s*****a 发帖数: 353 | 1 请问有没有一些文献描述下面这样的情况,
在一个含有许多同质agent的经济环境下分别定义Competitive equilibrium,也就是所
有agent把价格认为是恒定的均衡,再定义一个Nash equilibrium,也就是所有agent考
虑他们自身market power的均衡,结果发现Nash equil. 与 competitive equil. 不同
(这不稀奇),且当agent数量向无穷多趋近时,Nash equil.也不收敛到competitive
equil.
有没有这种可能呢? | U*****e 发帖数: 2882 | 2 似乎没有
Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry
William Novshek
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Apr., 1980), pp. 473-486
competitive
【在 s*****a 的大作中提到】 : 请问有没有一些文献描述下面这样的情况, : 在一个含有许多同质agent的经济环境下分别定义Competitive equilibrium,也就是所 : 有agent把价格认为是恒定的均衡,再定义一个Nash equilibrium,也就是所有agent考 : 虑他们自身market power的均衡,结果发现Nash equil. 与 competitive equil. 不同 : (这不稀奇),且当agent数量向无穷多趋近时,Nash equil.也不收敛到competitive : equil. : 有没有这种可能呢?
| f******k 发帖数: 297 | 3 depends on the settings of the games, it is possible that NE does not
converge to CE. for example, see Schmeidler & Postelwaite "Approximate
efficiency of non-Walrasian Nash equilibria", Econometrica, 1978.
competitive
【在 s*****a 的大作中提到】 : 请问有没有一些文献描述下面这样的情况, : 在一个含有许多同质agent的经济环境下分别定义Competitive equilibrium,也就是所 : 有agent把价格认为是恒定的均衡,再定义一个Nash equilibrium,也就是所有agent考 : 虑他们自身market power的均衡,结果发现Nash equil. 与 competitive equil. 不同 : (这不稀奇),且当agent数量向无穷多趋近时,Nash equil.也不收敛到competitive : equil. : 有没有这种可能呢?
| s*****a 发帖数: 353 | 4 我粗略看了一下这篇文章,感觉说的还是NE趋近了CE啊,下面是它的原文
...The inefficiency should be negligible when each agent's trades are
negligible relative to the aggregate trade if this is to be a plausible
model. The object of this papter is to show such a result.
Since in any model with a finite number of traders, a specific trader cannot
be completely negligible, we should not expect to get complete efficiency
in such a case. Rather, when each agent is nearly negligible, the allocation
resulting from a Nash equilibrium sh
【在 f******k 的大作中提到】 : depends on the settings of the games, it is possible that NE does not : converge to CE. for example, see Schmeidler & Postelwaite "Approximate : efficiency of non-Walrasian Nash equilibria", Econometrica, 1978. : : competitive
| f******k 发帖数: 297 | 5 sorry, bad memory. that one proves NE converges to CE in a Cournot game
under some conditions.
The one that I wanted to mention is Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite,
Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange
Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-27,
January.
basically if the action set is the demand function, then usually you do not
get the convergence.
cannot
allocation
the
【在 s*****a 的大作中提到】 : 我粗略看了一下这篇文章,感觉说的还是NE趋近了CE啊,下面是它的原文 : ...The inefficiency should be negligible when each agent's trades are : negligible relative to the aggregate trade if this is to be a plausible : model. The object of this papter is to show such a result. : Since in any model with a finite number of traders, a specific trader cannot : be completely negligible, we should not expect to get complete efficiency : in such a case. Rather, when each agent is nearly negligible, the allocation : resulting from a Nash equilibrium sh
| s*****a 发帖数: 353 | 6 what do you mean by"the action set is the demand function"?
not
【在 f******k 的大作中提到】 : sorry, bad memory. that one proves NE converges to CE in a Cournot game : under some conditions. : The one that I wanted to mention is Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, : Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange : Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-27, : January. : basically if the action set is the demand function, then usually you do not : get the convergence. : : cannot
| f******k 发帖数: 297 | 7 means that each agent reports his demand function in the game.
【在 s*****a 的大作中提到】 : what do you mean by"the action set is the demand function"? : : not
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