outstanding at the end of the quarter,
yet approximately $7.4 million in advances to suppliers. In our experience,
we’ve not seen any company manage working capital so inefficiently.
Perhaps the greatest mystery of all in ZSTN’s balance sheet is the question
of its inventory (or lack thereof). As of the last quarter, ZSTN carried
only $0.50 million of inventory on hand, and has not carried more than $1.50
million of inventory in the last 12 months. Yet, they manage to report over
$105 million of sales; this equates to an astronomical inventory turnover
ratio of ~200x!
The company says they subcontract all manufacturing on a turnkey basis, with
suppliers delivering fully assembled and tested products based on their
proprietary designs. This model they say allows them to have significantly
reduced capital requirements. We still don't understand how they avoid
taking the inventory onto the balance sheet since they ultimately contract
with their customers and take the risk of unsold inventory.
If ZSTN does not have to take inventory on to their balance sheet, then what
exact function does the company play in this industry? As illustrated
earlier, they definitely do not appear to be a leading edge technology
development company, since they spend almost nothing on R&D. Furthermore,
the company relies on only 1 patent in their business. As disclosed in their
filings, CEO Zhong Bo has legal ownership of just one patent in China that
they rely on in the operation of their business. On January 9, 2009, they
entered into a patent license agreement with him for the right to use the
patent.
The foregoing discussion merely begs the question: “What does ZSTN do?” It
appears they are just passing orders from customers to suppliers and acting
as a distributor. If they are purely a distributor, then their margins and
inventory turnover ratio is remarkable in comparison to leading multi-
billion dollar U.S. technology product distributors.
As the table below illustrates, profit margins average around 1.5% vs. ZSTN
’s reported 12.4% and inventory turnover ratios are closer to 12x as
opposed to ~200x.
ZSTN’s financial model appears to favor all its constituents except their
shareholders. As illustrated, since raising money from investors last year,
ZSTN has continued to grow its outstanding accounts receivables and advances
to suppliers, while reducing accounts payable to almost nothing.
Moreover, as we’ll explore later, it appears that cash is being siphoned
from the company by management to other outside entities. In return,
shareholders are being rewarded with reports of ever increasing sales and
net income, but no evidence of growth in cash generation.
Red Flag #2: 3 Auditors in 3 Years
ZSTN has changed its accountant/auditor a remarkable three times in only
three years. This fact is plainly disclosed by the company in its proxy
statement (see page 6 here). While not an indication of wrong-doing, this
repeated change should serve, at the very least, as a major red flag for any
potential investor. ZSTN recently appointed BDO China Li Xin Da Hua CPA Co.
, Ltd. to be their auditor in April 2010.
In FY09 they had Kempisty as their auditor and in 2008 they had AJ. Robbins,
PC. It’s noteworthy that ZSTN’s first two auditors, AJ Robbins and
Kempisty, are both U.S. based accountants with no presence in China, or
apparent expertise with Chinese companies noted on their websites.
Red Flag #3: Inexperienced CFO Running a Publicly Listed Company; Earnings
Already Restated Once
John Chen was appointed CFO in October 2009. According to his biography, he
does not have the requisite experience typically seen for CFOs of publicly
listed technology companies. He previously served as a banker with Brean
Murray and Global Hunter Securities (prolific underwriters of RTOs), neither
of which had any previous business relationship with ZSTN. Mr Chen is a
medical doctor by training, does not have a CPA or similar accounting degree
, and no apparent technology or cable product industry experience.
Furthermore, under his tenure as CFO the company has already had to restate
earnings once (see here).
Red Flag #4: No Indications that ZSTN’s Core IPTV Products Are Available to
Purchased Anywhere
Given the forgoing discussion of ZSTN’s impossibly remarkable financials,
we turn our attention back again to their products. Starting with their IPTV
set top boxes, we searched the internet looking for more information and
outlets to purchase their products. Our search for their ‘branded’ ZST
products resulted in absolutely nothing. We also searched by their local
name “Zhengzhou Shengyang Technology.”
We’ve provided the following links for the reader to verify our claims.
•See the company's website here. The website will be probably either 1
) be blocked by your browser due to concerns over malware; or 2) be
completely unavailable.
•Industry sources for IPTV STB manufacturers yield no results for ZST
’s ‘branded’ products (see here, here, here, here, here, here, and here).
Furthermore, in the company’s annual report, they claim that they have well
established distribution channels and regularly attend trade fairs for
electronic products to promote themselves (page 6, 10K). A quick check of
the fairs they mention, provide no indication they’ve attended any of the
recent fairs:
•Hong Kong Electronics Fair (here)
•CES Las Vegas (here)
•China Hi-Tech Fair (here)
Red Flag #5: Questionable New Business Line of GPS Products and Services
In late 2009, the company purchased certain 'technical know-how' related to
the GPS business for $190,136 (yes under $200,000 thousand). ZSTN says that
since Q4'09, they began providing GPS location and tracking services to
third parties, mainly automobile dealers and plan to participate in the GPS
service provider business by establishing a partnership with China Unicom (
CHU), a wireless network provider.
By the first 6 months of 2010, ZSTN is already reporting to be selling $6.6m
of GPS products with a 21% gross margin and $2.1m of GPS services with a 97
% reported gross margin. It seems almost improbable that within 6 months
ZSTN has established an entirely new business in which they have no prior
experience, and are generating almost $3.5m of gross margin. If our math is
correct, that's an astounding 3,582% annualized IRR on their investment!
The company has provided very limited disclosure as to how they have
achieved these remarkable results, but what is disclosed shows sizable
contradictions. To illustrate, the reported GPS products and services
revenues totaling almost $8.8 million diverges from their most recent
discussion of the business in their September 2010 investor presentation. As
slide 9 clearly indicates, ZSTN has captured only 3 contracts with product
sales totaling only $2.1 million and service fees totaling only $273,000 (
see here).
Many questions about this new GPS business remain unanswered. For example: 1
) Who sold them the technical know-how? 2) Who did they hire to help support
the tremendous growth of the business? 3) Who are the customers? 4) How
does this strategically fit with their other businesses? 5) Why are GPS
products such a hot growth area when they’ve been commercially available
already for many years around the world?
What is very clear, in our opinion, is that ZSTN’s core IPTV set-top box
business, if it really exists, is under pressure and will not grow at the
same rate that it’s currently being presented. The move into a seemingly
unrelated GPS products and services is a development investors should view
defensively.
Red Flag #6: ZSTN Is Vastly Understating Its Competition
In their 10-K, ZSTN names only Motorola (MOT), Cisco (CSCO), and Pace as
competitors. However, upon some simple fact checking, one quickly realizes
that ZSTN doesn’t make a single mention of any China-based competition!
Absent are ZTE, Huawei, UTStarcom, and a host of other significant players
in the Chinese market. We find it curious and highly unlikely that ZSTN
thinks that it doesn't compete against any of these much larger local
competitors. Oddly enough, by reviewing Pace's business you see that they
don't even have much of a presence in Asia/China and don't describe China as
being a core market for their products. If China were a great growth story
for Pace, we think they'd at least mention it in their annual report.
See China IPTV market research here.
See Pace's annual report, lacking any mention of China being a core market
for their business, here.
Red Flag #7: Corporate Governance and Shareholder Structure Major Concern
The last proxy reveals that Zhong Bo, the Chairmen and CEO, owns almost 43%
of the stock and can wield the entire decision making power over the company
. No director owns a single share in the company, and the CFO is the only
other member of the executive team owning shares (an insignificant 25,000
shares to be precise). There’s virtually no institutional support for the
stock other than the largely unknown underwriter Westpark Capital who
retained 6% of the stock offering.
The CEO is the father of Zhong Lin, the Chief Operating Officer, and also a
director of the company. Mr. Bo was kind enough to give his son Mr. Lin a $
285,000 retention bonus if he remains continuously employed with the company
for a period of 24 months. We note that no other members of management have
been awarded such generous retention bonuses. (See the Retention Agreement
From Father to Son here.)
Larger, and more mysterious, possible misappropriation of shareholder funds
are being funneled through outside ‘business development’ service
providers. To illustrate, in December 2009 ZSTN agreed to pay $1.55 million
to Finance Access, Inc. for “consulting, business development and
professional services.” Another two mysterious payments of $0.50 million
and $0.75 million were made in October 2009 to both Fabulous Worldwide
Limited and Practical Worldwide Limited, respectively, for providing “
business development services.”
We have not been able to find information on any of these three companies to
validate their existence. What is clear is that after almost 1 year since
these payments were made, ZSTN has not made a single announcement of any
business relationships resulting from these engagements.
•Finance Access Inc. Contract (here)
•Fabulous Worldwide Contract (here)
•Practical Worldwide Limited Contract (here)
We are skeptical that ZSTN shareholders got either “practical” or “
fabulous” services for these payments. To put into perspective the
magnitude of these three payments, totaling over $2.0 million, they are more
than 4.4x bigger than ZSTN has spent on research and development for its
products in that past 4 years!
Red Flag #8: SEC vs. SAIC Filing Comparison Shows Alarming Discrepancies
Perhaps the linchpin for our analysis is a comparison of what ZSTN is
reporting to China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC)
vs. what the company is reporting to the SEC and US investors; we’ve
presented them side-by-side for ease of comparison. The results are
astounding and provide further evidence that ZSTN’s business appears not to
be accurately portrayed to US investors. For those readers not familiar
with SAIC filing considerations and why they matter, an excellent discussion
is contained here.
The original SAIC Chinese and English translation versions are listed below:
Conclusion: ZSTN Should Be Viewed Extremely Cautiously as an Investment
We have illustrated more than a few questionable items to consider before
investing in ZSTN. We are highly skeptical that their business exists in the
manner it is being portrayed to U.S. investors. In our opinion, the
financial profile, governance and share structure have major deficiencies.
While, the stock valuation “looks cheap” on traditional valuation metrics
like Price/Earnings, EV/EBITDA, and EV/Sales, there are clearly many reasons
why.
The main concern is the lack of cash generation of this business, and a
financial model that appears to favor customers, suppliers, and creditors at
the expense of shareholders. The most alarming evidence we have indicating
the potential misrepresentation of their business is the big discrepancy
between SAIC and SEC financials showing extreme overstatement of revenues,
profits, and assets.
Furthermore, having had three auditors in three years, gives us grave
concern for the reliability of the financials.
We've seen numerous blow-ups recently in the Chinese RTO space. ZSTN fits
the mold of another RTO that is a time bomb waiting to explode.
Disclosure: Author is short ZSTN
About the author: Ben Axler Ben Axler is Managing Partner and co‐founder
of Spruce Point Capital Management, a New York‐based hedge fund that
specializes in cash‐rich, value equities and special situations. Prior to
founding the company, Mr. Axler spent eight years as an investment banker
advising, structuring and... More

【在 b*p 的大作中提到】
: 不是。自己关注或者投资的股票这些公开的信息总是要看的吧,看多了横向比较比较就
: 知道了。zstn 做的报告是不错,不过看了之后没有什么买的欲望,感觉发展快到瓶颈
: 了,而且preferred stock conversion rate 是现股价的一半不到。

m*z
发帖数: 2356
20
我看到借壳上市就更害怕了. 前一阵出事的FUQI也是借壳上市.
相关主题
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Almost $1 Billion Exits SPYMajor ETF List by Category
l*******g
发帖数: 137
21
多谢, 那看来我还是买ETF 或者基金了。大牛教教该怎么选ETF 或者基金呢? 我有
vanguard和
scottrade的账户, 在哪里买比较好呢?

【在 m*z 的大作中提到】
: 绝对不靠谱.打死我也不信未来5年回报率都是30%.
: 如果看好ENERGY想长期持有,最稳健的应该是买ENERGY的ETF, 或基金. 而不是一只成交
: 量不到250K的中概.

m*z
发帖数: 2356
22
现在油价太高, 不适合进场做长线. 看看有没有健康的回调先.
VANGUARD有一个ENERGY的FUND,但HOLD一年以上否则要扣1%.
ENERGY主要的ETF是XLE,别的还有:
Natural Resources Sector EFT List
Energy Select Sector SPDR Fund (XLE)
Market Vectors Gold Miners ETF (GDX)
Oil Services HOLDRS ETF (OIH)
SPDR S&P Metals and Mining ETF (XME)
2X↓ProShares UltraShort Oil & Gas Fund (DUG)
2X ProShares Ultra Oil & Gas Fund (DIG)
SPDR S&P Oil & Gas Exploration & Production ETF (XOP)
3X↓Direxion Energy Bear 3X - Triple-Leveraged ETF (ERY)
3X Direxion Energy Bull 3X - Triple-Leveraged ETF (ERX)
b*p
发帖数: 242
23
It is dubious (but don't forget the shorts or shorties hehe). The bottom
line is that their growth is likely leveling off. Their business model is
currently not sustainable (Set-top box is a one time deal and the future of
the GPS service is uncertain). And they are not very considerate of
shareholders.
But still, the prerequisite of investing in a company is the availability of
sec filings for me personally. Many US listed Chinese companies do very
poorly in this respect.
l*******g
发帖数: 137
24

多谢多谢。 我去好好研究研究

【在 m*z 的大作中提到】
: 现在油价太高, 不适合进场做长线. 看看有没有健康的回调先.
: VANGUARD有一个ENERGY的FUND,但HOLD一年以上否则要扣1%.
: ENERGY主要的ETF是XLE,别的还有:
: Natural Resources Sector EFT List
: Energy Select Sector SPDR Fund (XLE)
: Market Vectors Gold Miners ETF (GDX)
: Oil Services HOLDRS ETF (OIH)
: SPDR S&P Metals and Mining ETF (XME)
: 2X↓ProShares UltraShort Oil & Gas Fund (DUG)
: 2X ProShares Ultra Oil & Gas Fund (DIG)

h********r
发帖数: 668
25
How long will you wait? 5 years for CSCO?

【在 K**********r 的大作中提到】
: 5年30%要求并不苛刻啊。 涨到12就差不多了。怕就怕前5天30%,后5天-30%。
: 现在进csco等它涨回26也差不多30%了,而且还用不了那么久。

1 (共1页)
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